| The Funding of Political Parties in the United Kingdom | ||||
|
CHAPTER TWO THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION 2.1 The Neill Committee, in putting forward wide-ranging proposals for the control of party funding and election expenditure, were clear that such controls needed to be accompanied by effective oversight. To take on this role they recommended the establishment of an independent and authoritative Electoral Commission (R70). Many other jurisdictions have an Electoral Commission and there have been many long-standing advocates1 of a similar body in this country. The Government endorses this recommendation and Part I of the Bill (clause 1) provides for the establishment of the Electoral Commission. 2.2 The Electoral Commission's role will not be a purely enforcement one. It will have a wide-ranging remit to review electoral law and practice, much of which dates back to the last century. As well as being a force for the modernisation of our electoral machinery, the Commission will have an important role in promoting public awareness of the democratic process and encouraging greater participation in it. The establishment of the Electoral Commission also provides an opportunity to rationalise the number of disparate bodies responsible for different aspects of the electoral process and to bring overlapping functions together under the overall control of one organisation. 2.3 The functions of the Electoral Commission are crucial to maintaining public confidence in our democratic institutions. It is vital, therefore, that the Commission is wholly independent of the government of the day, and is seen to be scrupulously impartial in its dealings with political parties. To ensure that this is the case, the Commission will not be a non-departmental public body on normal lines but will be directly accountable to Parliament. The Bill provides for distinctive machinery for appointing the members of the Electoral Commission and for setting the Commission's budget, which will help reinforce its independent status. The functions of the Electoral Commission Regulation of controls on donations to political parties and of limits on campaign expenditure 2.4 The bedrock functions of the Electoral Commission, as recommended by the Neill Committee, will be those relating to the new regulatory framework for the reporting of donations to political parties, the ban on foreign donations and the controls on campaign expenditure at parliamentary and other elections. 2.5 In particular, the Electoral Commission will:
These functions are described in further detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 7. 2.6 As envisaged by the Neill Committee (R13), the Electoral Commission will have wide powers to call for financial information from political parties, registered third parties and referendum campaign organisations, and to enter their premises to inspect and take copies of financial documents or records. Appropriate provisions are contained in clause 92 of the draft Bill. Registration of political parties 2.7 The Neill Committee recommended that the Electoral Commission should assume the role of Registrar of Political Parties (R82). The Registration of Political Parties Act 1998, which created the office of Registrar, conferred it on the Registrar of Companies. With the establishment of the Electoral Commission, the Government agrees that it would be appropriate to bring this function within the Commission's remit. The transfer is provided for in clause 20. Review of electoral law and practice 2.8 The draft Bill confers two statutory functions on the Electoral Commission which underpin its remit to modernise electoral law and practice. First, the Commission will be required to publish a report on the administration of each major election (R71 and clause 4(1)(a)). A 'major' election for these purposes will be: a Westminster Parliamentary general election; a European Parliamentary general election; a Scottish Parliamentary general election; an ordinary election of the National Assembly for Wales; and a Northern Ireland Assembly election. The intention is that the reports should bring to light any features of electoral law and practice, including the operation of the new reporting requirements, which seem to deserve further attention. The Commission would be expected to publish its report as soon as reasonably practical after each election (months not years), but the Government does not consider it necessary to place it under a statutory duty to do so within any specific time scale. The Commission will have a similar duty to report after each major referendum (see Chapter 8). 2.9 The second statutory function of the Electoral Commission in this area will be to keep under review in a more general way the law and practice relating to party funding, elections and referendums, and to make reports with recommendations (R72 and clause 5(1)). From time to time there may be particular aspects of electoral law which Ministers wish to see examined as a matter of priority. In such circumstances, clause 5(2) would allow the Home Secretary, or other Secretary of State, to direct the Commission to review a specified matter within a specified time-frame and to report. 2.10 Under these arrangements Ministers would remain responsible for the law on party funding and the conduct of elections and referendums but, as recommended by the Neill Committee, there would be an expectation that they would consult the Electoral Commission before proposing any changes. 2.11 In the case of secondary legislation, this expectation is given statutory effect by requiring Ministers to consult the Commission before making certain regulations or other instruments under the Representation of the People Acts 1983 and 1985 and the European Parliamentary Elections Act 1978 (clause 6(2)(a) to (e)). There is a similar requirement to consult the Commission before the delegated powers in relation to the conduct of elections are exercised under the Scotland Act 1998, Government of Wales Act 1998 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (clause 6(2)(f) to (h)). 