Chapter Five: Solutions for Britain Without Constituency Changes
78. It is time to turn to the specifically British aspects of the issue. The problem here has obviously become more acute since the electoral watershed of the post-war period in 1974. Prior to the first of the two elections of that year British politics was overwhelmingly a two-party affair and although FPTP did not work perfectly (as in the perverse 1951 result, and in the bottling up of sporadic third party surges, which were only allowed to show themselves in by-elections) it did not represent a major and manifest unfairness between parties. Since that date approximately 20% of the voting public (26% in 1983) have turned away from the two-horse race( see Table 1 below). In these circumstances those who resist change have to argue that the preference of a fifth to a quarter of the nation is irresponsibly inimical to the British tradition, and that such a considerable proportion ought either to be forced back into a more acceptable pattern of behaviour or effectively ignored.
Table 1
|
| Year |
Conservatives |
Labour |
Liberals/
Lib Dems |
Nationalist
parties |
|
|
|
% vote |
% seats |
% vote |
% seats |
% vote |
% seats |
% vote |
% seats |
|
| 1945 |
39.8 |
33.3 |
48.3 |
61.4 |
9.1 |
1.9 |
0.2 |
- |
| 1950 |
43.5 |
47.7 |
46.1 |
50.4 |
9.1 |
1.4 |
0.1 |
- |
| 1951 |
48.0 |
51.4 |
48.8 |
47.2 |
2.5 |
1.0 |
0.1 |
- |
| 1955 |
49.7 |
54.6 |
46.4 |
44.0 |
2.7 |
1.0 |
0.2 |
- |
| 1959 |
49.4 |
57.9 |
43.8 |
41.0 |
5.9 |
1.0 |
0.4 |
- |
| 1964 |
43.4 |
48.3 |
44.1 |
50.3 |
11.2 |
1.4 |
0.5 |
- |
| 1966 |
41.9 |
40.2 |
47.9 |
57.6 |
8.5 |
1.9 |
0.7 |
- |
| 1970 |
46.4 |
52.4 |
43.0 |
45.6 |
7.5 |
1.0 |
1.3 |
0.2 |
| Feb'74 |
37.9 |
46.8 |
37.1 |
47.4 |
19.3 |
2.2 |
2.6 |
1.4 |
| Oct'74 |
35.8 |
43.6 |
39.2 |
50.2 |
18.3 |
2.1 |
3.5 |
2.2 |
| 1979 |
43.9 |
53.4 |
36.9 |
42.4 |
13.8 |
1.7 |
2.0 |
0.6 |
| 1983 |
42.4 |
61.0 |
27.6 |
32.0 |
25.4 |
3.5 |
1.5 |
0.6 |
| 1987 |
42.3 |
57.8 |
30.9 |
35.2 |
22.6 |
3.4 |
1.7 |
0.9 |
| 1992 |
41.9 |
51.6 |
34.3 |
41.6 |
17.9 |
3.1 |
2.3 |
1.0 |
| 1997 |
30.7 |
25.0 |
43.2 |
63.6 |
16.8 |
7.0 |
2.5 |
1.5 |
|
79. This is not an unarguable proposition. Indeed it can be and is argued, often with considerable force and some persuasiveness. But it requires as essential premises the views both that FPTP has served us peculiarly well, and that a deviation from it would be demonstrably deleterious. So far as the first is concerned it is undoubtedly true that Britain has long enjoyed an unusually stable parliamentary régime (broadening into a democracy between 1832 and 1918, or 1969 if age as well as class and sex enfranchisement are taken into account) and that this has on the whole been accompanied by a tolerant, decent and sometimes successful society. It is however much more difficult to argue that these qualities have been directly linked to the exact electoral system, and would have been gravely endangered if the recommendations of the 1917 Speaker's Conference for a mixture of the Single Transferable Vote in the big towns and cities and the Alternative Vote in the rest of the country, or the 1930 House of Commons endorsement of the Alternative Vote (rejected by the Lords) had been implemented. And if the criterion be economic success it would be still more difficult to argue that the British performance, particularly over the past 40 years, gives a clear endorsement to FPTP. Nor does the respect in which Parliament is currently held, or the turn-out at elections, or the degree of commitment to the political process exhibited, particularly by the young, constitute a ringing endorsement of the present system.
80. Against this background we have approached the question of what alternative system we should recommend for Britain. We do so by no means rejecting the achievements of the British political tradition, but being anxious to build upon and improve it, such flexible improvement being indeed very much part of the tradition. We do so also after observing the virtues and deficiencies of different systems abroad, without believing that any is perfect, but finding that there is nonetheless a lot to learn from objective comparative appraisal.
