Conclusions and recommendations
88. On the basis of the evidence we have taken this year, we
conclude that:
The Agencies' current priorities and plans
A. The process for setting the Agencies' priorities is
well established, but it is important that the Agencies are given
sufficient guidance in this area and the necessary resources to meet
these priorities to the best of their abilities. (Paragraph
14.)
B. We strongly support the Agencies' work in support
of UK and allied operations in the Gulf and the Balkans which continue
to be of some concern at this time. (Paragraphs
15-17.)
C. We continue to give our support to the Agencies' work
to counter the threats from terrorism, either at home or abroad, and
note the continuing need to allocate resources to this area of work.
(Paragraphs 15-21.)
D. The challenge of ensuring that GCHQ's New Accommodation
Project is brought in on time and to cost with no interruption to
operating capabilities during this reorganisation is a daunting one,
which will demand the highest levels of management and technical skills.
(Paragraph 19.)
IT Systems
E. It is important that the Agencies make the best use
of the IT systems available to them, including collaborative projects
where appropriate. We intend to question the Agencies in the coming
year about their expertise and decision-making processes in this area.
(Paragraph 23.)
Y2K Compliance
F. Each of the Agencies assesses that the vast majority
of their systems, including all their key and vital systems, will
be proven compliant by September, and we are impressed by their thorough
approach. However, there is no room for complacency and we will be
seeking further updates from all the Agencies on this issue during
the autumn. (Paragraph 28.)
Recruitment
G. We are encouraged by the efforts taken by the Agencies
to overcome their difficulties in the recruitment of staff, notably
IT specialists by GCHQ. However, it is vitally important that the
Agencies are able to recruit staff with the necessary language skills,
and we intend to keep this situation under review. (Paragraph
29.)
Employment Tribunals
H. We believe that the introduction of an amendment to
the Employment Relations Bill to allow the Agencies' employees access
to employment tribunals was most unsatisfactorily handled. We strongly
support the right to have access to an employment tribunal and that,
if the Government requires special powers to guard national security,
we believe that the Commissioners should examine the use of those
powers. We recommend that you require any Minister exercising this
power to submit their direction to the Commissioners for their consideration.
We also recommend that this provision is incorporated in legislation.
(Paragraphs 31-34.)
Commissioners' reports
I. We believe that the Government should make available
to us the confidential annexes to the reports of the Commissioners,
to allow us to see how the Agencies follow the regulations and procedures
set down in law, and to form a view on their administration. (Paragraph
36.)
Expenditure
J. We have noted the position of the Agencies with regard
to the SIV settlement, and the difficulties that SIS and the Security
Service envisage in the third year. We shall continue to pay close
attention to the ability of the Agencies to meet their objectives
against realistic budget settlements. (Paragraphs
41-42.)
Publication of NAO Reports
K. With the agreement of the Chairman of the Public Accounts
Committee, we have seen that NAO reports on the acquisition and refurbishment
of Thames House and Vauxhall Cross. We were surprised that the reports
had not been published previously, and the Committee believes that
these NAO reports should be published. We believe that publication
would not in any way prejudice national security or compromise commercial
confidentialities. (Paragraph 43.)
L. We continue to value the special capabilities of the
NAO in advising over the unique value for money and expenditure issues
in respect of the Agencies. (Paragraph 43.)
GCHQ New Accommodation Project
M. We will continue to follow closely the plans for GCHQ's
new accommodation project. We consider it vitally important that the
particular lessons of the Vauxhall Cross and Thames House projects
identified by the NAO in relation to estimates, objectives and the
cost of consultancy should be borne in mind by GCHQ at all stages
through the project, in order to ensure that similar difficulties
do not occur. (Paragraph 49.)
N. We recommend that the NAO reports on the New Accommodation
Project as soon as a contract is placed and we will report to you
on this matter in due course. (Paragraph
49.)
Sierra Leone
O. Following our examination of the Sierra Leone affair,
we noted the need to be able to provide secure communications equipment
and suitable protection to overseas posts at short notice. We intend
to question the Government further on the steps it has taken to meet
this requirement. (Paragraph 56.)
