CHAPTER 3

HUNTING AND THE RURAL ECONOMY

3.1       This chapter discusses that part of our remit which required us to consider the impact of hunting, and of a ban on hunting, on "the rural economy".

The wider context

3.2       It is important to see the arguments in this chapter, and the following chapter, in the wider context of the economic and social changes which have taken place, and are taking place, in the countryside.

3.3       Hunting is set in the rural economy.  Within the areas classified as 'rural', the population has been growing.  The population of districts in England with a predominantly rural character grew faster between 1984 and 1998 (10.3%) than that of the country as a whole (5.3%).¹  Rather more than a fifth of rural residents receive incomes in excess of 150% of the national average.  However, the incomes of almost one-fifth are below 50% of the national average.  Unemployment in rural areas is generally lower than in the country as a whole: 4.2% in rural districts compared with 6.1% in England in 1998.  There is also evidence that rural businesses are more vibrant.²  Thus, in many rural areas, poverty exists cheek by jowl with affluence.³

3.4       Within this buoyant rural economy traditional industries have been in long-term relative decline.  There has been a continuing long-term decline in the agricultural labour force and some shift in composition with the number of full-time workers falling more rapidly than the casual or part-time.  The process has accelerated recently and the number of jobs has decreased sharply in the last few years.  During the twelve months to June 1999 more than 7% of jobs were lost.⁴

3.5       The decline in the number of people engaged in agriculture has been accompanied by a long-term downward trend in the aggregate income of the sector.  However, in the last few years, the fall in real income has been much more dramatic.  Between 1995 and 1998 an index of Total Income from Farming more than halved.⁵

3.6       Faced with a situation in which many farms are operating at a loss, there is a strong pressure to reduce costs.  Apart from shedding hired labour, farmers seek to reduce all other forms of expenditure, including investment in replacement machinery and equipment.  There are already signs that this will be insufficient to enable all the current farm businesses to survive.

3.7       The growth in employment which has taken place in the rural economy is largely in service industries, including banking, finance and insurance and other services.⁶  This is strongest in those regions with easy access to centres of business.  In the remoter areas, that is not the case.  Here, the service industries which may create new jobs tend to be linked to small scale processing and the tourism sector.  Many of the jobs created are part-time and seasonal.

3.8       Hunting, as an economic activity, is so small as to be almost invisible in terms of national aggregates.  However, it often takes place in these remoter regions where farming is vulnerable and there are few alternative jobs close at hand.  In these areas the impact of a ban on hunting would be much more severe in terms of employment and, from the viewpoint of some upland farmers, in relation to the viability of their businesses.

3.9       Within both agriculture and hunting much work is of a part-time seasonal nature.  The activities are often complementary, hunting having its largest need for labour during the winter months when work on most farms may be at a low level.  This points to the danger of relying only on estimates couched in the language of Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs).  These are needed to make comparisons with the overall labour use in the sector.  However, in many rural situations, the loss of part-time jobs may seriously affect the capacity of relatively poor households to survive within their communities.

3.10     This background helps to explain why there has been so much debate in the last few years about the job losses which would result from a ban on hunting.  The effect on jobs and on the rural economy has been one of the main planks of the arguments put forward by those who are opposed to a ban on hunting.  It is interesting to note, in passing, that this is in contrast to the position when the Scott Henderson Committee reported, when there was little mention of possible job losses.⁷

The jobs and economic activity that are supported by hunting

3.11      There are four main categories of paid employment which need to be calculated in order to estimate the present number of jobs which depend on hunting:

• direct employment by the hunts themselves - it is relatively easy in principle to collect good quality information by carrying out surveys of the hunts
• direct employment by hunt followers - mainly grooms.  This information is very much harder to collect since the precise number of hunt followers is not known and because it involves estimating what proportion of employees' time is divided between hunt and non-hunt activities and whether the motivation/reason for keeping a horse at all is related to hunting
• indirect employment by suppliers of goods and services to hunts and hunt followers - this information is also very difficult to collect.  One approach is to use surveys of a sample of businesses which supply the inputs needed by hunts.  An example is the BETA survey.⁸  Again, most of these businesses supply non-hunting activities as well as hunts and followers, so some division has to be made.  An alternative is to work backwards from the expenditure of hunts and followers, using a coefficient which estimates the employment content of these purchases in the supplying businesses
• induced employment - this is employment which results from the spending of their wages by all the direct and indirect employees identified in the previous three categories.