The Alternative Vote
81. The simplest change would be from FPTP to the Alternative Vote (henceforth referred to as AV). This meets several of our four criteria. It would fully maintain the link between MPs and a single geographical constituency. It would increase voter choice in the sense that it would enable voters to express their second and sometimes third or fourth preferences, and thus free them from a bifurcating choice between realistic and ideological commitment or, as it sometimes is called, voting tactically. There is not the slightest reason to think that AV would reduce the stability of government; it might indeed lead to larger parliamentary majorities. This is a formidable list of assets, particularly in the context of our terms of reference. And there are at least two further ones. AV would involve no change of constituency boundaries, and could thus be implemented from the moment that Parliament accepted a positive vote in a referendum. It would also virtually ensure that each MP commanded at least majority acquiescence within his constituency, which is far from being the case under FPTP, where as we have seen nearly a half of members have more opponents than supporters, and, exceptionally, a member can be elected (as in Inverness in 1992) with as little as 26% of the vote. However, it is necessary to acknowledge the argument that the second or subsequent preferences of a losing candidate, if they are decisive, are seen by some as carrying less value (and even as arising almost accidentally) and so contributing less to the legitimacy of the result, than first preference votes (or indeed the second preferences of the most powerful candidates).
82. Beyond this AV on its own suffers from a stark objection. It offers little prospect of a move towards greater proportionality, and in some circumstances, and those the ones which certainly prevailed at the last election and may well do so for at least the next one, it is even less proportional that FPTP. Simulations of how the 1997 result might have come out under AV suggest that it would have significantly increased the size of the already swollen Labour majority. A 'best guess' projection of the shape of the current Parliament under AV suggests on one highly reputable estimate the following outcome with the actual FPTP figures given in brackets after the projected figures: Labour 452 (419), Conservative 96 (165), Liberal Democrats 82 (46), others 29 (29). The overall Labour majority could thus have risen from 169 to 245. On another equally reputable estimate the figures are given as Labour 436, Conservatives 110, Liberal Democrats 84 and others 29, an overall majority this time of 213. On either basis an injustice to the Liberal Democrats would have been nearly two-thirds corrected (their strictly proportional entitlement was 111 seats) but at the price of a still greater injustice to the Conservatives. The Conservative 30.7% of the votes should strictly have given them 202 seats. Instead FPTP gave them 165 or 25% of the seats, whereas AV would have given them on one estimate only 96 (or 14.6% of the seats), and on the more favourable one from their point of view 110 seats (or 16.7% of the total).
83. The 1997 election, it can be argued, was far from typical. The scenario was the one most calculated to produce an exaggerated majority and to increase disproportionality. There was a strong desire to get rid of the incumbent government, the third party (Liberal Democrats) was much closer to the main Labour challenger than to the government, and many voters cared more about casting an anti-Conservative vote than about whether this would result in a Labour or a Liberal Democrat victory in their particular constituency. (This last factor, however, did not clearly add to the difference between a FPTP and an AV result, for many electors did a sort of 'do it yourself' AV and voted for whichever of the two opposition candidates they thought was the more effective challenger.) In the three previous elections, those of 1983, 1987 and 1992, AV would have had a less distorting effect on proportionality between the two main parties. For example, one estimate suggests that it would have led to a Conservative majority (with the actual FPTP result again given in brackets) of 27 (21) in 1992. But it would have avoided this distortion at the expense of being able to claim much less credit for correcting the adverse treatment of the third party. The Liberal Democrats would in 1992 have got only 31 or 4.8% of the seats for 19% of the vote.
84. Added to this, AV on its own, because it makes use exclusively of single-member constituencies, would fail to address several of the more significant defects of FPTP which we identified earlier. In particular, there would still be large tracts of the country which would be electoral deserts for major parties. Conservative voters in Scotland, for example, might only hope to influence the result through their second choice. And although AV would probably increase the number of marginal seats thus reducing the number of voters effectively excluded from influencing the overall result, most seats in the country would remain safe.
