| The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry | |||
CHAPTER THIRTEEN - continued THE FIRST SENIOR INVESTIGATING OFFICER CLIFFORD NORRIS 13.52 There has been much debate about the motive to be attributed to Mr Crampton. Mr Mansfield roundly suggests that there were plenty of grounds to arrest by 24 April and that Mr Crampton deliberately did not arrest. The suggestion made, in plain terms, is that "What you were doing over that weekend was fudging it all, quite deliberately, and then you do exactly the same on the Monday morning so that you ensure no arrests and no identification". In other words Mr Mansfield suggested to Mr Crampton that he had for sinister reasons held back and formed a negative strategy, and that he had passed on this legacy to Mr Weeden, in the knowledge that it was likely that this strategy would be carried on. This introduces into the case the prolonged and serious investigation of the possible connection between Mr Crampton and Clifford Norris, the father of the suspect David Norris. Mr Mansfield's allegation against Mr Crampton is clear and uncompromising. He says that either through fear of Clifford Norris, or for corrupt reasons, Mr Crampton was influenced by his knowledge of Clifford Norris and his probable connection direct or indirect with Mr Norris and his family. 13.53 It is of course a notable coincidence that when Mr Crampton was given the short term duty of investigating the Stephen Lawrence murder he was actually engaged in connection with the trial of a man who was alleged to have killed a man called David Norris, an informant, sometime previously. The trial in connection with David Norris' death was starting at the Central Criminal Court, and it was to that trial that Mr Crampton had to go on Monday 26 April. That murder case involved drugs and was obviously in the high register of crime. Plainly the name "David Norris" must have been in the forefront of Mr Crampton's mind over the relevant weekend. Furthermore, Mr Crampton accepted that the "Deptford Norrises with Clifford at their head were notorious at the time". In addition, Mr Crampton was of course aware of the suggestion that the dead David Norris was connected by some family relationship with Clifford Norris and his brother Alexander Norris. 13.54 Both Clifford Norris and Alexander Norris had become involved in allegations of major crime, involving drugs and murder, from around 1987 onwards. Before that the criminal records of Clifford Norris do not disclose that he was a major criminal, certainly in the sense that he had not been arrested for major crimes. But in 1987 and thereafter he became involved in high level drug activity. Alexander Norris was in fact arrested in 1988, long before Clifford Norris, and Alexander was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment in 1989. Furthermore, Alexander was ordered to forfeit more than £750,000 in connection with his drug dealing activities, and an alternative sentence of an additional five years was imposed upon him. 13.55 Clifford Norris had evaded arrest in June 1988, and in 1993 he was known by the police to be wanted by the Customs & Excise in connection with major drug offences. Eventually he was arrested on the orders of Mr Mellish in 1994. 13.56 During the investigation into the David Norris murder Mr Crampton knew that the dead man had claimed to police officers that he was a cousin of Clifford Norris. Indeed this matter was positively investigated, and statements were taken from the dead man's two brothers which have been seen by the Inquiry. Both brothers deny that there was any relationship between them and Clifford Norris. Of course this is not conclusive, since the two live brothers may be wrong and the dead brother may have been right. Searches at Somerset House do seem to confirm that there is no close blood relationship between the dead David Norris and Clifford Norris. Be that as it may it is plain that Mr Crampton knew that there was a suggested relationship in the sense that David Norris had claimed when he was stopped by police in the company of a man called Gary French that he was a cousin of Clifford Norris. Gary French's sister is apparently married to Alexander Norris. So that there was an oblique connection by marriage between the families involved. 