Research

3.12     In order to throw more light on potential job losses we commissioned some research from Public and Corporate Economic Consultants (PACEC).  As we explain in more detail below, PACEC's work⁹ has been helpful on a number of counts.  First of all, it has highlighted some of the methodological issues that have to be resolved in calculating the jobs which are dependent, directly or indirectly, on hunting.  Secondly, it has produced an estimate for the number of jobs which the hunts themselves provide (710 full-time equivalents) which, we think, will be generally accepted as being broadly accurate.  Thirdly, it has served to narrow down - but not to define precisely - the parameters for the other jobs which presently depend on hunting.  The fact that we are not able to give firmer figures reflects a number of difficulties  Some of them are methodological and some are more to do with the inherent problems in identifying accurately all the participants in hunting, especially the mounted followers, and in allocating their expenditure between hunting and all the other equestrian activities in which they may take part.

3.13     Many different estimates have been produced of the jobs dependent on hunting, ranging from about 4,000 to over 22,000.¹⁰

3.14     As PACEC note, these reflect differences of approach in, for example:

• the treatment of part-time and seasonal jobs
• calculating the number of participants
• allocating expenditure by hunts and followers to direct and indirect effects
• distinguishing the proportion of horse-related expenditure and employment which should be allocated specifically to hunting as opposed to other equestrian activities¹¹

3.15     We describe in the following paragraphs the approach which PACEC followed in attempting to estimate the direct and indirect employment from hunting.  We discuss the qualifications which need to be attached to the approach which they adopted and the figures which they produced.  Finally, we consider the different - but equally difficult - question of how many jobs would actually be lost if a ban on hunting was introduced.

Methodology used by PACEC

3.16     The approach used by PACEC was to develop a "social accounting matrix" i.e. an input-output table of the hunting economy and how it relates to the rest of the economy.  This table, which is reproduced below in summary form, shows all the relevant income and payment flows, as well as the number of FTE jobs which are either known or are estimated to result from the different types of expenditure.  (The figures should not be regarded as precise but as indicating orders of magnitude).

Table 3.1¹²      Social accounting matrix for the Hunting Economy - Summary Transactions Table

Direct effects - income, expenditure and employment of the hunts

3.17     We, and the researchers, were fortunate that the Countryside Alliance had already commissioned Produce Studies to carry out a survey of hunts in order to collect this information and that they were willing to make it available.  We are grateful for this.  We asked PACEC to validate and "clean-up" these data.  They did this, in part, by carrying out telephone surveys of hunt masters/treasurers where there appeared to be inconsistencies, although in general they were small.  The survey was also used as a means of collecting more detailed information on hunts' employment, income and expenditure.¹³

3.18     As a result of this work PACEC were able to produce "grossed-up" figures for the 302 registered hunts in England and Wales.  Inevitably, this covered only recorded cash in-flows and out-flows.  Voluntary labour and in-kind income are not included.  The figures are shown in the following table.

Table 3.2¹⁴      Grossed-up and adjusted estimates of employment, income and expenditure of all hunts (Preferred estimates, based on findings of the PACEC follow-up survey, and other adjustments)

* not examined in the Countryside Alliance questionnaire.

3.19     As can be seen, total income was £15.6 million.  The following table shows that just over half of this sum came from payments by members, subscribers and others following the hunt.  Closely-related sporting and recreational events contributed nearly 40 per cent.  Total revenue expenditure came to £14.2 million.  Nearly 40 per cent was accounted for by staff costs.

3.20     There is little doubt that PACEC’s estimate that the hunts employ the equivalent of 710 full-time employees in 811 jobs is close to the mark.  It is broadly consistent with the figure of 835 jobs in the National Survey of Hunts.¹⁶  Nearly all the other studies produce similar figures.¹⁷

3.21     The most significant feature about the spread of these jobs is that some 28% of the employment is based in the south west of England. 

Direct effects - expenditure and employment of hunt followers

3.22     As we mentioned in paragraph 3.11, information about direct employment by hunt followers is very much harder to collect than that for direct employment by the hunts themselves.  Some of the difficulties are :

• there is no accurate information about the numbers of hunt subscribers, followers and supporters - and, indeed, confusion about the precise meaning of each of these terms makes it hard to gather reliable data
• some people will subscribe to more than one hunt but, equally, it is possible to follow hunts without becoming a member: the National Survey of Hunts indicated that 40% of the total number of days spent on organised hunting each year comprised "visitor days", that is, attended by visitors who do not pay an annual subscription to the particular hunt¹⁸
• many hunts do not collect annual subscriptions from farmers on whose land they hunt¹⁹
• it is not easy to calculate precisely how much horse-related expenditure and employment can properly be ascribed to hunting.  For example, if someone buys a horse primarily in order to use it for hunting, but then also uses it for other activities, should all the expenditure/employment be counted or only that proportion which reflects the time the horse spends hunting?

3.23     Using information derived from the National Survey of Hunts, their telephone survey and elsewhere, PACEC produced estimated totals of 8,839 subscriber/member households and 9,826 "other supporter" households.  They then sought to estimate the amount spent by households on horse-related activity and what proportion could be ascribed to hunting.  Based on telephone interviews with a sample of subscriber/members and followers, PACEC calculated the total amount spent on all horse-related activity as some £124 million a year.²⁰  On the basis of information derived from their survey about the use made of horses for hunting and other activities, PACEC calculated that 51% of this expenditure could be regarded as hunting-related.