85. The Commission's conclusions from these and other pieces of evidence about the operation of AV are threefold. First, it does not address one of our most important terms of reference. So far from doing much to relieve disproportionality, it is capable of substantially adding to it. Second, its effects (on its own without any corrective mechanism) are disturbingly unpredictable. Third, it would in the circumstances of the last election, which even if untypical is necessarily the one most vivid in the recollection of the public, and very likely in the circumstances of the next one too, be unacceptably unfair to the Conservatives. Fairness in representation is a complex concept, as we have seen in paragraph 6, and one to which the upholders of FPTP do not appear to attach great importance. But it is one which, apart from anything else, inhibits a Commission appointed by a Labour government and presided over by a Liberal Democrat from recommending a solution which at the last election might have left the Conservatives with less than half of their proportional entitlement. We therefore reject the AV as on its own a solution despite what many see as its very considerable advantage of ensuring that every constituency member gains majority acquiescence.
The Supplementary Vote
86. With it there falls in our view, the Supplementary Vote or SV. It is a system close to AV, and is likely to produce a very similar result. As such it shares many of the disadvantages of AV and some of the advantages, although not the major one of making each MP, at the last count, a majority choice. Its essential difference from AV is that it allows the voter to exercise only a second choice, and not a third, a fourth or even a fifth one, and thus avoids these weak, even haphazard lower-grade choices, as some would argue, from occasionally illegitimately influencing the result. It is much more suited to a three rather than a four party political scenario, and would therefore cause special difficulties in Scotland and Wales. Essentially, however, the deficiencies which we regard as endemic to AV apply almost equally to SV. If they could be overcome, the choice, in England at any rate, between AV or SV would be a finely balanced one.
The Second Ballot System
87. A cousin of SV is the French system of two ballots or deuxième tour. This cannot be wholly convincingly dismissed by Labour and Conservatives opposed to any change in the electoral system for it is near to the method they have both recently used for the choice of their party leader, and therefore in many cases of an actual or future Prime Minister. These elections were in consequence peculiarly important, carrying a choice of far more moment for the limited parliamentary electorate than does a choice of local MP for the run of constituency voters. Yet neither Conservatives nor Labour have in any contested election this century thought of entrusting this grave decision to the vagaries of a FPTP system. Of course in an election for a single position, whether it be leader of a party, President of a Republic, or Mayor of London, the more complicated but at least arguably fairer systems, such as the Single Transferable Vote or the Additional Member System, are by definition inapplicable. If only one is to be elected it is not possible to achieve a balance. A true majoritarian decision is the best for which it is then possible to go.
88. Nevertheless, despite its place in British party history, the second ballot is not a solution which the Commission is disposed to recommend. It suffers from nearly all the deficiencies of AV. In addition, like SV, it does not guarantee that each MP has majority support or at least acquiescence. It would involve the British electorate going twice to the polls, with many of them showing a considerable reluctance to go even once. And it necessarily involves a poll being spread over a minimum of one week. Until 1918 British general elections were spread over a longer period than is the current French habit but because of staggered polling days in different constituencies and not because of a second ballot. Despite this precedent such a spread would be inimical to the quick, sharp change of government (when that is the verdict of the electorate) which has become the British practice since 1945.
The 'Weighted' Vote
89. It should however perhaps be mentioned in passing that there is another system operating entirely on existing constituencies, apart from those systems which have already been discussed and rejected, which has been advocated by a number of those providing us with written submissions. It is what might be called the "weighted vote member system". Members would be elected exactly as now, but where their party was under-represented nationally this would be corrected by giving them an additional voting strength in the division lobbies of the House of Commons. Thus, to take an extreme example, a Liberal Democrat (then Alliance) member in the 1983 Parliament would have been entitled to cast 7 1/2 votes in any division, and more typically, in the present Parliament a Conservative member would be entitled to 1 1/4 votes. Whether they would carry these numbers round their necks or on their backs, rather like prize bulls at an agricultural show, is not clear, but what is clear is that there would be great problems if one of these vote-heavy beasts were to find himself in a lobby different from his party leader and whips, or worse still, if he were permanently to lumber off across the floor. There would inevitably be the most excited attempts to re-corral him. And the ability sometimes to take independent action must surely be preserved, even encouraged, if MPs are not to become party automata.
90. Therefore, while we respect the ingenuity and conviction with which this weighted vote solution has been put forward, we think that it would arouse more mockery than enthusiasm and be incompatible with the practical working of a parliament.
Inevitable Consequence
91. The Commission therefore believes that it can only discharge its duty of providing the electorate with a valid alternative choice to FPTP and come nearest to meeting its four criteria by accepting some modification of the one constituency/one member pattern. Otherwise it could make no contribution to fulfilling requirement (i), that of 'broad proportionality' and not enough to requirement (iii), that for 'an extension of voter choice'. However in view of requirement (iv), 'the maintenance of a link between MPs and geographical constituencies', it will endeavour to make this modification as limited as is reasonably effective.
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