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UK |
US |
CANADA |
| 1. Purpose of Intelligence and Security Agencies |
| Security Service equivalent |
Functions of Security Service set out in Security Service Act 1989 (amended by SSA '96):
protect national security
safeguard economic well- being of UK
support prevention/ detection of serious crime |
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) - component of Justice Department - dual role in counter- intelligence and law enforcement.
National Security Division of FBI responsible for countering espionage and terrorist threats in US and supporting CIA/NSA by collecting foreign intelligence within US. Also has power of arrest. |
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) governed by Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1984:
mandate to gather and advise on threats to national security. |
| SIS equivalent |
Functions of Secret Intelligence Service set out in Intelligence Services Act 1994 (ISA):
obtain/ provide information relating to actions/ intentions of persons outside UK
perform other tasks relating to actions/ intentions of such persons
But functions can only be exercised:
in interests of national security
in interests of economic well- being of UK
in support of prevention/ detection of serious crime |
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) established by National Security Act 1947:
provide accurate, comprehensive and timely foreign intelligence on national security topics
conduct counter- intelligence activities, special activities and other functions as directed by the President. |
No foreign intelligence service. (s16 CSIS Act lays down process for foreign intelligence tasking.) |
| GCHQ equivalent |
Functions of GCHQ set out in ISA '94:
monitor/ interfere with signals
provide advice/ assistance about languages/ cryptography
But functions can only be exercised:
in interests of national security
in interests of economic well- being of UK
in support of prevention/ detection of serious crime |
National Security Agency (NSA) founded in 1952:
intercepts and analyses foreign signals. |
Communications Security Establishment (CSE) (agency of Dept. of National Defence) not governed by legislative framework - mandate based on royal prerogative and order- in- council. |
| 2. Legal constraints on methods and targets |
| a) Property warrants |
Governed by SSA '89 (amended by SSA '96) and ISA '94
Warrants only issued if likely to be of 'substantial value' in carrying out statutory functions (see 1 above). Warrants in support of prevention/ detection of serious crime cannot relate to property in UK (unless involves violence, substantial financial gain or conducted by large number of people for common purpose). Secretary of State can authorise acts outside UK if necessary for proper discharge of any of SIS's functions (subject to certain safeguards); person carrying out act not then liable under criminal/ civil law of UK.
Warrants signed by Secretary of State (normally Home Secretary for Security Service, Foreign Secretary for SIS), or by senior official (valid for under 72 hours) but only in urgent cases and where expressly authorised by Secretary of State. |
Governed by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
Warrants issued only if 'probable cause' that target is foreign power or agent of foreign power and collection is for purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence.
Warrants authorised by special FISA court comprising selected Federal judges. Attorney General can in certain circumstances authorise by Executive Order searches/ warrants which would otherwise have required a warrant. |
Governed by CSISA '84.
Warrants issued only if 'reasonable grounds' for believing warrant required to investigate threat to national security.
Warrants approved personally by Solicitor General; then go before Federal Court judge. |
| b) Interception warrants |
Governed by Interception of Communications Act 1985.
Warrants issued only if necessary in: interests of national security; preventing/ detecting serious crime; safeguarding economic well- being. (But warrant for purpose of safeguarding economic well- being only considered necessary (and therefore granted) if information relates to acts/ intentions of person outside UK.)
Warrants signed by Secretary of State, or by senior official (valid for under 72 hours) but only in urgent cases and where expressly authorised by SofS. |
See 2a) above.
But communications which both originate and terminate outside US not regarded as 'US calls' and may be intercepted without warrant.
Would not normally target US citizens (would need warrant to do so). |
See 2a) above.
But interception of communications which both originate and terminate outside Canada does not require authorisation. Warrants only issued to CSIS - CSE then act on behalf of CSIS. |
| c) Establishing/holding files on individuals |
No statutory restrictions [Proposed that new Freedom of Information Bill will not cover Intelligence Agencies.] |
Can only establish and hold records on individuals relevant to conduct of authorised intelligence activities.
Freedom of Information Act enables individuals to ask to see files. May be given edited version, but Agency can choose neither to confirm nor deny that material has been withheld. |
Agencies subject to privacy and access to information legislation, but individuals have no right of access to files and not told whether or not file exists. Edited version of files may be made available but will be limited to information already in public domain. |
| 3. Oversight |
| a) Judicial checks |
No judicial involvement in granting of warrants.
Security Service Commissioner (Lord Justice Stuart- Smith), set up under SSA '89, reviews property warrants issued to Security Service; Intelligence Services Commissioner (Lord Justice Stuart- Smith), set up under ISA '94, reviews property warrants issued to SIS and GCHQ; Interception of Communications Commissioner (Lord Nolan), set up under IOCA '85, reviews interception warrants.
Each Commissioner:
- assists relevant Tribunal in investigating complaints
- makes annual report to Prime Minister (laid before Parliament)
- has statutory right of access to whatever documents/ information required to discharge functions (visit Agencies during year to check sample of warrants issued properly).
Agencies can be sued for unlawful actions, although primary method of recourse for individuals is to the Tribunals (see 4 below). |
FISA Court grants warrants.
Agencies can be sued for actions undertaken in course of official duties. |
Federal Court grants warrants.
Human Rights, Privacy and Information Commissioners can investigate activities of Agencies.