3.24     In the Countryside Alliance's view, the approach adopted by PACEC underestimates the amount of horse-related activity associated with hunting.  First, they argue that it underestimates the number of subscribers/members, followers and the number of households.  They consider, in particular, that it overestimates the extent of multiple membership and that it confuses following a hunt with membership or subscription to that hunt.²¹  In their view, Produce Studies' estimate of 16,700 subscriber/member households is more likely to be accurate.²²  Second, they argue that the figure of 51% used for hunting-related expenditure is too low, on the basis that time spent hacking or point-to-pointing should not necessarily be viewed as an entirely separate activity from hunting.²³

3.25     The breakdown of expenditure in the PACEC analysis is shown in the following table.

Table 3.4²⁴      Breakdown of followers' expenditure on hunting

3.26     PACEC's next step was to estimate the number of FTE jobs and the average full-time equivalent wage, based on their estimate of hunt followers' expenditure on wages.  This was done by using information from the sample survey, which implied that each FTE employee could look after an average of 16.9 horses and would be paid a full-time equivalent wage of £8,000.  They also estimated that the total number of horses involved in hunting was 50,000, which compares with BETA's estimate that 56,000 horses are used primarily for hunting.^{25 26}

3.27     On the basis of their figures, PACEC estimate that the number of FTE employees paid by followers is 1,497 and that they would be paid a full-time equivalent wage of £8,000.²⁷

3.28     This figure compares with Produce Studies' estimate of 6,100 jobs.  PACEC argue that the discrepancy is much lower if the latter figure is expressed as FTEs.  Depending on the precise method used for converting jobs to FTEs, it would translate to between 2,200 and 2,850 FTEs.  Thus, the difference between the two sets of figures is some 700-1,350 FTEs.

3.29     The Countryside Alliance argue that there is a flaw in the methodology used by PACEC to calculate the number of FTE grooms and the estimate of the total number of hunting horses.  And that, when this is combined with the underestimation of expenditure by followers on hunting, PACEC understate the number of FTEs attributable to hunting who are employed by members/subscribers.  They also dispute the PACEC calculation which translates the number of jobs in the Produce Studies data into FTEs and continue to argue that the difference between the two sets of figures is bigger than claimed by PACEC.²⁸

Reconciling participants’ expenditure with hunt income and expenditure

3.30     We suspect that the PACEC analysis understates the amount of economic activity that goes into supporting hunt followers.  In part, this reflects the extent to which much of the work is unpaid or is difficult to allocate to different activities.  However, it is in the nature of social accounts that incomes and expenditures need to balance.  In this case the bulk of the participants’ expenditure goes on horses but they also make payments direct to hunts for subscriptions and social activities.  It is a useful check to see how far the estimate of expenditure by followers coincides with the estimate of the hunts’ income from followers.

3.31     There were two categories where reconciliation was necessary.  There was a difference of some £3.3 million between the income which the hunts reported receiving from followers (£8.0 million) and the sums which followers themselves estimated that they had spent (£11.3 million). PACEC decided that the hunts' figure was more likely to be reliable, mainly because the survey of hunts was much more extensive than that of followers.²⁹  This left the problem of how to treat the remaining £3.3 million of estimated expenditure.  The researchers decided to treat half of it as a reporting error and to allocate the other half to the remaining expenditure categories, which we are about to discuss.³⁰

3.32     The second discrepancy (£6.8 million) is between the amount which followers reported spending on hunts' social and recreational activities and the income (mainly gross, according to the returns) which hunts themselves reported as receiving.  PACEC consider that the discrepancy can largely be explained by the fact that the participants' gross expenditure would include items like travel and food and drink which would not normally be included in the hunts' gross income figures.  In line with their experience of other voluntary organisations, the researchers decided to allocate to the hunt about half of supporters' gross expenditure on balls and point-to-points, and 60% of the expenditure on other animal or sporting events.³¹

3.33     Although we suspect that the analysis, if anything, understates the impact of the horse-owning activities of hunt followers on the local economy, these calculations provide some reassurance that the outcome of the calculation of expenditure by hunt followers is plausible.

