Chapter Eight: Related Issues
162. The report so far has concentrated on tracing the Commission's path towards recommending an alternative voting system to be put to the public in a referendum. We now turn to important related issues, which, although not strictly within the Commission's terms of reference, bear significantly on the conduct of the referendum and implementation of the new system.
Boundary Commissions
163. The role of the Boundary Commissions will be of key importance in implementing the voting system recommended in this report. There will be a need both to reduce the number of existing constituencies and to preserve the ratio of constituency to Top-up members. The Commission recommends that, both to ensure the stability of the ratio of constituency to Top-up members and to curb the tendency for the size of the House of Commons to creep up, the Boundary Commission should work to the present fixed number of MPs.
164. Paragraphs 40 to 43 of this report identified the problem of bias under the existing system, two sources of which are the over-representation of Scotland and Wales and inequality of constituency size. We note that the Government has already undertaken that, in reviewing the distribution of seats in Scotland, the Boundary Commission will not be required to have regard to the existing statutory minimum number of seats for Scotland. It may be thought appropriate to correct the similar situation which exists in Wales. We also recommend that any changes to the Boundary Commissions' criteria have regard to the need to correct sources of bias, for example, by moving to the use of a single electoral quota for the United Kingdom as a whole. The nature of the Top-up system we recommend, which will require that constituencies follow the boundaries of counties and chosen metropolitan areas, will indeed place some further restriction on the flexibility of Boundary Commissions in achieving constituencies of equal size. We do, however, consider that the ability of the Boundary Commissions to prevent their work becoming quickly out of date would be assisted by the statutory power to take account of projections of population changes.
165. We also recommend, in order to achieve the objectives set out above, that there be greater co-ordination of the work of the separate Boundary Commissions for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and that this function should be entrusted to an Electoral Commission which we discuss in paragraph 167-8.
Oversight of Electoral Matters and Conduct of the Referendum
166. In the course of the Commission's work, many compelling representations have been made of the need for independent oversight of electoral administration and related matters, and in particular of the conduct of referendums. The representations have without exception placed strong emphasis on the need for a publicly-funded (and therefore impartially informative rather than partisan) civic education programme to prepare the general public for the decision they would be asked to make in the referendum on the voting system which should follow this report.
167. We make two particular recommendations. First, the oversight of elections and electoral administration generally should be undertaken independently of government by an Electoral Commission. Although our elections are generally free and fairly conducted the rules governing their administration and conduct are outdated, complicated and inefficient. The case for such a commission is made forcefully by Professor David Butler in the Hansard Society report "The Case for an Electoral Commission - Keeping Electoral Law Up-to-date" which was published in February 1998. We hope the Government will accept the Neill Committee's recommendation that such a body should be established, but we accept that this may not be in place in time to inform early decisions on the system resulting from this report. We believe that an Electoral Commission could play a crucial role in preparing for implementation of the new system and, in the longer term, in monitoring its practical impact and advising Government and Parliament on the need for any adjustment.
168. Second, we strongly support the practical guidelines set down in the Report of the Commission on the Conduct of Referendums, chaired by Sir Patrick Nairne under the aegis of the Constitution Unit and the Electoral Reform Society. In particular we urge the Government to accept the recommendation, echoed by the Neill Committee, for an independent body to oversee the conduct of referendums, although we think that the Government should be entitled firmly to express its own view in any such referendum. It seems to us that an Electoral Commission would be best placed to discharge this role in relation to the referendum on the voting system. But if this is not in place we recommend that an independent Referendum Commission should be established to oversee the conduct of the referendum and, in the run up, the planning and oversight of the civic education programme, which we see as essential. It could also advise on the wording of the question. The success of the referendum could depend on the question being clear, simple and not open to legal challenge.
Arrangements for Reviewing the Electoral System
169. Another point made forcefully to us by many of our interlocutors, particularly overseas, was the need for a review of the new electoral system after it has been in operation for a reasonable period. The Conservative party's submission to the Commission calls for a further referendum after 10 years. Without endorsing such an advance commitment we believe strongly that a review process is desirable. First, we believe that a commitment to a review will encourage the accumulation of evidence from practical experiences as the system settles down. And second, the certainty of an objective review after a set period of time will help to stabilise the system in its early years.
170. We therefore recommend that a review should take place after, say, two general elections have taken place under the new system. Decisions as to the body responsible for conducting the review will be for the Government and Parliament. If, as we hope, an Electoral Commission has been established, that body would be in a position to offer useful advice on the arrangements for such a review, and maybe even conduct the review itself. We strongly recommend that fundamental change, such as substantially increasing or decreasing the ratio of Top-up members or a return to FPTP, should not be introduced without a further referendum.
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