| The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry | |||
CHAPTER FORTY-SIX CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 46.1 The conclusions to be drawn from all the evidence in connection with the investigation of Stephen Lawrence's racist murder are clear. There is no doubt but that there were fundamental errors. The investigation was marred by a combination of professional incompetence, institutional racism and a failure of leadership by senior officers. A flawed MPS review failed to expose these inadequacies. The second investigation could not salvage the faults of the first investigation. 46.2 At least now many of the failures and flaws are accepted. For too long the family and the public were led to think that the investigation had been satisfactorily carried out. The belated apologies offered at this Inquiry acknowledge the truth, but there is no remedy for the grief which the unsuccessful investigation piled upon the grief caused by the murder itself. 46.3 We were not presented with evidence to persuade us that collusion and corruption infected the investigation of the murder (Chapter 8). 46.4 There are dangers in summarising, but it is necessary to set out here the main thrust of our criticisms. Only a reading of the Report will fully convey its message. The impact of the evidence itself is hard to convey. Those who heard all the evidence found the experience depressing. The following paragraphs simply attempt to refer to the heart of the deficiencies which marred the investigation. FIRST AID 46.5 No police officer did anything by way of First Aid, apart from the small amount of testing to see whether Stephen Lawrence was still breathing and whether his pulse was beating. We strongly criticise the training and retraining of police officers in First Aid. A senior officer (Inspector Groves) signally failed properly to assess the situation and to ensure that proper steps were being taken to recognise and deal with Stephen Lawrence's gross injuries (Chapter 10). INITIAL RESPONSE 46.6 We were astonished at the lack of direction and organisation during the vital first hours after the murder. Almost total lack of proper documentation makes reconstruction of what happened during those hours difficult. But lack of imagination and properly co-ordinated action and planning which might have led to the discovery and arrest of suspects was conspicuous by its absence. No officers early on the scene took any proper steps at once to pursue the suspects. There were large numbers of police officers available, but inadequate measures were taken to use them actively and properly. This was due to failure of direction by senior officers, many of whom attended the scene, who seem simply to have accepted that everything was being done satisfactorily by somebody else (Chapters 11 & 12). FAMILY LIAISON AND VICTIM SUPPORT 46.7 From the first contact with police officers at the hospital, and thereafter, Mr & Mrs Lawrence were treated with insensitivity and lack of sympathy. One of the saddest and most deplorable aspects of the case concerns the failure of the family liaison. Mr & Mrs Lawrence were not dealt with or treated as they should have been. They were patronised. They were never given information about the investigation to which they were entitled. Family liaison failed, despite the good intentions of the officers allocated to this task. Senior officers never intervened to rectify the failure. Both Mr & Mrs Lawrence as the murder victim's parents, and Duwayne Brooks who was himself a victim of the attack, were inadequately, inappropriately and unprofessionally treated and were not treated according to their needs. (Chapters 4, 5 and 26). THE SENIOR INVESTIGATING OFFICERS 46.8 Detective Superintendent CRAMPTON - Mr Crampton was SIO until Monday 26 April. Revealing and detailed information reached the investigating team from 23 April onwards. There was no wall of silence. A vital and fundamental mistake was made in failing to arrest the suspects named in that information by the morning of 26 April. Enough information was available to make the arrests by the evening of 24 April, at about the time when Mr Crampton says that he made a "strategical" decision not to arrest. This decision is nowhere recorded. By Monday 26 April evidence, in a statement signed by Stacey Benefield, reinforced the information available about two of the suspects. That evidence would in itself have justified the arrest of David Norris and Neil Acourt and would have entitled the team to search their premises in connection with the murder of Stephen Lawrence. This flawed decision as to arrest is fundamental. Its consequences are plain to see (Chapter 13). 46.9 Detective Superintendent WEEDEN - When the investigation was handed over to Mr Weeden he perpetuated the wrong decisions made in the vital early days. He did not exercise his own critical faculties in order to test whether the right decisions had been made. He was confused as to his power of arrest. His fundamental misjudgment delayed arrests until 7 May, at which time the arrests were made because of outside pressures. His decisions and actions show lack of imagination and a tendency simply to allow things to drift. He failed to address with sensitivity the problems of family liaison (Chapter 14). 