Indirect employment resulting directly from supplying goods and services to hunts and hunt followers

3.34     In order to estimate the expenditure and employment generated indirectly through the spending by those businesses directly supplying hunts and their followers, PACEC carried out a survey of over 150 businesses known to be particularly strongly linked to hunting.³²  This produced a certain amount of information but its usefulness was limited by reluctance on the part of some of them to reveal sales and operating expenditure.³³  This information was therefore considered in conjunction with information available nationally about expenditure in these sectors on employment costs.  Employment impacts were then estimated for two groups of businesses: those with a heavy emphasis on horses or hunting and those which were more like the generality of the economy.  PACEC estimated that this produced a total of 680 FTE jobs in the first category and 400 FTE jobs in the second.³⁴

3.35     PACEC then calculated the "second and subsequent round" expenditure and employment derived from hunting.  This comes from the expenditure/jobs which are created further back in the economy by the money spent by the suppliers to hunts and hunt followers on, for example, raw materials.  This was done by applying the average UK ratio of sales to employment for the various industries and apportioning it between urban and rural-based businesses.³⁵  This resulted in an estimated 710 jobs, producing an estimated total of 1992 FTEs dependent on the direct and indirect result of purchases by hunts and followers.³⁶

Induced employment

3.36     The final category of employment which PACEC had to calculate was induced employment i.e. the jobs created in turn by the expenditure by all the direct and indirect employees of their wages.  They estimated that these totalled 1,525 FTEs.  It should be noted that a smaller proportion of these jobs are likely to be in rural areas since the expenditure concerned will be spent on goods and services across the UK and abroad.

Summary of calculations of employment dependent on hunting

3.37     Pulling all these figures together, we can see that PACEC's calculations produce the following figures.

Table 3.5

Conclusions

3.38.    We mentioned in paragraph 3.15 that we needed to attach some qualifications to the estimates produced by PACEC and, indeed, it will have been clear from the account we have just given that a number of the assumptions and figures which they have used are capable of being challenged.

3.39     We consider that the "social accounting matrix" approach which PACEC adopted (see paragraph 3.16) is a useful approach but it has its limitations.  In particular, it relies heavily, like all models, on the accuracy of the data which is inputted.  There are particular problems in applying a model of this kind to a very small sector of the economy, like hunting, and especially one which operates in many respects in quite an informal way.  For example, many businesses do not keep separate accounts of their receipts from different types of customer.  So, payments by people for horse-related equipment which they may or may not use for hunting are unlikely to be distinguished in the records of the retailers.  Similarly, those who buy items may use them for a number of purposes.  Electricity bought to light the stables will not be paid separately from that used for the farm as a whole.  Grass grazed by horses may not be separate from that used by sheep.  Horses which are used to train may be regarded as part of hunting expenditure where the aim is to enable a child to join the hunt, or as part of riding expenditure where hunting is not particularly in mind.  Moreover, because it is difficult to use national average data to check on a sector that has a distinctive and different pattern of resource use, one is driven to relying more heavily on the quality of the data that is collected through surveys - with all the difficulties which we have just described.

3.40     Another limitation of the "social accounting matrix" approach is that it is essentially a financial model.  In order to translate the financial figures into employment it is necessary to use some factor which represents payment per job.  This can be done only in terms of FTEs.  However, in the rural sector generally, and in hunting in particular, part-time work is likely to supply a large part of the total input.  This means that the number of jobs affected will be substantially greater than the FTEs, although we do not know how much greater.

3.41     A more fundamental point, in some ways, is that a "social accounting matrix" approach cannot take account of the fact that, in common with many rural recreation activities, many followers of hunts make an unpaid input into hunting from their own land and by their own labour.  This includes the voluntary activities of hunt members.  Some examples are looking after dogs in kennels, organising and managing fund raising activities, tending horses kept at home and supplying part of their food.  These activities will often be carried out, within an overall farm business, without being separately identified from general farm expenditure.  Sometimes these inputs are rewarded by payment in kind: for example, volunteers who look after horses may be allowed to ride them without payment.  This part of the employment generated by hunting cannot be precisely measured, even by those who supply it.  Equally, it is not clear how much of it would be redirected to other activities should hunting cease.  Despite this, in coming to a view on the totality of land and labour used in hunting, those who take part recognise it as significant.  Although these activities cannot be covered in studies of formal paid employment, they nevertheless form part of the real resources devoted to hunting.

3.42     For all these reasons we think that, despite the contribution which PACEC's work has made in clarifying some of these issues, it is not possible to give any very precise estimate of the numbers of jobs/FTEs which can be regarded as being dependent on hunting.  There is general agreement that the number of FTEs directly employed by the hunts is about 700.  But, as we have explained, it is very difficult to produce an accurate figure for the number employed by those who take part in hunting and, consequently, for those jobs which flow from other, indirect and induced, expenditure and employment.  Nonetheless, even allowing for all the uncertainties, we are satisfied that the number of FTE jobs dependent on hunting is fewer than 10,000 and that it is probably somewhere in the region of 6,000-8,000.  In terms of the total number of people affected the figure could be significantly higher.  The Countryside Alliance cite the Produce Studies' estimate that some 70% of the people employed by hunt followers work part-time, work for only part of the year, or work part-time for part of the year.  Applying the principle that two part-time or part-year employees equates to one FTE, the total number of people employed  by hunt followers might be some 70% higher than the number of FTEs.³⁷

3.43     We estimate that somewhere between 6,000 and 8,000 full-time equivalent jobs presently depend on hunting, although the number of people involved may be significantly higher.  About 700 of these jobs (involving some 800 people) result from direct employment by the hunts.  Another 1,500 to 3,000 full-time equivalent jobs (perhaps involving some 2,500 to 5,000 people) result from direct employment on hunting-related activities by those who are engaged in hunting.  The remaining jobs, in a wide variety of businesses, are indirectly dependent on hunting.  Of these, many will be in urban, rather than rural, areas.