13.57 The real significance of this however is that Mr Crampton indicated emphatically to this Inquiry that he did not between 23 and 26 April make the connection in his own mind between the young 17 year old David Norris, who was named by several informants, and the villainous Clifford Norris. Mr Mansfield regularly returned to the suggestion that it was inconceivable that such a connection was not made. Mr Crampton was equally positive that he did not make the connection, although he accepted that he knew about the existence of Clifford Norris and his notoriety. SERGEANT XX 13.58 As the cross examination developed a further connection emerged, which is of great concern to the Lawrence family. Information from the Customs & Excise was given to the MPS in 1988, in connection with their investigation of Clifford and Alexander Norris, namely that Clifford and Alexander were associating with a Flying Squad Detective Sergeant who we have referred to as Sergeant XX. That Sergeant was seen on four occasions in company with one or both of the Norrises in public houses at a time when both Norrises were under observation and investigation by the Customs & Excise. That matter was reported to the MPS, and a comprehensive inquiry took place leading to disciplinary proceedings being brought against Sergeant XX. 13.59 It has to be noted that the disciplinary proceedings were not brought in connection with the association with Clifford Norris and his brother. Although Sergeant XX had been seen in most suspicious circumstances with the Norrises, that association was not the subject of a charge under the discipline code. The documents show that the Sergeant was warned as to his behaviour in that regard, and the facts of the association were thus never pursued in disciplinary proceedings. Sergeant XX denied any corrupt motive for the association and stated that he was seeking to develop Clifford Norris as an informant. Since this assertion was never tested in formal disciplinary hearings no firm conclusion appears to have been reached by the MPS as to the real nature and motivation of Sergeant XX's involvement with Clifford Norris. It seems to us right that we should register our concern that this aspect of Sergeant XX's association with Clifford Norris was not formally pursued and that the disciplinary penalties which were subsequently imposed appear lax, particularly since they resulted in the continued employment of Sergeant XX in the CID in the same area of London. Regardless of the fact that the association was not subject to formal discipline procedures it was plainly highly suspect. 13.60 A connection between Sergeant XX and Mr Crampton was apparently known to his supervisors before this Inquiry, and emerged in the course of the evidence of Mr Crampton. It was discovered from the complaints file in connection with Sergeant XX that Mr Crampton had given a reference to the Disciplinary Board which dealt with Sergeant XX in 1989. That reference is in the form of a written statement, setting out a "professional" reference indicating that in Mr Crampton's view the officer was to be commended for his work, and indeed for his honesty during the time when he served under Mr Crampton in 1987. At that time Sergeant XX was stationed in south-east London, and he was serving immediately under Mr Crampton. 13.61 Understandably this aspect of the case was pursued during our Inquiry over a considerable time. Furthermore, at the behest of the Inquiry all the relevant intelligence files in connection with Clifford Norris were obtained by the Inquiry, as were the personal files of the senior officers including Mr Crampton. These have been most carefully surveyed by all four members of the Inquiry team. These documents include a full report of the disciplinary investigation carried out into Sergeant XX by Superintendent Button. They also include the statement of Sergeant XX in connection with the disciplinary matters. Sergeant XX was in fact disciplined in connection with false entries on his duty state and other matters connected with his absence from duty, when he was supposedly at court, during the same period as he was associating with the Norrises. Sergeant XX was required to resign by the Disciplinary Board, but at a later appeal before an Assistant Commissioner he was allowed to continue his service, but was reduced to the rank of Detective Constable. We are bound to say that having seen the discipline file this appeal decision was unduly lenient. Assistant Commissioner Johnston appeared during his evidence to share our view. 13.62 The question of course is whether that connection between Mr Crampton and Sergeant XX involves any reverberation or connection which should persuade this Inquiry that Mr Crampton is more closely involved with Clifford Norris than he is prepared to say. 13.63 Mr Crampton's evidence in this regard is categorical. He says that he simply did not know of the association between Sergeant XX and the Norrises, since of course the disciplinary proceedings did not involve that specific allegation. Mr Mansfield tested Mr Crampton strongly in this respect, and suggested that he must have known of the association. 13.64 In addition to the question of the reference, Mr Mansfield also questioned Mr Crampton closely about his career and his positions both in SO11 (Criminal Intelligence Branch), and his professional positions in South London. SO11 is a section which deals amongst other things with intelligence as to criminals and their associates. The suggestion of course is that any police officer serving where Mr Crampton had served must have been alive to the existence and character of Clifford Norris, so that he could not possibly have failed to forge a connection between the suspect David Norris and his notorious father. 