46.10 Detective Inspector BULLOCK - As Deputy Investigating Officer Mr Bullock must be associated with the decisions and actions of the SIOs. He failed to process properly vital information given to the team by James Grant. He was often passive, and not up to his job. The major responsibility for the team's failures lie with those who supervised Mr Bullock, but as DIO he bears his share of responsibility for the team's failures (Chapter 15). 46.11 Detective Chief Superintendent ILSLEY - Mr Ilsley allowed himself to go along with the weak and unenterprising decisions made by his SIOs, in which he had been himself directly involved. He tended to disconnect from responsibility for the investigation when faced with justifiable criticisms. He failed to supervise and to manage effectively this highly sensitive murder investigation. He acted insensitively and unwisely when arranging to take over the family liaison on 6 May 1993 (Chapter 27). FAILURE TO ARREST CLIFFORD NORRIS 46.12 The failure of the team to do all that was possible to arrest Clifford Norris and to remove him from the scene is unexplained and incomprehensible, particularly in the light of the Stacey Benefield case and the belief that Clifford Norris' influence was inhibiting young potential witnesses (Chapter 9). SURVEILLANCE 46.13 The surveillance operation was ill-planned, badly carried out, and inadequately documented. If this surveillance was part of the SIOs' strategy in substitution for arrests the decision-making in this regard was flawed and incompetent. The indications are that the team was simply going through the motions in order to establish association. There was inadequate direction and lack of urgency in this operation (Chapter 18). THE INCIDENT ROOM 46.14 The HOLMES system was inadequately staffed. The Incident Room was not supervised by responsible and trained officers. This may account for many delays apparent in the processing of information reaching the investigation team (Chapter 16). THE RED ASTRA AND ELIMINATION OF SUSPECTS 46.15 It is a cause of concern and criticism that there was serious delay and failure to take necessary action in connection with the occupants of the red Astra car seen twice on the night of the murder. Furthermore there were serious omissions and failures in the steps taken properly to investigate and eliminate from the investigation associates of the five suspects who were reported also to be suspected of involvement in the murder (Chapter 20). IDENTITY PARADES 46.16 The identification parades were poorly planned. There were clear breaches of the Codes of Practice governing identity parades. In particular witnesses were allowed to be together before parades took place. Witnesses were not properly supervised. Successful identification might well have been compromised by these breaches (Chapter 21). THE FAIR HAIRED ATTACKER 46.17 Witnesses, including Duwayne Brooks, indicated that one of the offenders was fair haired. Further information supported this evidence. We agree with Kent's conclusion that the failure to deal logically and thoroughly with this line of inquiry is a clear source of criticism of the first investigation (Chapter 20). SEARCHES 46.18 When the arrests were made on 7 May it is plain that the searches of all the suspects' premises were inadequate. Information expressly suggested that knives might be concealed under floorboards. There is no evidence that a single floorboard was removed during any of the searches (Chapter 23). "JAMES GRANT" 46.19 The handling of James Grant by Detective Sergeant Davidson and Detective Constable Budgen, and the failure to register him as an informant is the subject of criticism. Senior officers failed to ensure that this man, and other hesitant witnesses, were properly followed up and sensitively handled (Chapter 19). POLICY AND RECORDS 46.20 Policy decisions were ill considered and unrecorded. Records and notes were not made or retained. THE BARKER REVIEW 46.21 Detective Chief Superintendent BARKER - The Review was factually incorrect, and inadequate. Mr Barker allowed himself to impose shackles upon his consideration of the investigation which resulted in the production of a flawed and indefensible report. There is concern about the reception of the Barker Review by all senior officers. That part of his Review which dealt with Mr & Mrs Lawrence is inaccurate, insensitive and thoughtless (Chapter 28). 46.22 Deputy Assistant Commissioner OSLAND - Mr Osland accepted that he was responsible for all operational and administrative activities on 3 Area. Yet the evidence shows that he was much too ready to accept that things were going satisfactorily during the course of the investigation. Having established the Barker Review he uncritically accepted what had been reported, and allowed the Review to go to senior officers including the Commissioner without critical appraisal. No senior officer at any level tested or analysed the Review. Mr Osland's attitude to Mr & Mrs Lawrence and their solicitor is reprehensible (Chapter 29). 