Intelligence and Security Committee - Annual Report 1997-98Personnel Management Issues

 
 
Personnel Management Issues
 
30. Good personnel policies and practice are important in any organisation. In the intelligence and security Agencies, where the cost of failure may be very great, they are vital. Recent experiences on both sides of the Atlantic underline the importance of having a range of effective measures for dealing with staff problems as they arise, and of making every effort to address and resolve potential disaffection at an early stage. We therefore decided to continue the Committee's work in the last Parliament by taking a detailed look at the various procedures available to Agency staff with grievances or personal problems, and at some of the measures that might be taken in dealing with threats by disaffected staff to reveal sensitive national security information. We also inquired into a range of related personnel management issues, in particular the selection of new entrants to the services, and career management during the first few years in intelligence work and in the longer term. In so doing, we took evidence from the Heads of the Agencies, and from the Staff Counsellor to the Agencies, Sir Christopher France; we also conducted a series of 'sub-group' visits to each of the Agencies to discuss these issues in more depth with personnel staff involved at all levels.
 
Recruitment and probation
 
31. We began by examining the various methods of recruitment into the Agencies, both of mainstream intelligence officers and of the various specialist and administrative support staff. We questioned the Agency Heads on the relative merits, and use, of old methods of recruitment - for example, personal recommendation and the use of 'talent-spotters' - and new, including open recruitment campaigns and the use of recruitment consultants25. All three of the Agencies told us that they had adopted, as far as practicable, the Civil Service Code of Practice on recruitment, to help ensure that the procedures used are as open and fair as possible. We discussed, with those staff in the Agencies directly involved in the recruitment processes, the particular qualities and motivations of candidates for employment, and some of the ways in which these are tested during the recruitment process. These issues have a direct bearing on the management of the various occupational groups in the Agencies, most notably in areas of particular recruitment or retention difficulty. One such area for all three Agencies is that of lT specialists: in earlier reports, this Committee drew attention to critical shortages at GCHQ as high quality people were attracted away to industry by very substantial salary increases26. To some extent, particularly at GCHQ, the highly specialist and 'cutting edge' nature of the work helps to retain high skills, but this needs to be reinforced by greater pay flexibility for particular groups, and this is being introduced.
 
32. A particular challenge is faced during the probationary period of an individual's first years in the service. The Agencies cannot afford to carry passengers, and new staff are often used, and tested, in operational postings27 . This may expose them to challenging and possibly highly sensitive intelligence work at an early stage in their careers, thus placing a high premium on effective and supportive 'mentoring' and guidance, with regular assessments and feedback on performance. This is clearly not an ideal arrangement, but we accept that the Agencies may on occasion be forced to use relatively new staff in this way. We recommend that wherever possible early postings to the most sensitive areas of work should be avoided until there is clear evidence of an individual's qualities and commitment.
 
Dealing with problem cases
 
33. Changes in the Agencies' personnel management policies and practices over the last few years have been broadly in line with changes throughout the public sector and with evolving best practice outside. The Agencies are, for example, developing measures to increase personal responsibility for career development, including: placing a clear emphasis on the development of personal skills or competences to equip an individual for a wide range of jobs; continuous personal development, and the widespread use of open job advertising inside and, whenever possible, outside the department. Career progression is increasingly replacing promotional 'jumps' to more senior grades; and management is able to plan and effect staff deployments with a much clearer idea of individual aspirations, strengths and weaknesses28.
 
34. Despite these advances, however, and the development of more rigorous recruitment and enhanced vetting procedures, problem cases still occur. These appear to be relatively few in number but are often complicated in nature involving, for example, misconduct, medical issues, grievances over career progression and, on occasion, ethical concerns about some particular areas of intelligence activity. We have therefore been concerned to see whether those involved in handling such cases are adequately equipped to do so and, in particular, to take effective action whenever possible to resolve those problems that have potential to develop into security concerns.
 
35. There is a range of individuals or bodies, both inside and outside the Agencies, who may become involved in handling such problems (see table at Appendix 4), including: the individual's line manager, the grade manager in the Personnel Branch, training or security staff, occupational psychologists, or personal and financial counsellors. In addition to this range of management, we have also met the welfare staff now employed by each of the Agencies. We were impressed by the experience and commitment of this professionally trained group, whose role is to provide confidential support, advice and counselling on any problem, which in many cases will be a personal one.
 
36. In addition, since 1987 there has been an external Staff Counsellor, available to be consulted by any member of staff of the Agencies with anxieties relating to the work of his or her service. The Staff Counsellor was originally envisaged as handling 'ethical' problems, but his role has since been widened by mutual agreement with the Agency Heads to include the full range of management issues. On occasion, he is also called upon to help resolve problems arising from grievances held by former staff of the Agencies. Since the creation of the post in 1987, Sir Christopher France and his predecessors have handled some 149 cases: 102 from staff at GCHQ, 34 from SIS and 13 from the Security Service29. (We were told that these figures are partly a function of the relative size of the Agencies, but also of issues such as recent outsourcing at GCHQ, which generated a great deal of staff concern.) On the evidence we have taken, we are convinced of the continuing need for the Staff Counsellor, and of his important role in helping to resolve staff problems once internal procedures have been fully exhausted. The Agencies' management should make particular efforts to publicise his role and work, especially to staff with grievances or concerns which they do not feel have been adequately addressed internally and who may be thinking of leaving, or already have left, employment for this reason.
 
37. On our initial examination of this critical area, we conclude that responses to staff problems of whatever nature should be as early as practicable, and supportive. Ultimately, there are limits to what can be achieved if an individual nursing a grievance refuses to make use of any of the channels described above, or to accept the advice or assistance offered. In such cases, it may be necessary to look to ease the individual out of the service as early as practicable, offering assistance with resettlement - for example, in finding new employment - and making a particular effort, where there are security concerns, to keep in contact following departure.
 
38. The Committee also believes that everything possible should be done to ensure that employees of the Agencies have the same rights as employees elsewhere. One of these is access to industrial tribunals. Under current procedures, industrial tribunals may hear cases involving national security, in camera and possibly with the Tribunal President sitting alone. However, if this is deemed not to be sufficient protection where vital national security matters may be involved, the Secretary of State can issue a certificate preventing an individual from having access to a tribunal. The Tribunals established under the Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 were not set up to handle complaints involving staff of the Agencies, and have made clear their view that they are not adequately equipped to do so. We believe that it ought to be possible to constitute a tribunal of members and staff qualified to serve a normal industrial tribunal, but of the necessary integrity and security clearance to handle such potentially sensitive material, and we so recommend.
 

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