2.12 Furthermore, certain delegated powers, in particular those that provide for the variations of expenditure limits at elections, will be exercisable only on a recommendation from the Commission (clauses 7 and 982). The Government has separately announced proposals for pilot schemes to test innovative voting arrangements3. The Government is considering what role the Electoral Commission might play in relation to pilot schemes of this kind and in the subsequent roll-out of successfully piloted voting arrangements across the country as a whole. The Electoral Commission's role in relation to registration and returning officers 2.13 The present arrangements for the administration of the electoral process, except in Northern Ireland, date back a century and more. Local councils are responsible for choosing polling places. Registration officers are normally senior local government officers, but they derive their authority from the relevant statutes and are not answerable to their parent local authority in respect of these duties. The arrangements for preparing for and conducting elections are similarly in the hands of returning officers, who are, at least in England and Wales, invariably the same people as the registration officers in their areas. The cost of registration is borne on local government funds but the cost of parliamentary elections is reimbursed to returning officers from the Consolidated Fund. The Home Office, in respect of Great Britain, and the Northern Ireland Office set expenditure limits for parliamentary elections and give advice to registration and returning officers on law and practice. Registration and returning officers act as a source of information to central government and, with others (principally officers of the political parties), may suggest improvements in general practice or, if necessary, in electoral law. 2.14 In some but not all of the countries which have Electoral Commissions, voter registration and the actual administration of elections are in the hands of the Commission. This might be a natural model to adopt if starting from scratch. But the current arrangements command public confidence. A change-over would be a very large legislative and administrative project, at the expense of other priorities, and neither the Neill Committee nor any other authoritative body has suggested that it is necessary. The Government does not, therefore, propose to alter the present arrangement in any such far-reaching way. 2.15 Nevertheless, the Government agrees with the Neill Committee that the relationship between returning officers and the Electoral Commission should in future be a close one4. It does not seem necessary for this purpose to pursue the possibility, canvassed in the Neill report, of placing returning officers under the supervision of the Commission. Such an arrangement would in any event be difficult to make in the absence of a wider scheme of reconstruction of the relationship between central government, local government, returning officers and the Electoral Commission. There is no supervisory role which can simply be transferred to the Commission. 2.16 We believe, however, that the Electoral Commission will quickly become the natural focal point for the provision of guidance to electoral administrators and for promoting best practice in how they discharge their statutory duties. The Electoral Commission, for its part, may be expected to look to the cumulative knowledge and expertise of registration and returning officers to inform its reviews of electoral law and practice. By this two-way process the Government anticipates that the Commission will, as the Neill Committee envisaged, develop a close working relationship with the electoral administrators which will enhance the efficiency and effectiveness with which our elections are conducted. Promoting awareness of electoral matters 2.17 The Electoral Commission will have an important educational role to play in promoting public awareness of and participation in the democratic process. The setting up of a fully independent body, free of any suspicion of political partisanship, offers an opportunity to make a step change in this area. Hopefully, this work will have a contribution to make to improving the poor turnout in elections in this country compared with others. The draft Bill (clause 11) therefore places the Electoral Commission under a duty to promote public awareness of electoral systems and matters, and of systems of local and national government and of the institutions of the European Union. In conducting these programmes the Electoral Commission will want to link up with work being done by Department for Education and Employment with schools to prepare young people for their role and responsibilities as active citizens in a modern democracy5. 2.18 The Electoral Commission's work in this area will subsume the campaigns at present run annually by the Home and Scottish Offices in connection with the registration of electors and the campaigns, conducted at the time of a parliamentary general election, to remind people of the timetable and procedure for applying for an absent (postal or proxy) vote. Additionally it will take responsibility from the Northern Ireland Office for similar campaigns conducted in advance of all elections in Northern Ireland. In carrying out this function in Northern Ireland, the Electoral Commission would be expected to work closely with the Chief Electoral Officer who currently conducts the campaign to encourage registration. Separate campaigns may continue to run in Northern Ireland, in recognition of the distinctive electoral arrangements that apply. The review of electoral boundaries 2.19 The establishment of the Electoral Commission affords an opportunity to re-examine the current arrangements for the review of electoral boundaries. The Neill Committee received suggestions that the Electoral Commission should assume the responsibility of the present Parliamentary Boundary Commissions. They expressed some doubt about these suggestions, on the ground that the extra work might overload the new Commission. The Jenkins Commission on the voting system, on the other hand, argued for greater co-ordination of the work of the separate Parliamentary Boundary Commissions for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and suggested that they be brought under the umbrella of the Electoral Commission6. The Government agrees that there is a need for better co-ordination of the work of the four Boundary Commissions and that the setting up of an Electoral Commission provides a good opportunity to achieve it. Clause 14 of the draft Bill accordingly provides for the functions of the Parliamentary Boundary Commissions to be transferred to the Electoral Commission. 