46.23 There can be no excuses for such a series of errors, failures, and lack of direction and control. Each failure was compounded. Failure to acknowledge and to detect errors resulted in them being effectively concealed. Only now at this Inquiry have they been laid bare. THE SECOND INVESTIGATION 46.24 The second investigation attempted to salvage the situation. Forthright steps were taken. Clifford Norris was arrested. Sophisticated surveillance of the suspects took place. By 1994 however the case was becoming stale. No satisfactory fresh witnesses have ever come forward. We have no criticism of this investigation by Mr Mellish. Indeed it was managed with imagination and skill. The trust of Mr & Mrs Lawrence was regained by the sensitive approach of Mr Nove (Chapter 33). RACISM 46.25 We do not attempt to summarise Chapter 6 which deals with this central and vital issue. Save to repeat two of its paragraphs, which we apply to the evidence and facts of the Stephen Lawrence case: 6.4 "Racism" in general terms consists of conduct or words or practices which advantage or disadvantage people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin. In its more subtle form it is as damaging as in its overt form. 6.34 "Institutional Racism" consists of the collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness, and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people. 46.26 At its most stark the case against the police was that racism infected the MPS and that the catalogue of errors could only be accounted for by something more than incompetence. If corruption and collusion did not play its part then, say the critics, the case must have been thrown or at least slowed down because officers approached the murder of a black man less energetically than if the victim had been white and the murderers black. An example of this approach was that posed by Mr Panton, the barrister acting for Greenwich Council, who argued that if the colour of the victim and the attackers was reversed the police would have acted differently: "In my submission history suggests that the police would have probably swamped the estate that night and they would remain there, probably for the next however long it took, to ensure that if the culprits were on that estate something would be done about the situation". 46.27 We understand why this view is held. We have examined with anxiety and care all the evidence and have heeded all the arguments both ways. We do believe, (paragraph 6.48) that institutional racism is apparent in those areas described. But we do not accept that it was universally the cause of the failure of this investigation, any more than we accept that a finding of institutional racism within the police service means that all officers are racist. We all agree that institutional racism affects the MPS, and Police Services elsewhere. Furthermore our conclusions as to Police Services should not lead to complacency in other institutions and organisations. Collective failure is apparent in many of them, including the Criminal Justice system. It is incumbent upon every institution to examine their policies and the outcome of their policies and practices to guard against disadvantaging any section of our communities. 46.28 Next we identify those areas which were affected by racism remembering always that that emotive word covers the whole range of such conduct. In this case we do not believe that discrimination or disadvantage was overt. There was unwitting racism in the following fields:
COMMUNITY CONCERNS 46.29 Wider issues than those closely connected to the investigation of the murder of Stephen Lawrence dominated Part Two of our Inquiry. It may be thought that in this respect we have strayed outside our terms of reference. We are convinced that the atmosphere in which racist crime is investigated is bound to influence the outcome of such investigation. We believe that Mr & Mrs Lawrence and all who have been involved in this Inquiry would agree that this is so. 46.30 First and foremost amongst our conclusions flowing from Part 2 is that there is a striking and inescapable need to demonstrate fairness, not just by Police Services, but across the criminal justice system as a whole, in order to generate trust and confidence within minority ethnic communities, who undoubtedly perceive themselves to be discriminated against by "the system". Just as justice needs to be "seen to be done" so fairness must be "seen to be demonstrated" in order to generate trust. An essential first step in creating that trust is to ensure that it is a priority for all Police Services. The existing system of Ministerial Priority is the obvious route by which this may be achieved (Recommendation 1). 