CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE

THE SECOND INVESTIGATION

33.1 By June 1994 the investigation of the Stephen Lawrence murder was at a low ebb. The CPS had indicated twice that they did not believe that there was a case to take forward to the courts. Nothing fresh had materialised by way of evidence. Much publicity had been given to the case.

33.2 High level correspondence and conferences were held. The Commissioner was personally involved in the sense that he wrote letters about the case to Mr Khan and to Mr Peter Bottomley MP and to Mr Peter Lloyd MP, and it is plain that there was much interest in the case both before and after the Barker Review was completed, between September 1993 and the spring of 1994.

33.3 Advertisements seeking witnesses were published in the autumn of 1993, and the investigation continued, to little avail. To his credit Mr Weeden delayed his retirement, in the hope that he might further the investigation.

33.4 The documents show that there had been continued activity by the MPS during the latter part of 1993 and the early months of 1994. The Inquest was adjourned in December 1993, because Mr & Mrs Lawrence's legal team believed that further evidence might be available.

33.5 On 2 May 1994 Mr Johnston's command team was joined by a senior officer, who was at that time a Commander, named Perry Nove. Mr Nove is now Commissioner of the City of London Police Service. On 1 August 1994 the MPS was restructured and Mr Nove became the Deputy Head of the new South East Area which took in all of the old 3 Area and most of the old 4 Area of south London.

33.6 Mr Johnston and Mr Nove decided that there should be virtually a fresh start with the investigation of Stephen Lawrence's murder. Mr Nove indicated that it was not easy to "do away with the bureaucracy at the stroke of a pen". But he and the Assistant Commissioner decided that a second investigation needed urgently to be launched, and decided that whatever the second investigation needed it was going to get. Primarily of course resources come from the Area involved. But it is apparent that during the course of the second investigation Mr Nove did all that he could to ensure that the investigation's needs in respect of cash were satisfied. Mr Nove says that everybody insisted that the second investigation had to be fully resourced so far as possible.

33.7 The man chosen to be SIO in the new regime was Detective Superintendent William Mellish. In 1994 he was a most experienced detective. Immediately before taking over the Stephen Lawrence murder case Mr Mellish had been involved with a team of officers in the reinvestigation of the murder of Police Constable Blakelock which took place in Tottenham. That investigation had lasted from 1992 until June 1994. During that investigation Mr Mellish had worked under Mr Nove, and it was at Mr Nove's behest that Mr Mellish became involved in the Stephen Lawrence murder inquiry. Mr Mellish continued as SIO until March 1995. Thereafter he continued to help Mr & Mrs Lawrence's legal team when they embarked upon the private prosecution. Summonses in respect of that prosecution were issued in April 1995. Day to day charge of the matter after Mr Mellish ceased to be SIO was in the hands of Detective Chief Inspector John Carnt.

33.8 Nobody queried Mr Mellish's record in terms of his police expertise or suggested for a moment that anything that he did might be influenced by racism. Indeed all the indications are that Mr Mellish treated everybody firmly but well.

33.9 The arrival on the scene of Mr Nove and Mr Mellish did give a fresh impetus to the investigation which had flagged badly in the 14 months since the murder. We have already indicated that Mr Mellish found a dispirited team. Although he speaks highly of some of the qualities of Mr Bullock, who continued as the DIO, he criticised the fact that Mr Bullock seemed to show no innovation or flair in any of the decisions or suggestions that he made in connection with the investigation.

33.10 Mr Mellish was at pains to indicate that from the start he intended to look forward in the investigation. What he described as conventional methods of investigation had in his opinion been exhausted by June 1994. He understood that his role did not include reviewing or reinvestigating what he called the "minutiae of what the earlier investigation had done or not done". He saw the Barker Review, but laid little store by the contents of that document. He said that he regarded the Review as a "tick in the box". Meaning that he was prepared to accept that a line should be drawn under the earlier investigation, and that a fresh start should be made.