13.65 In the end we simply have to form a view of Mr Crampton based upon his own prolonged evidence and on what we have seen in the relevant documents disclosed during the days spent pursuing this important matter and searching the intelligence and other files to which we have referred. 13.66 We understand the argument and suggestion made to Mr Crampton that it is strange indeed that the connection was not made in his mind. But we must also bear in mind the positive and indeed repeated evidence of Mr Crampton himself that there was in any event no kind of corrupt or improper holding back or fudging of his part of this investigation for any reason. Even if Mr Crampton had made the connection between the suspect David Norris and Clifford Norris at once, there is no evidence before us that Mr Crampton was himself fearful of what Clifford Norris might do, or that he was in contact with him in any way, or that he was or would have been likely to wish to hold back the prosecution of these vicious young men for any reason connected with Clifford Norris. 13.67 We know that Clifford Norris, through his agent, is said to have become positively and corruptly involved in the prosecution of his son in connection with the attempted murder of Stacey Benefield, so that we have to bear that firmly in mind when looking at the whole picture in connection with the Stephen Lawrence murder. There is however no suggestion that any witness was tampered with or paid money in connection with the Stephen Lawrence case. There is the allegation that DS Crowley undermined the evidence of Mr Brooks, but this did not occur until weeks after Mr Crampton was wholly disengaged from the Stephen Lawrence inquiry. 13.68 We are convinced that in spite of the connection which exists between Mr Crampton and Sergeant XX there is no proof that this connection or Mr Crampton's knowledge of Clifford Norris affected in any way his conduct. No allegation of this kind should be made lightly, and no allegation of this kind should be dismissed without the most careful and strenuous examination of the relevant documents and facts. However it would be wrong to make any conclusion or to draw any inferences against Mr Crampton without satisfactory proof that such a conclusion or such a deduction was justified. We do not believe that Mr Crampton was corruptly connected with Clifford Norris, or indeed that he acted out of fear or because of any other wrong motive in the actions that he took over the first weekend. It would be wholly unfair to Mr Crampton in all the circumstances to conclude or to hint otherwise. 13.69 It should be added that during the hearings in connection with this part of the case Sergeant XX was at a fairly late stage represented by Counsel. In spite of the submissions made on Sergeant XX's behalf the Inquiry thought that it was right that the relevant documents should be used publicly in connection with Mr Mansfield's cross examination of Mr Crampton. Although disciplinary documents are usually wholly confidential, in our opinion justice required that they should be disclosed to the parties simply for the purposes of the Inquiry, and that they should be used by Mr Mansfield in his cross examination of Mr Crampton. Mr Crampton was criticised for giving a reference without knowing the full and detailed account of the matter with which Sergeant XX had become concerned. We do not accept that that criticism is justified, although it is normally desirable that those giving references should be aware of the circumstances in which they are asked to give them. It does have to be said that our experience is that references are given, particularly references of the kind referred to in this case, simply as a general commendation of a man judged in connection with his professional activity. We do not believe that the circumstances established that Mr Crampton must have known or did know of the association between Clifford Norris and Sergeant XX. It does have to be noted that it is strange that this was not within Mr Crampton's knowledge. Rumours or talk about such things must have been rife, and Mr Crampton was concerned enough to give his reference. But we accept his evidence in this respect. 