CSIS can be sued under Security Offences Act but must show unlawfulness and intention to commit; no prosecutions brought to date. |
| b) Executive oversight/ accountability |
Director General, Security Service reports to Home Secretary; Chief of SIS and Director, GCHQ report to Foreign Secretary. Home Office and Foreign Office officials can pursue issues with agreement of Head of relevant Agency.
Ministerial Committee on Intelligence Services (CSI) keeps under review policy on security and intelligence services, assisted by Permanent Secretaries' Committee on Intelligence Services (PSIS).
Remit of Joint Intelligence Committee includes 'to provide direction and keep under review organisation and working of intelligence activity to ensure efficiency, economy and prompt adaptation to changing requirements. ' Intelligence requirements set by JIC. SIS/ GCHQ performance reviewed annually by Intelligence Co- ordinator; Security Service reviewed by SO( SSPP). Reports go to CSI.
Intelligence and Security Committee makes annual report to Prime Minister. Edited version laid before Parliament. |
Agencies report to relevant Secretary. Head of the Intelligence Community reports to the President.
Inspectors General within each Agency report to Agency Directors. IGs' remit varies (some statutory) but primarily focus on compliance with laws/ rules; and identifying waste, fraud and abuse.
Inspection Division/ Oversight Board within Agencies with remit to review 'questionable' activities.
Intelligence Oversight Board reports to President on activities which may be illegal under US law - receives reports from Igs and Agencies (does not report to Congress).
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board assesses quality, quantity and adequacy of intelligence collection. Provides private advice to President (does not report to Congress). |
Director of CSIS responsible to Solicitor General for control and management of Service; and consults with Deputy Solicitor General on operational policy. Chief of CSE responsible to Minister of National Defence.
Inspector General reviews compliance with law by CSIS (acts as eyes and ears of executive) and carries out annual certification procedure. IG reports through Deputy Solicitor General to Solicitor General.
Commissioner for CSE reports to Minister for National Defence but mandate only relates to ensuring compliance with law.
Co- ordinator plays similar role to Co-ordinator in UK. |
| c) Legislative oversight |
Intelligence and Security Committee, set up by ISA '94, composed of 9 members of House of Commons and House of Lords. ISC members appointed by Prime Minister; make annual reports to Prime Minister and can report at other times on any matters relating to discharge of functions. Redacted version of annual reports laid before Parliament by Prime Minister.
Remit of ISC is to examine expenditure, administration and policy of Agencies.
Access to information set out in ISA '94 - restrictions on access to 'sensitive information' (sources, information about particular operations), but Agency Head and/ or Secretary of State can authorise disclosure if 'safe to do so'/' in public interest'. Guidelines on disclosure approved by Ministers in December 1994.
ISC has 3 full- time staff provided by the Cabinet Office. |
Congressional oversight committees (House and Senate) governed by Intelligence Oversight Act 1980 and Intelligence Authorisation Act 1993. Senate Committee has 19 members; House Committee has 16 members.
Remit of Committees is to authorise funding for intelligence activities; and conduct investigations, audits and inquiries as may be required.
Access is unrestricted. DCI has statutory duty to keep Committees 'fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities'. But Agencies not expected to reveal details of sources and methods. Committees receive IG reports.
Senate Committee has 35- 40 staff; House Committee has 25 staff. |
Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), set up under CSIS '84, acts as 'surrogate' of Parliament. Between 3 and 5 Privy Councillors (not members of House of Commons or Senate); appointed by Governor in Council.
Remit of Committee is to review performance of CSIS's duties and functions; investigate complaints from public; and consider reports concerning immigration and citizenship applications. Committee has authority to direct Inspector General to examine specific activities.
SIRC has access to all information under CSIS's control (except Cabinet confidences).
Staff of around 12. |
| 4. Individual recourse |
Members of public can complain:
- to Security Service Tribunal or Intelligence Services Tribunal if aggrieved by anything they believe Agencies have done in relation to them or their property
- to Interception of Communications Tribunal if they believe their communications have been intercepted
No right of access to files (see 2c) above) |
Public can raise issues with Oversight Committees, but Committees will not normally choose to become involved in individual cases.
Individuals may be given access to files (see 2c) above). |
Public can complain to:
- SIRC about any act or thing done by CSIS
- CSE Commissioner, but has limited powers to investigate complaints and cannot inform individual of findings.
Individuals may be given access to files (see 2c) above). |
| 5. Value for money |
Single Intelligence Vote (SIV): aggregate of Agencies' expenditure. PSIS scrutinises annual expenditure forecasts; submitted to Ministers who agree funding through SIV.
National Audit Office has full access to information subject to restrictions necessary to protect identities of certain sources of information and details of particularly sensitive operations. Reports to Chairman of Public Accounts Committee. NAO completes annual audit of SIV and has power to carry out value- for- money reviews of significant areas of expenditure.
ISC examines expenditure across the board, including resource allocation and
reaches value- for- money judgements on specific areas of inquiry. |
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) supervises budget for community as a whole (National Foreign Intelligence Programme).
GAO has no authority over intelligence budget - IGs responsible for auditing and investigating value- for- money issues.
Congressional oversight committees approve budget for intelligence activities. (Members of Oversight Committees only politicians involved in intelligence budget.) |
Auditor- General responsible for all government auditing, including intelligence community - reports to Public Accounts Committee. Does not carry out intelligence value- for- money studies.
Inspector General (for CSIS) and CSE Commissioner carry out value - for - money studies of operational areas. |