46.31 The need to re-establish trust between minority ethnic communities and the police is paramount. Such distrust and loss of confidence is particularly evident in the widely held view that junior officers discriminate in practice at operational level, and that they support each other in such discrimination. We have referred (Para 45.8) to the primary problem of "stop and search", including those stops which are unrecorded within the present statistics. The minority communities' views and perceptions are formed by their experience of all "stops" by the police. They do not perceive any difference between a "stop" under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act from one under the Road Traffic Act whilst driving a vehicle. It is essential to obtain a true picture of the interactions between the police and minority ethnic communities in this context. All "stops" need to be recorded, and related self-defined "ethnic data" compiled. We have considered whether such a requirement would create too great a bureaucracy for operational officers, and we are persuaded that this is not the case. The great weight of extra recording would undoubtedly relate to "traffic stops" many of which are already recorded via the HORTI (production of driving documents) procedure. In this context we have also specifically considered whether police powers to "stop and search" should be removed or further limited. We specifically reject this option. We fully accept the need for such powers to continue, and their genuine usefulness in the prevention and detection of crime (Recommendations 60-63). 46.32 Seeking to achieve trust and confidence through the demonstration of fairness will not in itself be sufficient. It must be accompanied by a vigorous pursuit of openness and accountability across Police Services. Essentially we consider that the principle which should govern the Police Services, and indeed the criminal justice system, is that they should be accountable under all relevant legislative provisions unless a clear and specific case can be demonstrated that such accountability would be harmful to the public interest. In this context we see no justification for exemption of the Police Service from the full provisions of the Race Relations Act. Chief Officers should be vicariously liable for the actions of their officers. Similarly we consider it an important matter of principle that the Police Services should be open to the full provisions of a Freedom of Information Act. We see no logical grounds for a class exemption for the police in any area (Recommendations 9-11). 46.33 The depth of the failure of the investigation into the murder of Stephen Lawrence is such that there is a particular need for the MPS to be given a current "clean bill of health" by a process of vigorous independent inspection. The MPS must also be shown to be as open and accountable as possible by ensuring that the levels of their accountability mirror those of other services. We therefore welcome the forthcoming introduction of a Police Authority for London. However we see neither logic nor justification for limiting its powers in comparison with those existing in other Police Services in England and Wales. In particular we suggest that openness and accountability require that all the MPS Chief Officers should be appointed by the Police Authority and be fully accountable to them (Recommendations 3, 4 and 6). 46.34 If racism is to be eliminated from our society there must be a co-ordinated effort to prevent its growth. This need goes well beyond the Police Services. The need for training of police officers in addressing racism and valuing cultural diversity is plain. Improved understanding and attitudes will certainly help to prevent racism in the future, as will improved procedures in terms of recording and investigating racist incidents. Just as important, and perhaps more so, will be similar efforts needed from other agencies, particularly in the field of education. As we have indicated, the issue of education may not at first sight sit clearly within our terms of reference. Yet we cannot but conclude that to seek to address the well founded concerns of minority communities simply by addressing the racism current and visible in the Police Services without addressing the educational system would be futile. The evidence we heard and read forces us to the conclusion that our education system must face up to the problems, real and potential, which exist. We therefore make a number of Recommendations aimed at encouraging schools to address the identified problems (Recommendations 67-69). 46.35 We have referred (paras 45.22 and 45.33) to the minority communities' doubts and concerns about "deaths in custody" and the existing complaints system. Distrust is generated by what is perceived to be a lack of openness and accountability in both areas. Particularly in the complaints system our conclusion is that a strong element of independent investigation must be considered. A significant benefit of such independence would be that it would also address the distrust which currently surrounds the question of "deaths in custody" and their investigation as a result of complaint by those concerned. Furthermore in the context of complaints we have given specific consideration to the issue of whether Investigating Officers' reports produced during the investigation of complaints should continue to attract class exemption under public interest immunity rules and procedures. Having seen and used the Kent IO's Report in the course of our Inquiry we are sceptical of the need for class exemption. There appears to us to be little, if anything, in the Report which could not and should not be made available to the complainants. We consider that to make such reports available to complainants would be a helpful short-term step in building public confidence in the complaints system, and would be in accord with the principle of ensuring the greatest degree of openness and accountability (Recommendation 10). 