2.20 It is not the Government's intention that this transfer should happen immediately. Initially, the Electoral Commission's priority will be establishing its internal systems to receive, scrutinise and publish the returns of disclosable donations made by political parties and preparing for the new controls on expenditure by political parties and third parties at the next general election. Furthermore, by the time the Electoral Commission is set up, the Parliamentary Boundary Commission for England will have embarked on its fifth general review of parliamentary constituencies. To avoid disrupting the work of the Parliamentary Boundary Commission for England and to enable the Electoral Commission to bed in the new controls on parties' income and expenditure, the Government proposes to defer the transfer of the work of all four Parliamentary Boundary Commissions to the Electoral Commission until the fifth general review has been completed in around 2005. There is, however, no reason not to take the opportunity now offered to make the necessary changes in primary legislation. 2.21 In parallel with the four Parliamentary Boundary Commissions, there are separate Commissions in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland for conducting reviews of local administrative and electoral (ward and division) boundaries. Last year a Financial and Management Policy Review of the Local Government Commission for England made a strong case for a merger with the Parliamentary Boundary Commission for England7. This concluded that such a merger would lead to improved efficiency and greater effectiveness and coherence in the review of all boundaries from ward level up to Westminster constituencies. The Government endorses this view and accordingly also proposes to transfer to the Electoral Commission the functions of the Local Government Commission for England (clause 16). As with the Parliamentary Boundary Commissions, the transfer will be effected in around 2005. 2.22 The review of local authority administrative boundaries is a devolved function in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, as is the review of local electoral boundaries in Scotland and Wales. The arrangements for conducting such reviews are therefore a matter for the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly (when the Northern Ireland Act 1998 comes into effect). It will be open to the Scottish Parliament and devolved Assemblies to decide for themselves to confer these functions on the Electoral Commission8. Clause 17 of the draft Bill makes provision for the National Assembly of Wales to transfer the functions of the Local Government Boundary Commission for Wales to the Electoral Commission. Provisions will be added to the Bill as introduced to enable the Scottish Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly to similarly confer these local boundary review functions on the Commission. 2.23 In order to undertake its boundary review functions, the Electoral Commission will be required to establish four statutory Committees, one for each constituent part of the United Kingdom (clause 12). These four Committees will exercise the functions of the four Parliamentary Boundary Commissions under the Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986. The statutory Committee for England will additionally take on the functions of the Local Government Commission for England under Part II of the Local Government Act 19929. The proposed composition of the four statutory Committees is described in paragraphs 2.28 and 2.31 below. Assistance to overseas governments and international organisations 2.24 The Electoral Commission should be able to establish itself as a leading international authority on electoral matters. As part of Britain's role in promoting democratic institutions throughout the world, the Government is from time to time invited to assist with the organisation or monitoring of elections in other countries (most recently in the Nigerian elections of February 1999, which marked that country's return to democracy). The Electoral Commission will be best placed to provide or co-ordinate such assistance in the future. Clause 8 of the draft Bill gives it the necessary authority. Assistance to the devolved administrations 2.25 Within the United Kingdom, the Electoral Commission is empowered to provide advice and assistance to the devolved administrations (at their request) in respect of devolved electoral functions. Other functions of the Electoral Commission 2.26 Other functions of the Electoral Commission in respect of the disbursement of policy development grants, referendums and party political broadcasts are described in Chapters 6, 8 and 9 respectively. Constitution of the Electoral Commission 2.27 The Neill Committee emphasised the need for the Electoral Commission to be, and to be seen to be, an independent and impartial body. To this end, they recommended that its members should be chosen on a non-partisan basis and enjoy substantial security of tenure (R75 and R76). They further recommended that the Commission's budget should be set in such a way as to preserve its impartiality and independence (R78). The Committee saw the arrangements for settling the budget of the National Audit Office as a possible model to follow. The Government accepts and endorses these conclusions. 2.28 It is proposed that initially, as recommended by the Neill Committee (R77), the Electoral Commission should consist of five members. However, the functions of the Commission will go rather wider than those envisaged by the Neill Committee, and so the draft Bill (clause 1(3)) provides that up to nine Electoral Commissioners may be appointed. The Government intends that the further four Commissioners should be appointed once the Electoral Commission takes on the functions of the four Parliamentary Boundary Commissions, and should chair the four statutory Committees of the Commission described in paragraph 2.23 above (although their duties as Commissioners will not be confined to the review of electoral boundaries). The number of Commissioners will thus fluctuate between five and nine, depending on whether parliamentary or (in England) local government boundary reviews are being undertaken. 