The effects of a ban

Factors to be considered

3.44     It is one thing to estimate the number of jobs, direct or indirect, which are dependent on hunting.  It is an entirely different matter, however, to estimate what the effects would be on those jobs - and, more importantly, on the people involved - if hunting was banned.

3.45     Factors which need to be taken into account are:

• the extent to which other activities, especially equestrian activities, would serve as a replacement for hunting
• the extent to which other changes in the rural economy would offset losses in expenditure and employment
• how the money presently spent on hunting would be expended
• the extent to which the impact would be increased, or reduced, by the part- time and seasonal nature of much of the work
• the extent to which other economic activities related to hunting or using hunt labour, such as point-to-point, National Hunt and riding schools would be affected
• the impact on pubs, hotels and so on of lost trade from those visitors who come to the area to take part in, or to observe, hunting
• the significance of unpaid and voluntary work
• the uneven nature of the impact in different rural areas
• the timescale over which changes would occur
• the nature of the adjustment that would be needed.

3.46     It is impossible to predict with any certainty what would happen in practice.  What we can say with some confidence is that, even on a worst case scenario, not all the jobs presently dependent on hunting would be lost.  In particular, we believe that only a small proportion of horse owners would immediately seek to get rid of their horses if a ban was introduced.  It is much more likely that many would take up other equestrian activities, reduce the use of their horses or not buy new horses when the time came to replace them.  Any reduction in jobs flowing from decreased use of horses for hunting would therefore be gradual rather than immediate.

3.47     It is also important to note that a proportion of the induced employment which is dependent on hunting does not form part of the rural economy at all.  It relates to goods and services which are supplied by urban providers, some of which will be based outside the UK.

3.48     We can also be confident that there would be some job losses if hunting was banned.  Even if drag and bloodhound hunting expanded - and we argue in a later chapter that these activities would be unlikely to see major growth in the short term - they would take up only some of the slack.  In particular, because drag and bloodhound hunts use fewer hounds, there would be a need for fewer kennelmen.  It is also likely that there would be fewer non-mounted followers since both sports appeal primarily to riders.

Changes in the rural economy

3.49     As we noted in paragraph 3.8, hunting forms an extremely small part of the national economy.

3.50     It is true to say that, from a macro-economic perspective, the number of jobs which are presently dependent on hunting is very small compared with the jobs which, as we noted in paragraph 3.4, have been lost in agriculture or for that matter, in other sectors such as mining or shipbuilding.  We know that, although agricultural employment has declined, it has been more than compensated for by increases in other sectors: rural employment increased by nearly 600,000 in the 1980's and 1990's.  This trend is expected broadly to continue, as illustrated in the following table.

Table 3.6³⁸      Employment trends and change in England and Wales

3.51     The following table also shows that employment in all rural areas in England and Wales is projected to go on increasing, including in the south west region.

Table 3.7³⁹      Regional breakdown of employment trends and change in rural areas

3.52     However, as we noted in paragraph 3.7, the growth in employment which has been taking place in the rural economy has largely been in service industries and has been strongest in those areas within easy reach of urban centres.

3.53     It was suggested to us that job losses might be mitigated through increased tourism and recreation in the countryside as a result of improved public access resulting from the Countryside and Rights of Way Bill currently before Parliament.  It seems to us, however, that there is little available evidence to suggest that significant numbers of people are currently constrained from visiting the countryside because of lack of public access (or, indeed, because of objections to hunting, as was also suggested in evidence).  The UK Day Visits Survey, undertaken by Social and Community Planning Research, showed that, in 1998, 34% of households in England did not visit the countryside at all.⁴⁰  The reasons given did not relate to hunting or to lack of access.

3.54     Similarly, a recent survey by MVA Ltd showed that the majority of the respondents (69%) did not think than an extension of their access rights to open country would lead to a change in their use of the countryside.⁴¹  Curry and Ravenscroft suggest that, when the data are grossed up to reflect the entire population, the findings show that approximately 2% of England's population would spend an extra one to two hours in the countryside, particularly in woodlands and along watersides, if access to open country became law.⁴²

3.55     It is important to note too that job losses would not be evenly spread across all rural communities.⁴³  It is highly probable, therefore, that, in particular localities such as some of the villages in Exmoor, they would not be compensated for, at least in the short term, by projected employment growth.