33.11 Mr Mellish was asked by this Inquiry what his view was about the earlier activities of the team, and in particular the decision not to arrest in the early days. He said that it was impossible or unfair to try to make a decision about the previous SIO's activity unless one was "privy to all the information that the SIO had at the time". Understandably he was unwilling to perform the task which has been entrusted to this Inquiry, namely to make a comprehensive judgment on all that took place from the time of the murder on 22 April 1993. He did however say that if the names of the suspects were enshrined in good information within the first 48 hours then if things went well, and if the suspects could be definitely placed in their homes, arrests might have been made by the Tuesday or Wednesday after the murder.

33.12 Sensibly however Mr Mellish was not prepared to be drawn too much into expressing opinions as to the past. He was very keen to indicate that while he ordered many actions in respect of names of persons who had earlier been investigated the new investigation was to be of a different kind and character.

33.13 Mr Mellish was briefed by Mr Weeden, and there are notes to show that the effective handover took place on and after 20 May 1994. By early June 1994 Mr Mellish was firmly in the saddle. In addition to briefings and meetings with Mr Weeden and Mr Peter Essex, a solicitor in the MPS, Mr Mellish had visited the Incident Room at Eltham Police Station and taken away relevant statements and documents. He had also read all the police reports to the CPS which had been rendered to date. During his phase of the investigation Mr Mellish himself had no contact with Mr Khan and Mr & Mrs Lawrence. It was expressly laid down and agreed that Mr Nove himself or alternatively Commander William Griffiths or Mr Johnston would undertake all liaison with the family and their lawyers.

33.14 There was no doubt at all in Mr Mellish's mind but that this was a racist murder. His brief from Mr Nove was that there should be evolved a radical and innovative strategy in order to try to get the investigation back on the rails and in order to obtain evidence to take the suspects to court.

33.15 Mr Mellish produced a diagrammatic document setting out the strategy that he proposed to follow, in conformity with Mr Nove's instructions and discussions between himself and Mr Nove. There were in effect three main lines followed by Mr Mellish. First and foremost it was decided that there must be sophisticated surveillance using all available techniques to observe the suspects. The intention was to monitor the suspects for as long as possible in order to establish what they were doing, and perhaps to arrest one or more of them for some other serious crime. Next it was hoped that one or more of the suspects could be "rolled over", meaning that they might agree to give evidence against the others. In addition Mr Mellish intended to review the best witnesses. For example, Witness B was taken to Kings Cross Police Station where there is a modern video interview facility. The idea was to debrief the important witnesses and to check on the evidence available.

33.16 Early on in his investigation Mr Mellish focused upon the position of Clifford Norris. He was aware that Mr Norris was wanted for large scale drug importation and that "his presence at large in South East London could have a significant intimidatory effect". He rightly believed that both witnesses and sources of information could be inhibited by the shadow of Clifford Norris. Nobody knew where Clifford Norris was in 1994, although of course it is evident that he had been in close contact with his son because of the history of the case brought against his son involving the attempted murder of Stacey Benefield. Before he became involved in this investigation Mr Mellish had not himself known of Clifford Norris, but he said that he was, as we accept, well known in south London. Furthermore, Mr Norris had been on the run since 1988. It is difficult to understand why he had not been more energetically pursued after that date. There is no true explanation of the lack of energy in this direction either by Customs & Excise or by the police. Mr Norris' brother Alexander had been sentenced in 1989 to a long prison sentence for involvement in major drug crimes.

33.17 A combination of surveillance and investigation led the team to some oasthouse cottages in Battle, Sussex.

33.18 Mr Mellish's account of the capture of Clifford Norris was factual but dramatic, and it was received by the Inquiry audience with applause. There is no need to go into the full details in this report, since they appear in the evidence on Day 42. The long and the short of it was that by 10 or 11 August 1994 it appeared obvious to Mr Mellish and his team that Clifford Norris was at the oasthouse cottages. Observation was continued there, and on the evening before his arrest Mr Norris and an associate went to a public house where they were positively identified by DS Knight. Permission to carry out an armed operation was obtained from the local constabulary who provided armed officers. Mr Mellish also contacted the local Regional Crime Squad, and a team of officers including DS Davidson was provided to him. Mr Mellish spent the night at the police station and briefed everybody at 05:00 on 11 August. Mr Norris and his associate Mr Stainer moved in the middle of the morning and stopped for breakfast at a local cafe, where they were arrested. They were in possession of loaded handguns. An Uzi sub-machine gun and a large amount of ammunition were found at the oasthouse cottage.