46.36 Furthermore there is, as this case shows, a need to ensure that nobody obscures the approach to incidents involving racism because of lack of appreciation or willingness to accept that racism is involved. A clear and uncompromising definition of such incidents is needed to ensure that there is no shelter for such views (Recommendation 12). 46.37 Systems of inspection and the existence of objective external appraisal are part and parcel of the process of accountability and reconciliation. They need to be strong and independent. In this context we are attracted by the "standards based" approach adopted by OFSTED which in a transparent way shows the standards against which schools, colleges and other educational establishments will be judged. A similar approach in inspection of Police Services could have advantages and should be more broadly adopted. Furthermore in the future work may profitably be done by "cross-cutting" inspection work across the criminal justice system as a whole, with appropriate and fair treatment as the aim. Perhaps a change of approach would help to produce a criminal justice service which is accessible and acceptable throughout to all those who experience it (Recommendation 5). 46.38 The public and the Police Services of the United Kingdom are justifiably proud of the tradition of an unarmed police service which polices with the consent of the public. The recent perceptive HMIC thematic report "Winning the Race" reinforces our view that at present the confidence and trust of the minority ethnic communities is at a low ebb. Such lack of confidence threatens the ability of the Police Services to police by consent in all areas of their work, not simply in the policing of racist incidents and crimes. 46.39 Our Recommendations which follow are intended to reflect our main conclusions and findings, and to address issues encompassed by this Report. It will be noticed that we make few specific Recommendations as to police disciplinary hearings. We do however record that following our examination of a number of discipline and related files in the course of our Inquiry we all felt concern that there may be insufficient vigour in the area of discipline, supposed sickness and retirement. The need for change is already highlighted by the strong Report of the Home Affairs Committee into "Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures" which led to the Home Secretary announcing in 1998 changes which would be made, to take effect on 1 April 1999. The key changes were:
No doubt the operation and efficacy of these changes will be carefully monitored. We believe that the changes are apt and important. They have our full support. 46.40 First and foremost and fundamentally we believe that there must be a change so that there is genuine partnership between the police and all sections of the community. This cannot be achieved by the police alone. The onus is upon them to start the process. All other agencies, particularly those in the field of education and housing must be involved. Co-operation must be genuine and vigorous. Strategies to be delivered under the new Crime & Disorder Act will provide an opportunity in this respect. Training will play its part. The active involvement of people from diverse ethnic groups is essential. Otherwise there will be no acceptance of change, and policing by consent may be the victim. 46.41 The Commissioner himself, in the context of his own suggestion that an appropriate Ministerial Priority would be welcome, said to us: "I believe that the way the police meet the needs of minority ethnic communities in terms of their experience of crime and harassment is of such importance that a Priority is needed in order to achieve lasting change. It has become increasingly clear that nothing short of a major overhaul is required". 46.42 We hope and expect that implementation of our Recommendations will ensure that the opportunity for radical thinking and root and branch action is seized. Nothing less will satisfy us and all those who so passionately spoke to us during our hearings in and out of London during the long months of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. We also hope that as Police Services reach out to local communities their approach will not be rejected. The gap between Police Services and local communities may seem to be great, but early steps welcomed and encouraged by both sides will surely lead to confidence and co-operation. This may then be the start of the beginning of change.
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