Effect on farmers

3.56     Many farmers too would no doubt feel that they had suffered a financial loss if hunting was banned.  They would no longer be able to use the local hunt as a free "pest control" service or to use the hunt's volunteer labour for mending fences and gates. In addition, they would expect, rightly or wrongly, to experience more predation of lambs, poultry, piglets and game birds or more damage to their crops.

3.57     Those farmers who currently use the "fallen stock" service presently provided by many hunts would also be faced with potential additional costs.  This service involves the collection from farms of unsaleable dead farm animals or injured or sick animals.  The 200 hunts surveyed in the Produce Studies National Survey of Hunts indicated that they had handled some 336,000 carcasses in the previous 12 months.  Because of the different methods of calculating throughput, it is not easy to say what proportion of the total business this represented.

3.58     The fallen stock service used to be provided free of charge but, because of increased costs, mainly resulting from the additional restrictions imposed as a result of the BSE crisis, many hunts now charge small fees.  These charges, however, are substantially lower than those which would be charged by a licensed knacker’s service.  The evidence we received from the Countryside Alliance and the hunts indicated that this service would cease almost entirely, in the event of a ban on hunting.

3.59     It is not clear, in any case, whether all the hunts would be able to continue the fallen stock service even if hunting was not banned.  The EU Waste Incineration Directive introduces new requirements for hygiene and for incinerators.  PACEC’s report indicated that up to 19% of hunts had said that they would either upgrade their incinerator and continue a fallen stock collection or that they had been told that their incinerator already met the new requirements.⁴⁴

3.60     In the event of a ban, it seems plain that a large part , at the very least, of the existing service would cease.  This would clearly have financial consequences for farmers if they had to use a licensed knacker’s service instead.  Although it has been argued that this cost would not be significant, this would not necessarily be true for those farmers who had come to rely on the service provided by hunts.  Moreover, the cost would need to be seen against the backcloth of the depressed livestock industry.

3.61     A reduction in the fallen stock service would also have potential implications for the environment since farmers might resort more frequently than at present to burning or burying carcasses.  The latter carries a serious risk of contaminating water courses.

Effect on other businesses

3.62     The extent to which businesses supplying goods and services to the hunts and hunt followers would be affected by a ban on hunting would be determined by their relative dependency on hunting in relation to their overall supply and to the financial state of their business.  For some businesses which are only just viable, the loss of revenue, even if only representing a small proportion of total income, might be critical.  This could force some businesses to close, with a knock-on effect for local communities.  Because of the more remote location of some of these businesses, it cannot be assumed that custom lost by a specific individual or business would necessarily be picked up by another.

Effect on the horse economy

3.63     Hunting as an economic and social activity is intrinsically intertwined with other activities within the horse and countryside economy.  The horse economy is large, with an estimated 2.4 million participants in horse riding and 900,000 horses.⁴⁵  As we note in the following chapter, related activities and events include point-to-points, National Hunt, pony clubs and agricultural and country shows.  Other related interests include riding schools, veterinary surgeons, horse breeders, farmers and all the businesses which depend to a greater or lesser extent on hunting.  It is possible that, in the event of a ban on hunting, these businesses could be dealt a double blow.  Not only might they suffer a loss of income from hunting but, if the related activities were also affected, they might lose income from those activities too.

3.64     Among the points which were put to us were:

• the Association of British Riding Schools told us that their part of the equestrian industry has been struggling financially since the early 1990s and that livery for hunting and the hire of horses for hunting in many rural (and urban) areas is an essential part of riding schools’ business.⁴⁶  A survey of riding schools, recently conducted by the Association, found a dramatic decline in the number of schools in business, due to increases in the Uniform Business Rate, district council licensing fees, veterinary fees, insurance premiums and the cost of complying with new Health & Safety requirements
• the British Equine Veterinary Association estimates that several hundred veterinary surgeons deal regularly with horses involved in hunting, although many more may deal with them occasionally.⁴⁷  A recent poll amongst veterinary practices in Gloucestershire revealed that 36 out of 40 treat horses regularly and that in 9 of these practices equine work accounts for 75% of their caseload
• the Farriers Registration Council estimates that, in the worst case scenario, there would be a loss to the industry of around 32% of business.  It notes that, whatever the take-up of drag hunting or bloodhound hunting in the event of a ban, the frequency of shoeing for horses engaged in such activities is less than that for foxhunting.⁴⁸

3.65     In the event of a ban on hunting, there could also be a significant impact on point-to-pointing, National Hunt racing and other equestrian interests.  Among the points which were put to us were:

• the British Horse Racing Board has estimated that, at a minimum, at least one quarter of point-to-point venues would close as a consequence of a ban in hunting.⁴⁹  Such a shrinkage is estimated to lead to a drop of at least 25% in the total numbers of people and horses participating in the sport
• in terms of National Hunt, Hunter Chases, for horses which have hunted in the current season, make up 9-10% of the National Hunt steeplechase programme and these races would obviously be affected, with subsequent effects on employment
• there would be a loss in the breeding, training and trading of hunting, point-to-point and National Hunt horses, as well as general horse-related services and specialist services specifically related to this sector of the industry, including insurance and transportation.  In the event of a ban on hunting, there might be a decline in breeding activity as dressage and showjumping horses are imported at high prices from the Continent
• current employment associated with point-to-points is obviously predominantly rural, involving some 660 trainers, 1,000 stable staff, vets, farriers, transporters, feed and forage merchants and a variety of other services, including breeders, stud staff and agents.⁵⁰  A reduction in the volume of point-to-pointing might lead to job losses in these businesses
• in addition, there might be a knock-on effect on the professional racing industry.  Of the 523 professional licensed trainers (employing over 5,300 stable staff), 56% are located away from the five main training centres (Newmarket, Lambourn, Middleham, Malton and Epsom).  These trainers rely on local suppliers whose economic viability depends on the existence of sufficient demand, part of which arises from the local hunt 
• the UK is the centre of the “eventing” world, which also has its roots in hunting.  The British Equestrian Trade Association predicts a decline in eventing over the longer term as fewer young people grow up in a hunting environment⁵¹
• as other equestrian activities declined in popularity following a ban on hunting, BETA predicts that showjumping would become more popular, but large indoor facilities would be in much greater demand and unaffiliated showjumping events held in farmers’ fields would become less frequent.⁵²

3.66     In addition to various consequential effects of a ban on hunting on other equine sporting events, there might be similar changes to dog shows and other canine events.  For example, the Hound Trailing Association told us that a ban on hunting could lead to them losing permission to run on some landowners' courses.⁵³

3.67     In summary, a ban on hunting ban could set in train a series of interlocking reactions which would affect a wide range of equestrian activities and businesses and might alter the structure of the equestrian industry as a whole.  BETA predicts that, without hunting to sustain it, equestrian activity would be likely to change to a more elitist model, akin to that which exists in Germany, over a generation or so.  As the rural riding school sector continued to decline, exacerbated by the loss of hunting livery income, riding centres would become more like clubs, with good facilities and a more affluent customer base, and would be concentrated in the suburbs of the larger conurbations.  They note that even now many of the major equestrian establishments are not in rural areas.  This would lead to a growing interest in indoor equestrian activity, particularly in dressage.  Concurrently, there would be an increase in less well-managed establishments, offering low cost options with lower standards to cater for a declining lower end of the market.  As riding became more elitist, BETA predicts that fewer people would take part, with a decline to around 1.4m riders.  In such a reduced market place, surviving businesses would be larger and more profitable and the breeding industries would produce predominantly dressage horses.⁵⁴

Effect on individuals

3.68     Another very important factor to bear in mind is that the people who would be displaced from the jobs which are dependent on hunting would not necessarily be suitable for the new jobs being created.  This was a point emphasised to us by the TGWU and the Union of Country Sports Workers in their evidence to us.^{55 56}  Most of the people employed by hunts and hunt followers fall into an employment group which is expected to decline over the next ten years.  Many of those displaced would not have - or would find it difficult to acquire - the skills and qualifications needed.⁵⁷  Some thought would need to be given to ways in which the people concerned might be re-trained.

3.69     Research in other areas suggests that, while some of those who are displaced would find jobs almost immediately, a larger number would not do so for some time or might drop out of the labour market altogether.  The process of adjustment could be severe for the individuals involved, their families and, in some cases, for local communities.

3.70     Another important factor is that a person's income may be made up of a number of different income sources.  For example, someone may have seasonal employment or supplement their income from work during the week with money earned at weekends.  In this situation, if one of these elements is put at risk, the individual's financial situation as a whole can be endangered.  How serious this would turn out to be in practice would depend on the actual jobs available to that person, not the total number of vacancies available in the region. To people who would be displaced by hunting, this makes the state of the related employment sectors - farming, tourism, horse-related recreation and forestry - of particular importance.  Here, again, the use of aggregated data, even those used for remote rural regions, may not really shed much light on the way in which individuals would actually be affected by a ban on hunting.

3.71     As we noted earlier on, too, the rural economy involves a good deal of unpaid work in which people either give up their time voluntarily or for payment in kind.  It is very difficult to predict what the effects would be of a ban on employment of this kind and how much of it would be redirected to other activities.