13.70 The matter has been one which required anxious and careful consideration by this Inquiry, since if there were improper influences bearing upon Mr Crampton that would most seriously affect the conclusion reached by us in connection with Mr Crampton's decisions made during his short tenure of office as SIO. 13.71 Kent were asked in September 1997 by Mr & Mrs Lawrence to investigate the possibility of police collusion or corruption. This matter had not been raised until then, and had not formed the basis of the original complaint made by Mr & Mrs Lawrence against the MPS. Until the end of September 1997 Mr & Mrs Lawrence did not in fact co-operate with Kent. After that they did register their opinion that the quality of the initial investigation "could have been deliberately affected by collusion between one or more of the senior police officers with the prime suspects or their families". The fact that the matter was raised late does not mean that it could not be established. Now that the matter has been most thoroughly investigated, particularly in connection with Mr Crampton's part in the affair, we are convinced that there is no ground for a conclusion that collusion or corruption infected in any way the conduct of Mr Crampton. 13.72 We saw him over a prolonged period in the witness box and
we are wholly satisfied that his strong denial of the allegations made against him is to
be accepted. As 13.73 A further limb of the cross examination of Mr Crampton involved the crime report which was completed in connection with the Stephen Lawrence murder. That is a document which is normally protected by public interest immunity, but it was disclosed and used in this case. The omission by Mr Crampton to indicate expressly on the form which was prepared by him that this was a racist incident is said to reflect the lack of importance given to the racist nature of the murder, as also reflected in the subsequently expressed views of several officers involved in the investigation that the murder was not racist, and the lack of urgency given to lines of investigation relating to the racist nature of the attack. Plainly this indication should have been given specifically upon the form, and similarly the relevant box indicating that this was a racist killing should have been ticked. This was not done. On the other hand the original form does bear a racist incident (RACINC) number, so that it is apparent that the matter was reported as a racist incident even if the form was improperly completed. 13.74 It should also be stressed that in Mr Crampton's case nobody can suggest that
he did anything other than conclude and assert that this was a purely racist murder from
the start. We have already commented upon the entry in the policy file which might suggest
some doubt about the matter. But having seen Mr Crampton and having heard him in the
witness box we are convinced that he was wholly alive to the racist motive and nature of
this murder throughout. He was undoubtedly not influenced in our opinion by the fact that
the victim was black, and there would be no justification in the case of this senior
officer for an assertion that he held back on racist grounds. It is perfectly true that Mr
Crampton, like other officers, indicated that he had received little if any training in
connection with race issues even at the SIO's course at Bramshill. 13.75 Mr Yearwood, on behalf of the CRE, suggested that when statements were taken in the early days of this investigation from Joseph Shepherd and Stacey Benefield, more reference should have been made to the possible racist aspect of the case. For example it was suggested that Mr Shepherd should have been specifically asked about the racist remarks made by the attackers, and that Stacey Benefield should have been asked about his knowledge as to Neil Acourt and David Norris' racism. We see little ground for this criticism. 13.76 Mr Crampton was also cross-examined by Mr Macdonald on behalf of Mr Brooks. Mr Crampton indicated that he formed the view that Mr Brooks was doing all that he could to assist. Indeed both in his statements and in his evidence to the Inquiry he indicated that Mr Brooks was comparatively calm when he had contact with him and that he was satisfied that Mr Brooks was giving all possible assistance to the police. Indeed, he accepted in terms that Mr Brooks came over as "quite a decent lad who appeared to be truthful and helpful". 13.77 Mr Macdonald appeared to suggest that there was some criticism to be made of Mr Crampton because of his failure to refer in his early statement, made before the Inquest, to the racist motive of this crime. This seems to us to be an unjustified criticism. Mr Crampton was simply making a "potted version" statement of what had happened factually. In any event reading Mr Brooks' statement alongside Mr Crampton's statement it is obvious that there was nothing but racist motive in this case, as Mr Crampton readily accepted. He was certainly not one of those who ducked the issue in connection with the motive of these white youths, and we see no grounds for criticism in connection with the making of his own statement. 13.78 Mr Crampton was taken with care by Miss Sonia Woodley QC on behalf of the SIOs through each aspect of the case as it concerned Mr Crampton. He pointed out and stressed the basis on which he formed his strategy both in connection with the scientific or forensic matters and particularly in connection with his view that "there were people or persons out there who did have that information and we were going to get to it and we felt that the delay and to try and get that was worthy of waiting. It was a risk but that was the decision we were going through". 