33.19 With Mr Norris safely removed from the scene Mr Mellish hoped that fresh information would emerge, and that he might be able to discover or develop some eye witness evidence. Unfortunately the fact is that no such evidence has been obtained either by Mr Mellish or thereafter. The limited amount of evidence available in this case is only too clear to all involved.

33.20 The next step taken was intrusive video and audio surveillance of a flat occupied by Gary Dobson. He had been given a flat in Footscray Road, Eltham, by the Social Services Department, and these premises were found to be suitable for insertion of a probe. An audio and visual probe was inserted in the premises, and over a considerable period during December 1994 films and recordings were made which we have seen. The details of these are dealt with elsewhere, but as Mr Mellish indicated they showed that those who were present in that flat, including all the suspects except Jamie Acourt, had "a propensity for violence and the carriage of knives and raving bigotry". The young men made revolting and explicit racist comments and remarks repeatedly, and large knives were much in evidence. These knives were waved about and used to simulate stabbing. On several occasions knives were inserted in the waistbands of some of the young men who were seen to leave the premises and to return, depositing the knives back on the window sill. Jamie Acourt was in custody, having been charged with another offence involving violence.

33.21 We do not here examine the full nature of these terrible recordings. The fact is however that it was apparent that the young men almost certainly suspected that they were being bugged. Whether they appreciated that there was a video camera installed may be subject to doubt. But it is evident that these men knew that they were being overheard. Not only are they proved by the recordings to be violent racists, but they are also defiant of anything that is done by the police or by authority in connection with their own activities and their own nature. The transcript of the recordings which were before us is in the Appendices to this Report.

33.22 From time to time the men were at pains to indicate that they had not been involved in the Stephen Lawrence murder. They did this obliquely, but it is a significant element of the audio recording. How much can be divined from this is problematical. The fact is however that, as Mr Mellish accepted, the product of the probe was disappointing to him. He had hoped to obtain either some direct admissions, or at least admissions of other criminal activity which would have enabled him to arrest the suspects. Mr Mellish's own view strongly expressed, was that "not one iota of evidence capable of being left to a jury to prove that these men were the murderers of Stephen Lawrence was obtained".

33.23 As a result of the earlier audio surveillance a small morsel of information had been obtained indicating that perhaps Gary Dobson could not "hack the pressure". This information came from conversation overheard when the young men were visiting Jamie Acourt at the Remand Centre where he was detained. He had stabbed somebody in a night-club, and was held in custody in connection with that matter. The fact that undercover police officers present in the club had observed the stabbing may have been one of the contributory factors which alerted the young men to the fact that they were being watched and recorded.

33.24 It was Mr Mellish's view that their knowledge and their appreciation of the possibility of the surveillance came primarily from "schooling" from Clifford Norris before he was arrested. Mr Mellish believed that after their arrest in 1993 Mr Norris would have "sat the boys down", as he put it, and instructed them to keep silent and warned them of the risk that there might be sophisticated surveillance of them in the future. This is a possible theory. Alternatively they may have been alerted by others. In addition the young men were aware from the very start, as the recordings show, that the landlord of the flat with somebody else had been let in by Gary Dobson and the direct statement is made in the very first recording indicating that some interference had taken place.

33.25 It may not matter in the end how they were aware of the surveillance. The fact is that they probably were aware of it and therefore may have avoided making any incriminating remarks. Their whole attitude and their denials may have been specifically intended to put the police off the scent.

33.26 When Gary Dobson was seen by DS Knight, who approached him on the softly, softly basis he made no admissions in a long conversation and produced no useful indication that he would be able to give evidence against the others. Later when he was arrested Mr Mellish interviewed him, and again Mr Dobson made no admissions and was not prepared to assist. Incidentally there was very little evidence ever available against Gary Dobson. He was not identified at any parade, and the only material available to the prosecution in the end was the weak or very weak evidence concerning the suggested transference of fibres to Stephen Lawrence's hand.