Conclusions

3.72     In view of all the uncertainties, it is not possible to give a precise figure for the number of jobs which would be lost if hunting were banned.  In terms of national employment statistics, the short-term loss would be limited, and extend not much further than those employed by the hunt, and some employed by those hunt followers who immediately reduced their use of horses.  In the medium term, say three to five years, more losses would occur as hunt followers brought their horse numbers into line with current use.  Losses would also arise in the wider rural economy, in particular the horse economy, although in part they would be offset by other changes, including expenditure being diverted into other activities.  In the long term, say seven to ten years, most (if not all) of the effects would be offset as resources were diverted to new activities and the rural economy adjusted to other economic forces.

3.73     In terms of national resource use, the economic effects of a ban on hunting would be unlikely to be substantial, especially in the context of the drastic changes taking place in the agricultural sector.  However, at least in the short and medium term, the individual and local effects would be more serious.  Most jobs that are directly dependent on hunting are in the land-based sector.  Some of those directly affected have specialised skills which would not transfer easily, and they would find it hard to find alternative employment.  For these people especially, the adjustment process could be painful.  Some thought would have to be given to the possibilities for re-training and acquiring new skills.

3.74     For some businesses that are on the borderline of viability, the loss of revenue could lead to a bigger impact than the direct effect may suggest.  For a small number of local communities which depend to a significant extent on hunting, and where there are limited alternative employment opportunities, the effects could also be more serious.

3.75     Farmers would lose the benefit of a recreation they value.  In addition, many of them would feel that they had suffered an economic loss since a free "pest control" service would have been removed; they would expect more predation of lambs, poultry, piglets and game birds; and they would lose the "fallen stock" service provided by many hunts.  The negative impacts of a ban would be particularly resented because they would be viewed as unnecessary by many of those affected, and as an avoidable addition to other problems facing the farming community.

² Ibid

³Rural Economies.  Performance and Innovation Unit. 1999.  (PIU report)

⁴ Agriculture in the United Kingdom (AUK), various editions, MAFF; and MAFF Statistics News Release, 12 January 2000

⁵ MAFF AUK 99

⁶ PIU report Chart 5.1. Table 5.1

⁷ Report of the Committee on Cruelty to Wild Animals, paragraphs 133-137. Cmd 8266

⁸ National Equestrian Survey 1999.  British Equestrian Trade Association (BETA)

⁹ The Economic Effects of Hunting with Dogs.  Public and Corporate Economic Consultants (PACEC),

    49-53 Regent Street, Cambridge CB2 1AB (‘PACEC’)

¹⁰ PACEC, Table 2.1

¹¹ Ibid,2.4.4 and 2.4.5

¹² Ibid, Table 1.1

¹³ Ibid, 1.2.8

¹⁴ Ibid, Table 3.3

¹⁵ Ibid, Table 3.4

¹⁶ CA2, 2.1.3

¹⁷ PACEC, Table 2.1

¹⁸ CA2, 2.2.15

¹⁹ Ibid, 2.2.15

²⁰ PACEC, 1.2.6 and Table 4.1

²¹ CA2, 2.2.15-2.2.16

²² Ibid, 2.2.19

²³ Ibid, 2.2.23

²⁴ PACEC, Table 4.2

²⁵ PACEC, 4.3.2

²⁶ BETA 1, 3.03

²⁷ PACEC, 4.4.3

²⁸ CA2, 2.11.4

²⁹ PACEC, 5.2.3

³⁰ Ibid, 5.2.4

³¹ Ibid, 5.2.5-5.2.7

³² Ibid, 5.3.1

³³ Ibid, 5.3.2

³⁴ Ibid, 5.3.8

³⁵ Ibid, 5.3.10

³⁶ Ibid, 5.3.12

³⁷ CA2, 2.11.13

³⁸ PACEC, Table 6.7

³⁹ Ibid, Table 6.8

⁴⁰ U.K. Day Visits Survey.  Social and Community Planning Research

⁴¹ Access to the Open Countryside: Measuring Potential Demand. Report to the Countryside Agency

⁴² Assessing the Demand for Countryside Recreation: A Case Study in the County of Surrey, Draft Final Report to the Countryside Agency, London, Curry N and Ravenscroft N (2000)

⁴³ PACEC, 6.4.5

⁴⁴ PACEC, 3.7.4

⁴⁵ National Equestrian Survey, 1999

⁴⁶ Association of British Riding Schools 2

⁴⁷ British Equine Veterinary Association 1, Para 1,2

⁴⁸ Farriers' Registration Council, 1,3

⁴⁹ British Horse Racing Board 1and 2

⁵⁰ Ibid 18

⁵¹ BETA 1, un-numbered

⁵² Ibid, un-numbered

⁵³ Hound Trailing Association, Ltd 2, un-numbered

⁵⁴ BETA 1, un-numbered

⁵⁵ Rural & Agricultural and Allied Workers (TGWU) 1, un-numbered

⁵⁶ Union of Country Sports Workers 1, 4(a)

⁵⁷ PACEC, 6.4.6

We welcome your comments on this site. Prepared 12 June 2000