Italy
63. Italy is frequently held up as the locus classicus of the evils of a proportional system. It is certainly true that it practised a list system with a threshold of 2% on the basis of large regions for nearly fifty years from the establishment of the republic in 1946, and that this coincided with bewilderingly frequent changes of government. There were 29 switches of Prime Minister during this period, although the cast was revolving as well as large: 18 individuals headed the 29 governments. Paradoxically, there was also a considerable, arguably too much, stability of policy. The Christian Democrats, at least as broad as the Church of England, were always the core of every government, with a fringe of various coalition partners. The instability was essentially that of political personnel, which had the effect of rendering the political class somewhat irrelevant. The non-elected administrators, filling a vacuum, perhaps achieved more power than is healthy in a democracy. This was particularly true of the Banca d'Italia and of the Italian Foreign Ministry, both of which performed with distinction and consistency. Despite the frequent changes at the top there was a good deal more steadiness of Italian economic and foreign policy in, say, the twenty-five years from 1955 to 1980 than there was of British policy in these fields. And this showed itself both in a more successful Italian than British handling of relations with the European Community and of a much stronger Italian rate of economic growth. It is clear, however, that the Italians were concerned about the rapid turnover of governments, and attributed this at least in part the electoral system. As a result, they changed in 1993 to a variant of the German Additional Member System, not, as has been erroneously reported, to FPTP.
64. Underneath the electoral system, however, there were two deep fractures in Italian society. The first was that over a century after the exploits of Garibaldi's 'Thousand' the old Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, with its weak civic culture, remains fundamentally unintegrated into the successful Italy of the north and the centre. The second was that the Communist Party of Italy, while always more open, moderate and penetrating of bourgeois life (films and publishing for example) than was the French Communist party, nonetheless occupied for decades the awkward position of being sufficiently strong to block the emergence of any other mass opposition to the ruling Christian Democrats, while sufficiently 'way out' to make any government with Communist participation unacceptable to the Catholic Church, to the United States (always a crucial factor in post-war Italy) and maybe to the leaders of the European Community. As a result there could be no easy and natural alternation of governments in Italy, and with this major safety valve unavailable, a superficial instability provided a minor and unsatisfactory alternative. These two fractures have been a much more fundamental cause of Italian political weakness than has been its electoral system. That 1946-93 system was not however one which this Commission would contemplate recommending for Britain. Since then, the knot at the heart of Italian politics has been loosened by the old PCI (Communist Party of Italy, not to be confused with the rump Refundazione Communista) changing both its name and its policies, moving further into the mainstream, and becoming part of the 'Olive coalition' with which Romano Prodi has successfully governed for 2 1/2 years until this autumn. The rump party has however retained enough power to be the catalyst for defeating the Prodi Government by one vote earlier this month. Such a narrow defeat can, however, happen under almost any political and electoral system. It was exactly the fate which in 1979 met James Callaghan after only a few months longer in office.
France
65. On France the British Conservative party's powerful memorandum of evidence to us stated that "it is well-known that PR contributed to the instability of governments in the French Fourth Republic (which is why it was repealed in 1958)". Once again it is undeniable that the Fourth Republican list system did coincide with frequent changes of government - there were twenty in the twelve years between de Gaulle's two periods of power. And there was also, with the exception of Mendès-France's effective nine months in 1954-55, a persistent weakness of government. Nevertheless there were some significant achievements: the launch of the Schuman Plan, the modernisation of the French economy under the Commissariat du Plan, which laid the foundation for much of the economic success of the Fifth Republic, and the difficult but necessary withdrawal from Indo-China. The peculiar difficulty that the French had in winding down their colonial empire - with Algeria even more traumatic than Indo-China - was a continuing cause of weakness and instability. This, and the fact that each National Assembly for its five years of life was effectively immune from either the threat of dissolution or the responsibility, when it had defeated one government, for finding another (in sharp contrast with the duty laid upon the German Bundestag of not being able to vote out one government without providing another) had at least as much to do with the deficiencies of the régime as did the electoral system.