33.27 By the time Mr Mellish left the team there was really little advance, in the sense that no satisfactory additional evidence was obtained in order to assist the prosecution. Mr Mellish was very doubtful about the evidence of Duwayne Brooks, principally in his case because he felt that everybody should "be aware that his defence have used a psychiatrist who says that he was suffering from post traumatic shock at the time of the riot. If this is so what value can we place on his positive ID made just after the riot?"

33.28 Mr Mellish did not wish to approach the case or the family or their lawyers on the negative basis that the case was hopeless. But it is apparent that Mr Mellish's view was that the case was very weak. Indeed he indicated this informally to some of those involved from time to time. It was not for him to make the ultimate decision as to whether the prosecution should go ahead. That was for the Crown prosecution team, and later for the lawyers advising Mr & Mrs Lawrence. The CPS had made their decisions in 1993 and April 1994, so it was for Mr & Mrs Lawrence's team to make a proper and informed decision as to whether the prosecution should proceed. Once it has been decided that there should be no prosecution by the CPS it is possible for a private prosecution to start, subject to any veto which may be imposed by the Attorney General.

33.29 Mr Mellish indicated that there was not the material upon which a jury might act, even if the Judge let in the vital evidence of Mr Brooks. Mr Mansfield believed that the surveillance evidence would be admitted. Mr Mellish did not agree. This of course was never tested at trial, although it is right to indicate that the Magistrate at the committal proceedings did allow the edited version of these terrible scenes and words to be given in court. He did not have to make any final ruling as to whether the recordings could be made available at trial.

33.30 Mr Mellish was asked about the resourcing of his inquiries. He gave evidence which reflects the position, namely that resources are always and were always tight, but that those above him were undoubtedly helpful in obtaining money for the initiatives which he wished to take forward. Mr Mellish did not complain that he was short of officers or short of funds in the result in connection with the initiatives and investigation which he had proposed.

33.31 As to Mr Brooks Mr Mellish noted that Mr Brooks had been acquitted in connection with the Welling disturbance on the basis of traumatic stress. And his logic was that Mr Brooks must have made his identifications when he was under the same traumatic stress and "a half reasonable defence barrister would make mincemeat of him".

33.32 Mr Brooks had never formally become a protected witness, in the full sense of that phrase. By the time of the trial at the Central Criminal Court he was still a vital witness. He had given evidence at the committal, and there is no doubt but that anybody who decided to call him thereafter as a witness must have been apprehensive. At the time he was being advised by Miss Jane Deighton, a solicitor from the firm of Deighton Guedalla, so that in one sense he was in her charge. We are sure that if there had been any trouble or difficulty in connection with Mr Brooks and the giving of his evidence she would have been the first so to indicate.

33.33 It was thought wise however that there should be a police escort provided for Mr Brooks during and around the days of the trial, and that he should be accompanied to hotels to spend the night with officers nearby. Throughout the course of the trial namely from 17 April to 26 April 1996 there were police officer escorts provided. Mr Brooks was taken each evening to Snow Hill Police Station, near the Central Criminal Court, where he was collected by officers who were given the duty of looking after him for the night. A detailed survey has been made of the duty states of the officers allocated to perform this guard duty.

33.34 In his statement to the Inquiry Mr Brooks does complain that he was taken to an Eltham hotel, where he had little sleep and he says that this affected his evidence. In fact he went to an Eltham hotel only after he had completed his evidence in "the trial within a trial". It is perfectly true that he might have had to give evidence before the jury if the Judge had let his evidence in, but it seems most likely that after he had given his preliminary evidence the general expectation must have been that his evidence would not be put before the jury.

33.35 Mr Brooks gave evidence on 18 and 19 April. He then went away for the weekend to the West Midlands. He continued and finished his evidence in the "trial within a trial" on Monday, 22 April 1996.

33.36 One of the officers allocated to guard him on that night was DS XX, to whom much reference has been made. Anybody who is asked about this allocation accepts rightly that if the allocating officers had known about DS XX's past he must have been regarded as a wholly inappropriate person to guard Mr Brooks. Mr Mellish had no knowledge of the association of DS XX with Clifford Norris, which had taken place in 1987/88. DS XX had been left as a fully serving officer from the date of his discipline hearings. Mr Johnston was appalled that a man who had associated with a criminal such as Clifford Norris should have remained in the MPS.