2.29 Electoral Commissioners will be appointed by Her Majesty The Queen. Recommendations to The Queen to appoint Commissioners will be subject to the approval of the House of Commons. The procedure will involve the House of Commons agreeing an Address to the Sovereign on a motion presented by the Prime Minister, acting with the agreement of the Chairman of the Speaker's Committee, established by clause 2 of the draft Bill. Before moving such an address, the Prime Minister will be required to consult the leaders of those political parties to which two or more sitting Members of the House of Commons belong at that time (clause 3(2)). 2.30 To meet the point about security of tenure, it is proposed that members of the Electoral Commission should be able to be appointed for a period of up to ten years and should be removable within their periods of office only on certain specified grounds, and then only with the agreement of the House of Commons (R76 and clause 3(3) and paragraph 2 of Schedule 1). The appointments will be renewable, but the expectation will be, in line with the Commissioner for Public Appointments' guidance on appointments to public bodies, that no-one will serve for longer than ten years. 2.31 Deputy Electoral Commissioners will be appointed by the Electoral Commission to serve on the four statutory Committees responsible for discharging the Commission's functions in respect of the review of electoral boundaries. The draft Bill (clause 12) requires that there be at least three members are appointed to each Committee including the chairman, who must be an Electoral Commissioner, and two other members, who must either be Electoral Commissioners or Deputy Commisioners; the precise number of Deputy Commisioners would be subject to agreement with the Speaker's Committee. The remit of the Deputy Commissioners will be limited to the functions of the Committee to which they are appointed. 2.32 The independence of the Electoral Commission will be further buttressed by the arrangements for setting its budget, which will not be controlled by a Departmental Minister. The Commission's budget will be examined by the Speaker's Committee which will then lay the budget, with any modifications it thinks fit, before the House of Commons (R78 and paragraph 13 of Schedule 1). The Speaker's Committee will also approve, by the same process, a five-year corporate plan drawn up by the Electoral Commission. 2.33 The functions of the Speaker's Committee will closely mirror those of the Public Accounts Commission in relation to the National Audit Office. The Committee will consist of nine Members of Parliament. Three of the members will be ex-officio appointments, that is the Chairman of the Home Affairs Select Committee, the Home Secretary and a Minister responsible for local government in England. To allow for the fact that there may be more than one Minister with responsibilities for local government, the draft Bill (clause 2(3)) provides for this appointment to be made by the Prime Minister. The other six members will be Members of the House of Commons appointed by the Speaker, none of whom will be a Minister (clause 2(4)). 2.34 To provide assurance that the absence of Ministerial or Departmental oversight will not result in runaway expenditure, it is proposed that the Bill should contain a number of safeguards. In approving the Commission's budget, the Speaker's Committee will be required to have regard to any advice from the Treasury (this is similar to the arrangements for setting the budget of the National Audit Office). Further safeguards for the effective and efficient operation of the Commission are being developed for inclusion in the Bill as introduced which will provide reassurance that the budget setting and accountability arrangements will secure value for money and affordability. 2.35 Under the devolution legislation10, the registration and funding of political parties and the conduct of elections (other than local elections in Scotland) are reserved or (in Northern Ireland11) excepted matters. The Electoral Commission's remit will therefore extend throughout the United Kingdom. It will be a matter for the Commission how it best discharges its functions in any part of the country, but in view of its responsibilities for Parliamentary boundary reviews and in respect of elections to the devolved legislatures, it is anticipated that the Commission will wish to establish a permanent presence in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
1 An Electoral Commission was proposed by the Home Affairs Select Committee in their report on Electoral Law and Administration (Fourth Report, Session 1997-98 HC 768) and in the Report on the Independent Commission on the Voting System (October 1988, Cmnd 4090). 2 The Bill, as introduced, will also contain an amendment to the like effect to section 76A of the Representation of the People Act 1983 (power to vary provisions concerning election expenses). 3 House of Commons Official Report 12 July 1999, Cols. 5 to 9.. 4 Paragraph 11.23. 5 Proposals for citizenship education have been published by the DfEE and QCA in their consultation paper, 'The Review of the National Curriculum in England The Secretary of State's Proposals' (QCA 99/405). 6 Paragraphs 163 to 165 of the Report of the Independent Commission on the Voting System (Cmnd 4090). 7 Quinquennial Review of the Local Government Commission: Prior Options Study by Robert Hazell (March 1998); published by the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions and the Constitution Unit. 8 The position in Northern Ireland is slightly different in that whilst the review of local administrative boundaries is a devolved matter, the review of local electoral boundaries is an excepted matter. But as the one is to a large measure dependent on the other, it is not proposed to alter the existing arrangements. 9 The functions conferred on the Local Government Commission by the Local Government and Rating Act 1997 and by the Greater London Authority (Referendum) Act 1998 will be similarly transferred to the Electoral Commission. 10 The Scotland Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act 1998 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998. 11 Schedule 2 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 already provides that elections and the registration of political parties are excepted matters. The funding of political parties is closely related to these two issues and in view of this the Bill, as introduced, will add it to the list of excepted matters.
| ||||