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
P. We have been informed by the Agencies about their
important work in seeking intelligence to help counter the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. However, we are concerned that there
appear to be inconsistencies between the information provided by the
Agencies and Government departments about whether sanctions and control
regimes are working effectively. We believe that if the Agencies were
more proactive they could produce better results in countering proliferation.
The work of the Agencies in countering proliferation is putting strain
on their resources, as the Agencies find themselves attempting to
cover new, high priority targets. Any additional work will clearly
put further pressure on the Agencies' resources which will need to
be carefully managed and may require the re-prioritisation of work.
(Paragraphs 61-66.)
Serious crime
Q. We have taken evidence from the Agencies and from
others, including the law enforcement agencies, about work to counter
serious crime. We note the scale of serious crime, most notably in
the area of drug smuggling and the involvement of Turkish groups,
and cigarette smuggling. (Paragraphs 68-70.)
R. On the basis of the evidence we took, we believe that
the current system of allocating resources to NCIS means that funding
will continue to be limited below the necessary level. (Paragraph
71.)
Commercial Encryption
S. We welcome the Government's proposals under the Electronic
Commerce Bill to include powers to issue orders for the production
of keys in order to decrypt material which has been lawfully acquired.
We intend to keep this issue under review. (Paragraph
73.)
Security Policies and Procedures
T. We continue to take a close interest in security policies
and procedures, and have tasked our Investigator to undertake a stocktaking
exercise in this area. (Paragraph 74.)
External records/files
U. We welcome the Home Secretary's agreement to the involvement
of Public Record Office officials in the examination of files identified
by the Security Service for destruction. This will allow for a degree
of independent scrutiny that we consider especially important. However,
we were disappointed that the Security Service continued to destroy
files during the review of this matter, and we strongly recommend
that there are no recurrences of such an event. (Paragraphs
78-79.)
V. We intend to examine the whole area of files in greater
detail, including issues relating to file creation and rights of access,
the verification of information, and the implications of data protection
and human rights legislation. (Paragraphs
81-82.)
Defence Intelligence Staff
W. The Defence Intelligence Staff plays a key role at
the heart of the United Kingdom's intelligence organisation. We intend
to take evidence on any changes of funding and structure of the DIS
and the implications that this might have for the Agencies, and its
contribution to the UK and Alliance's intelligence effort in the Kosovo
campaign. (Paragraph 83.)
Investigator
X. We believe that the appointment of the Investigator
has significantly enhanced the Committee's capability, and we have
already tasked him with his first investigation. We also believe that
the Agencies should be able to invite the deployment of the Investigator
into any particular matter which they wish to be investigated, although
he will be required to report to the Committee in the first instance,
under the terms of the Intelligence Services Act 1994. (Paragraph
86.)
Future programme of work
89. Over the course of the next year, we shall pursue a number of
issues identified elsewhere in this Report, including:
- the process of establishing the requirements and
priorities for the Agencies and the allocation of sufficient resources
to requirements;
- the details and costs of the PFI for GCHQ's New
Accommodation Project;
- the Agencies' ability to operate into the year
2000 and other Y2K issues;
- co-ordination between the Agencies and the law
enforcement organisations in fighting serious organised crime, in
particular the Agencies' work conducted overseas;
- the intelligence contribution to the Kosovo campaign
and the analysis of the material produced;
- in respect of personal files:
- whether individuals should have rights in connection with the
destruction or otherwise of any file held on them and protections
against having inaccurate information gathered, stored and used
against individuals' interests;
- the position under future/current data protection legislation;
and
- implications of the European Convention on Human Rights;
- recent measures taken to enhance the Agencies'
internal security policies and procedures; and
- any changes proposed in the funding and structure
of the DIS as a result of the Government's Strategic Defence Review,
and the implications that these may have for work of the Agencies.
90. We also propose to continue our inquiries into an area of
particular concern to the Committee, the Agencies' work in respect of
the security of Government communications and the UK's defences against
what is commonly termed information warfare. We will also be looking
into the Agencies' IT systems and co-operation between them and their
customers.
Signed TOM KING
Chairman, on behalf of the
Intelligence and Security Committee
30 July 1999
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