33.37 That is a separate matter in a sense, since the fact is that he was originally required to resign, but on appeal that decision was upset and he was allowed to remain in the force, in the same Area, as a Detective Constable.

33.38 So far as the guarding of Mr Brooks is concerned, while it is obviously undesirable that DS XX should have been anywhere near him, there is no evidence whatsoever that anything went wrong as a result of DS XX's presence. Again we reiterate that if there had been any suggestion that DS XX might have interfered with Mr Brooks' evidence in any way it would at once have been raised. We are convinced that there is no basis for any suggestion that the presence of DS XX had in fact any bearing on the evidence given by Mr Brooks or indeed upon the course of the trial.

33.39 When the trial was over Mr Mellish himself wrote to Mr Penstone of the Greenwich Borough Council, on 9 July 1996, seeking a Community Care Grant for Mr Brooks. Mr Mellish confirmed that Mr Brooks had been under his care during the currency of the trial and he pointed out that Mr Brooks had undergone rigorous cross-examination and had been the focus of enormous media attention. He indicated quite rightly that these experiences had had a most traumatic effect on this young man, and he hoped very much that Mr Penstone and indeed the police could help Mr Brooks to readjust to his new life. He rightly pointed out that Mr Brooks had been under exceptional pressures and would need every support to cope with his new situation.

33.40 It is a pleasure to record that at the outset of Mr Mansfield's cross-examination he thanked Mr Mellish and expressed the appreciation of Mr & Mrs Lawrence for the way in which he had conducted the second investigation. Mr Mansfield then prepared the ground for the showing of the video of the Mr Dobson's flat. The Inquiry then saw the video highlights, as did the public and the press. Mr Mansfield rightly told the Inquiry that consideration had been given to the question of prosecution for possible offences arising from the video itself. Since the activities of these young men took place in a private flat there was in fact no appropriate crime with which they could be charged.

33.41 As to Clifford Norris Mr Mansfield pointed out that Mr Mellish had been able to obtain from intelligence dockets and other documents his information about Clifford Norris without difficulty. Mr Mellish had never associated DS XX with Clifford Norris, but at the relevant time he was aware that DS XX had "met a criminal in bad circumstances and was disciplined". Plainly the tactic of arresting Clifford Norris could have been followed earlier by the Weeden team. It is surprising that particularly after the Benefield case no positive steps seem to have been taken to take Mr Norris out of circulation. He must always have been regarded as an evil influence hovering over the case and potentially over witnesses and those who might give information, most of whom had been known to one or other members of the gang.

33.42 As to James Grant Mr Mellish indicated that the name Grant was of course on the system when he took over. He also said that James Grant was, so far as he knew, an informant judging by the text of the message or the action which had identified him to Mr Mellish in the first place. He said that his officers tried to find the paperwork relating to James Grant locally and at AMIP Headquarters but that they could find no documentation whatsoever. He raised an action to try to trace James Grant, and he told the Inquiry that he knew that one of his officers had approached somebody who appeared to have been involved as a handler of James Grant who told him that there was an informant, but that he had forgotten his name except that it was "something like an off licence". Mr Mellish sardonically indicated that the name of James Grant was the nearest that one could get to an off licence connection.

33.43 The action to trace James Grant remained open until the new year of 1995. James Grant was never traced formally as a result of that action, but it is interesting, and somewhat surprising, to discover that two of Mr Mellish's officers in fact by coincidence when visiting somebody else came into contact with James Grant, and also Witness K. There was some confusion in the evidence about this aspect of the matter, but a pocket book entry by the two officers shows quite plainly that James Grant was seen on 2 and 3 February 1995 by them and that James Grant made a limited verbal statement to the officers.