13.79 Miss Woodley stressed that Mr & Mrs Lawrence had asked to be left alone on Sunday 25 April, so that the available time during which he could have visited Mr & Mrs Lawrence was very limited. Furthermore he had established the family liaison team, and had instructed Mr Jeynes to go to visit Mr & Mrs Lawrence at the time when he was attending the post mortem at 09:00 on 23 April. We understand that point, but in a case as sensitive as this one it was absolutely essential that the SIO should take positive steps to ensure that nothing went wrong from the start. Both in connection with the arrests and in connection with family liaison the immediate decisions made and actions taken were of course vital. In spite of all the pressures upon him it would have been better that Mr Crampton had himself seen Mr & Mrs Lawrence. 13.80 In his initial interview by Kent, Mr Crampton indicated that ".... in my opinion I had more resources on that murder than I would normally have expected ... I was satisfied from the point of view of inquiry officers. If you want to ask me about was I satisfied with the amount of indexers [HOLMES team] I had then the answer was no." According to AMIP policy the murder of Stephen Lawrence should have been classified as a "B" classification incident, but Mr Crampton said that the incident was not really formally classified as such and that lip service was paid to such classifications, and the reality of the situation was that Detective Superintendents were given such staff as was considered appropriate in discussion with Mr Ilsley. Had the incident been formally classified as a "B" then in comparison to the staffing levels recommended by policy there was a deficiency of two Detective Sergeants and a Police Constable in the Incident Room and the outside investigation team exceeded the specified levels by two Detective Sergeants and two Detective Constables. The view of "an expert" SIO from another force, Detective Chief Superintendent Burdis of South Yorkshire Police, indicates that in an investigation of this nature he would have required more than double the staff allocated to Mr Crampton (see Chapter 32). Nevertheless the flawed decision made by Mr Crampton in relation to delayed arrests had nothing to do with strained resourcing. It is striking that this is another area where the MPS policy through its AMIP guidelines was clearly ignored with the apparent acquiescence of more senior officers. There is no indication that any senior officer took any direct interest in the application or otherwise of AMIP policy or in the adequacy or otherwise of staffing levels in this particular investigation. 13.81 Mr Crampton had never previously used the HOLMES system in a murder investigation. He had had a two-day course on HOLMES in 1990, but it is plain that he and all those around him were remarkably untrained in connection with this computer and its operation. A separate section deals with this matter (see Chapter 32), but it is a matter of concern that this AMIP team was allowed to embark upon this murder investigation staffed by an SIO who had never run a HOLMES based incident, backed by a Detective Inspector with the same handicap, and initially assisted by a Detective Sergeant who had never been trained on HOLMES and had never run such an incident before. 13.82 On Monday 26 April Mr Crampton left the investigation of the Stephen Lawrence murder. 13.83 We take into account all that Miss Woodley has said and written by way of submission on Mr Crampton's behalf. But we are convinced that a vital opportunity was missed, and that the failure to arrest by Monday 26 April, by which time Stacey Benefield's clear statement was in the hands of the team, must be primarily the responsibility of Mr Crampton. Mr Ilsley's acquiescence in Mr Crampton's decision is also the subject of criticism (see Chapter 27). This flawed decision appears to us to have been fundamental and most regrettable. Its consequences are plain to see. POSTSCRIPT AS TO GROUNDS FOR ARREST 13.84. As a result of the later submissions made on behalf of members of the Police Superintendents' Association (12 January 1999) we address specifically one of the central considerations in the investigation namely whether and when to arrest. We set out the grounds on which such a decision can be made, since there was clearly some confusion in the minds of more than one senior officer. Given the importance of the issue we summarise the considerations thus. 13.85 Section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act provides that "where a constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an arrestable offence has been committed, he may arrest without a warrant anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be guilty of the offence." "Reasonable grounds for suspicion" is not defined in the Act. It has been held (O'Hara -v- The Chief Constable The Royal Ulster Constabulary (1997) 2AC.286.) and other cases that an arresting officer must have formed a genuine suspicion that the person being arrested was guilty of an offence, and there must be reasonable grounds for forming such a suspicion. Such grounds may arise from information received from another (even if it is subsequently proved to be false) provided that a reasonable man, having regard to all the circumstances, would regard them as reasonable grounds for suspicion. 