66. Furthermore, the experience of France in the lead up to the 1940 collapse makes it very difficult to lay the blame for national weakness at the door of a proportional electoral system. Between 1919 and 1927 France had got along under a proportional multi-member system known as scrutin de liste. Then it was changed for the last twelve years of that Republic to scrutin d'arrondissement, which was very similar to the British system with single member constituencies and simple pluralities, although with two ballots as in the France of today. As those twelve years terminated in the collapse of 1940 it could be argued that the agent of disaster was the switch to a single member majoritarian system. But it would be much wiser not to, and to recognise that there are factors more fundamental and more complicated than its electoral system in the strength or weakness of a nation and its régime, and that what can work well in certain countries and circumstances can work badly in others, and vice-versa. Fractured societies are more powerful than voting systems, good or bad, in producing failures of government.
New Zealand
67. The fourth overseas comparison which has recently come to be cited adversely to the case for electoral reform is that of New Zealand. New Zealand, which had previously used, with small modification, the FPTP system as currently practised in Britain, moved after the 1993 general election and a referendum to what is there called Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) and is very close to the German system with both countries using FPTP for constituency elections and a near-equal balance between constituency and list seats. The general election of 1996 is so far the only one in New Zealand to have been fought under the new rules. There have been wide reports of early disenchantment with the new system, which the Commission took sufficiently seriously to think it wise to send a delegation of three of its members to investigate. Their clear report was that while dissatisfaction might well lead to a further referendum (there was always provision for an early review) and some modification of the MMP system, it was the nearly unanimous opinion of politicians and other opinion makers that there was unlikely to be a simple reversion to FPTP. Such nearly unanimous punditry can of course be wrong. But there are nonetheless some substantial reasons for thinking that it may be modification of the new system rather than reversion to the old which the New Zealand electorate will favour. There are also some considerable lessons of relevance here to be drawn from striking a balance sheet of the pros and cons of the brief New Zealand experience.
68. Apparently on the adverse side of the balance sheet is the behaviour of the New Zealand First party. There is, however, at least an even chance that it would have held a hinge position even had the election been fought under the previous FPTP system. It was a new party, although containing a few old politicians, which in the 1996 general election campaigned vigorously against the National party government of Mr Bolger. And it was a substantial beneficiary of that campaign. It secured 17 seats (or 14.2% of the total), eleven of them by list rather than by direct election. This gave it a key position, with Labour on 37 seats, the National party on 44, the Alliance party on 13 and others on 9. It was not however much beyond their deserts, for they had secured 13 1/2 % of the votes. After an eight week interregnum New Zealand First then proceeded to form a coalition, not as had been expected with the Labour party, but with the National party, which they had so freely denounced during the campaign. Neither the delay not the apparent reversal of alliance created a good impression. Nor was it markedly beneficial to the fickle party. New Zealand First secured 5 (out of 20) Cabinet posts, but its poll rating fell quickly from 14% to 1%. The party has since split and partially withdrawn from the coalition.
69. There have been two other aspects of the new system which have militated against its popularity. The first was that it was associated with an increase in the size of the Parliament from 99 to 120 members. (This in relation to size of electorate would be equivalent to increasing a British House of Commons with already 1794 members to one of 2175.) It was not popular, for a lack of respect for existing MPs was a considerable factor in producing the referendum vote for a change. The electorate did not want more of them. The British House of Commons with a membership of 659 is today one of the biggest legislative assemblies in the world. Many think it would function better if smaller. That is well outside our terms of reference. But one conclusion we draw from the New Zealand experience is that we should avoid any solution which involves even a small increase in the size of the House of Commons.
70. The other factor which seems to have disappointed the New Zealand electorate has been the failure of the new system to produce any reduction in the rancour and bitterness of party politics. There was apparently a widespread desire and hope that MMP would lead to a more consensual political habit. This had been a marked feature of its near twin AMS in Germany. In the Federal Republic, with its elaborate system of power-sharing between Länder and not very centralised central government, and within the federal legislature between Bundestag and Bundesrat (the latter made up of Länder representatives, often with different parties in power in the different institutions), a consensual habit has become the dominant political culture.