33.44 Mr Mellish believed James Grant to be a registered informant and he says that that interview would not have resulted in any formal record of what had taken place. As Mr Mellish points out James Grant himself never gave any indication that he was a witness, and the true value of his information both earlier and in 1995 was in connection with what witnesses such as K and B might have been able to say. Witness K had given a short statement to DS Davidson on 17 May 1993. He had said that he had visited 102 Bournbrook Road at about 23:30 on the night of the murder and that he had seen Jamie and Neil Acourt and Gary Dobson and that one of them had said "It weren't us". One of them, says Witness K, had his T-shirt off. Thereafter Mr Mellish told the Inquiry that Witness K was of course a priority and that he and his officers spent "an awful lot of time trying to track him down and get him back on side". There had been variations of versions of what Witness K might have been able to say. Plainly Mr Mellish was keen to get in touch with that potential witness. However he indicated that Witness K was "not making himself available to us", and the long and the short of it is that Witness K disappeared, so that the only witness statement that ever existed was that taken in 1993.

33.45 As to the registration of James Grant Mr Mellish confirmed that there was no paper work anywhere, although of course there should have been if James Grant had been formally registered and if the relevant and proper steps had been taken in connection with the documentation.

33.46 As to the private prosecution Mr Mellish told Mr Mansfield that he had never wanted to be negative and he would have mentioned in conversation rather than at formal meetings that he thought that the case was not strong. It was, said Mr Mellish, the family's job together with their lawyers to make up their minds whether they were going to go for a prosecution. Mr Mellish regarded his own opinion as in a sense irrelevant.

33.47 Mr Mellish was cross-examined by Miss Woodley, on behalf of the SIOs. Mr Mellish agreed with Miss Woodley that the circumstances under which he operated were different from and better than the circumstances prevailing in 1993. Simply for example there was a dedicated HOLMES suite at Shooters Hill Police Station in 1994, and indeed dedicated staff filled various roles which had been duplicated or triplicated in 1993. Furthermore it is evident, as we have already indicated, that Mr Mellish was provided with money from central funds, because a decision had been made in the higher echelons that the second investigation should be well supported in terms of resources. It must be said that it was open to the senior officers overseeing the first investigation to have treated that operation with a high priority and to have provided additional funding and staff. He also agreed that he had met very similar difficulties to those encountered by the first investigation in connection with, for example, eliciting information from witnesses such as Emma Cook and others, who had always been reluctant to co-operate with the police. In connection with Emma Cook Mr Mellish said that police officers were simply prevented from getting anywhere near her by her mother. There is therefore an echo of DS Davidson's encounter with that particular girl. Similarly Michelle Casserley, who by that time had her own solicitor, was seen by a representative of Mr Khan's office, with wholly unproductive results. This cross-examination did indicate that the second investigation was itself unable to advance the case or to obtain satisfactory evidence, otherwise than in connection with the video recordings.

33.48 In answer to Mr Macdonald, on behalf of Mr Brooks, Mr Mellish reiterated that while the "guardian" officers would have known something about the case which was going on at the Central Criminal Court, they would not have known the details. By then Clifford Norris had been arrested, and David Norris himself was not on trial at the Central Criminal Court, so that the "Norris factors" in the case were in any event diminished.

33.49 In answer to Mr Brian Barker QC, on behalf of the CPS, Mr Mellish confirmed that Mr Youngerwood was anxious to see the investigation going forward as far as humanly possible. Furthermore he indicated that he was prepared to give Mr Mellish every support that he could from his professional position and that he would of course support a further step in connection with the prosecution if any hard useful evidence could be produced.

33.50 Mr Mellish confirmed that he had not met Mr & Mrs Lawrence during the investigation. The connection with them had been firmly taken into the hands of Commander Nove. Mr Mellish had been told that there had been a lack of communication with the family and that Mr Khan had played an important part in that, and he added that Mr Bullock told him that the solicitor had effectively "hijacked the family". In Mr Weeden's briefing note to Mr Mellish Mr Khan was described as "closely linked to ARA. Within hours of the murder he interposed himself between the Lawrence family and the Police. Has turned the case into a political bandwagon". This is another example of Mr Weeden passing on deprecatory views which did not help the situation.

33.52 Mr Melllish did all that he could during his time as SIO. He retired from the MPS in February 1998, after 33 years service.

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