13.86 Having arrested on suspicion the police must then establish whether there is evidence sufficient to sustain a formal charge, in this case of murder. This is a subjective decision by the police initially, but the grounds on which they base their charge must subsequently pass the test applied by the Crown Prosecution Service (see Chapter 39, paragraph 12). Consequently police must have an eye to that test. In serious cases there is often discussion as to the grounds for charge with the CPS in advance. 13.87 In this case an early arrest between Saturday 24 April and Monday 26 April, would have had to have been made on the grounds of reasonable suspicion. Evidence would subsequently have had to be obtained to support the charge within 96 hours of the arrest taking place. Sections 41 to 43 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act provide that a person shall not be detained for more than 24 hours without being charged. Magistrates, on application by the police, can extend this to a maximum period of 96 hours. 13.88 Whilst it is perfectly legal to arrest a suspect on "reasonable suspicion", consideration needs to be given to the likelihood of evidence being secured within 96 hours of that arrest and the impact of release without charge if such evidence is not forthcoming. If there is a better chance of securing evidence pre-arrest as opposed to developing it quickly after having arrested on "reasonable suspicion" then this may justify delay. There are no "rules". Each decision is different and more or less difficult according to the circumstances of the case. An SIO must make clear, logical decisions in this area. One would expect the issues considered, the reasoning and the decision to be carefully made and fully reflected in the policy log. In this case they were not. 13.89 The Inquiry asserts that the decision not to arrest by Mr Crampton and Mr Ilsley was a fundamental error. Our grounds for so asserting are clear. The first point at which we consider the decision to arrest could and should have taken place is on the late evening of Saturday 24 April. By then there were ten separate pieces of information, nine directly and one indirectly identifying the Acourts and their associates. In addition James Grant had given his initial information and had been seen a second time by DC Budgen and by DS Davidson. He had confirmed his information. The balance of considerations lay firmly with an early arrest, particularly with the possibility of obtaining scientific evidence. There existed "reasonable suspicion" par excellence. 13.90 The balance continued to tip heavily in favour of a decision to arrest as time progressed through to Sunday 25 April when there is one further relevant item of information regarding the Acourts and, most importantly, the obtaining of Stacey Benefield's formal statement. At this point the balance in favour of action was in the Inquiry's view overwhelming. 13.91. We recognise that on Sunday 25 April Mr Crampton was about to hand over to Mr Weeden. He may have felt reluctant to act at that late stage, unjustifiable though this is. However, by Monday 26 April when the handover took place in the presence of Mr Ilsley, the balance in favour of a decision to arrest was so clear that it should have been identified by Mr Crampton and by Mr Ilsley. An immediate review and assessment by Mr Weeden and Mr Ilsley should have been carried out resulting in a decision to arrest. We are conscious, in much of our Inquiry, that we may be accused of that fatal disease - hindsight. In this context we are certain we are not contaminated. The balance was clear to anyone who chose to look thoroughly and logically at the information available. The weight of the evidence in favour of decision to arrest should have been identified by all three senior officers, Mr Crampton, Mr Ilsley and Mr Weeden, not later than Monday 26 April. 13.92 The lack of professional thoroughness and logic is demonstrated by the absence of any entry in the policy log. In the event there is nothing to justify inaction, and the conclusion must be one of drift rather than considered decision. In addition the fundamental mistake of delaying arrest is compounded by the abysmal nature of the accompanying surveillance.
|