71. New Zealand, on the other hand, with its unicameral legislature and weak local government, was unusually free of any such checks and balances. The public hope that the new system would lead to politicians taking more notice of their opponents has however been sadly disappointed. The 'shot-gun marriage' between National and New Zealand First, while producing only a parliamentary majority of one, nevertheless proceeded to govern with considerable intransigence. It seized the Speakership, the deputy Speakership and 15 out of 17 committee chairmanships, while also forcing through after minimal discussion a highly controversial budget and finance bill as well as other far from consensual legislation.
72. Considerable off-setting factors are however widely perceived in New Zealand. The first is that the current parliament is seen as being the most representative which has ever there been elected. The proportion of women members has risen to 30%, the Maoris have for the first time achieved a representation approximately equal to their numerical strength, and there is also a hitherto unknown presence of Asian and South Sea Islander MPs. Few in New Zealand would want to lose this better balance.
73. It is also the case that the New Zealand electorate seem to appreciate the greater degree of voter choice offered by the new system. In 1996 37% of those voting - a much higher proportion than in Germany - chose to split the party affiliation of their two votes, thereby liberating their choice of local members from their view of what party or combination should form the government of the country. Nor did they show any evidence of finding the new system confusing. 87% of them turned out to vote and cast valid ballots. For these reasons amongst others, while it is impossible to pretend that the country's early experience of MMP has been fortunate, it is unlikely that it will opt to go back to FPTP as opposed to some modification of the new system.
Australia
74. The next international comparison we make is perhaps the one with most resonance for the United Kingdom. Australia is often referred to as the most governed country in the world with three distinct, but interrelated layers of Government at local, regional and national or federal level. It is the latter in which we have most interest. At national level Australia is governed by a bicameral parliament with direct elections to both Houses. Members of the House of Representatives (the lower house) are elected using the Alternative Vote, or the Single Transferable Vote in single member constituencies as it sometimes called there, while members of the Senate (the upper house) are elected on a more proportional basis using the Single Transferable Vote in multi-member constituencies. Compulsory voting ensures that turn-out at elections is very high, generally exceeding 95%.
75. The relationship between the two Houses and their respective electoral systems is key to understanding Australia's polity. The systems operate in tandem to deliver stable government with constituency members elected on a majority vote and normally delivering 'single'-party majority Government in the House of Representatives (in Australia the National Party and Liberal Party are in almost indissoluble alliance which means that the Commonwealth is effectively a two-party society). Wider representation or proportionality is delivered through the Senate. Unlike the House of Lords vis-à-vis the House of Commons the Senate has broadly the same powers as the House of Representatives. This and the fact that it is rare for the Government to hold a majority in both Houses makes it a powerful check on the executive. The Australian electorate and politicians appear at ease with their electoral systems, which have on the whole worked effectively since 1919. In the October 1998 election Pauline Hanson's much apprehended extreme One Nation Party failed as a result of the Alternative Vote even to retain the seat of its leader, and the Liberal/National Alliance was returned to power with a working majority in the lower house, but as it had substantially fewer votes than the Labour Party, this was a still more perverse result than the British ones of 1951 or 1974.
FPTP Shared Mainly with North America and India
76. It is difficult to find in the post-1945 years examples beyond India, which is admittedly a big exception, although not one exhibiting great stability since the prestige of the Nehru/ Gandhi Congress party faded, of a country making an unfettered choice, as opposed to accepting an inheritance, in favour of FPTP. None of the new democracies of the first decade of freedom in central and eastern Europe appear to have contemplated going in that direction. If there is a trend, it is towards incorporating a degree of constituency representation, and in some cases moving away from pure proportionality (while retaining a significant proportional corrective mechanism).
77. FPTP we share with the United States and with Canada. The United States is of course the most powerful democracy in the world, with an impressive record of world leadership for nearly the past sixty years. On the other hand it is a presidential and not a parliamentary system in the British sense (which may be good or bad but weakens the comparison), its level of participation in elections, at barely 50% for Presidential elections and only 37% in the last mid-term Congressional elections, is appallingly low, and some would say that its system of government has not recently been a great advertisement for democratic maturity. The Canadian political record was for long an impressive one, but it has not recently produced much stability (the previously governing Conservative party was reduced to two seats at the 1989 election) or successful national unity. While it would be wrong to attribute the Quebec problem to FPTP, it would also be wrong to say that Canadian experience provides evidence for FPTP being a nationally unifying system.
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