| Intelligence and Security Committee - The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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THE MITROKHIN INQUIRY REPORT INTRODUCTION 1. On Monday 13 September 1999, the Home Secretary, the Rt. Hon. Jack Straw MP, after consultation with the Prime Minister, invited the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) to conduct an inquiry into the intelligence and security agencies' handling of the information provided by Mr Mitrokhin (Annex A). The ISC's Chairman, the Rt. Hon. Tom King C.H., MP, on behalf of the Committee, accepted the Home Secretary's invitation on the same day. 2. This invitation followed the Times newspaper's publication on Saturday 11 September 1999 of a serialisation of ''The Mitrokhin Archive'' written by Mr Vasili Mitrokhin and Professor Christopher Andrew. The Mitrokhin Archive was based on the secret notes that Mr Mitrokhin had produced as chief archivist of the KGB records, and cover the period 1917 to 1984. This was the first public disclosure that Mr Mitrokhin and his material existed and that there were Soviet spies in the UK that had never been caught and prosecuted. 3. The paper's front-page story revealed the identity of a Soviet atom spy who had not been prosecuted by the authorities, Mrs Melita Norwood, code-named HOLA. She had actively spied for the Soviets in the post war period and continued even after the organisation that employed her stopped doing classified work for the UK Government and her security clearances were not renewed. She had remained in contact with the KGB until her retirement. The article also identified John Symonds, code-named SCOT, as another KGB agent who had never been prosecuted by the UK for espionage. 4. The Mitrokhin Archive was being serialised in the Times prior to its formal publication on 20 September and it also formed the basis of part of a BBC series by the journalist David Rose. The BBC series, and articles in the press, also identified other ''spies'' who had never been prosecuted by the UK authorities but had been identified in the records of the former East German Secret Police, the Stasi. 5. This burst of publicity about hitherto unknown matters gave rise to considerable public concern. These focused primarily on:
6. On 16 September 1999 the ISC sent a questionnaire (Annex B) to the SIS, Security Service, Home Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Cabinet Office/No.10 and the Legal Secretariat to the Law Officers. 7. The Home Secretary wrote to the ISC Chairman on 8 October establishing the inquiry's terms of reference (Annex C). During the Home Secretary's statement to the House on 21 October 1999, the ISC Chairman and Committee members stressed the need for access to papers, including advice to Ministers, to allow them to conduct a thorough inquiry. Although there was some delay in reaching agreement about the papers, the request was eventually met in full. 8. In the event the Committee received the responses to the whole questionnaire on 16 November, although no papers were included. On 18 November the Clerk to the ISC requested copies of relevant papers, which were given to the Committee in separate bundles - the last set was delivered on 7 December 1999. The Committee also took oral and written evidence from a number of witnesses. A list of witnesses can be found at Annex D. 9. This Report covers the three key concerns identified by the Committee. There is also a brief summary of key events for reference. The Report is supported by a number of annexes, which contain summaries of the detailed evidence given to the Committee during the inquiry; it contains a brief section on how Mr Mitrokhin brought his valuable material to the UK, and it pays tribute to the courage and commitment of Mr Mitrokhin who worked at great personal risk to ensure that the work of the KGB and its predecessors was exposed to the world. 10. Turning to the Annexes: a. Annex A is the Home Secretary's statement on 13 September 1999. b. Annex B is the questionnaire the Committee sent to Departments and Agencies at the start of the inquiry. c. Annex C is the letter from the Home Secretary establishing the Government's terms of reference for the inquiry. d. Annex D is the list of witnesses. e. Annex E is a complete summary of events in the handling of the Mr Mitrokhin's material by the Agencies and Departments, supported by extracts from submissions, meeting records and oral evidence. f. Annex F covers the handling of Mr Mitrokhin's material by the SIS. g. Annexes G and H describe the way the Security Service handled the information from Mr Mitrokhin's material and the formal procedure for handling such material. h. Annex I describes the current procedure within the Security Service for informing Ministers and senior officials about espionage cases. i. Annex J outlines the Security Service assessment of Mrs Norwood activities as a spy. 11. The Committee, during the course of the inquiry, had the opportunity to meet Vasili Mitrokhin. The Committee believes that he is a man of remarkable commitment and courage, who risked imprisonment or death in his determination that the truth should be told about the real nature of the KGB and their activities, which he believed were betraying the interests of his own country and people. He succeeded in this, and we wish to record formally our admiration for his achievement. The Committee believes that the poor media handling of the publication of The Mitrokhin Archive, which allowed the emphasis to fall on the UK spies, detracted from the brave work of Mr Mitrokhin and the importance of the revelations about the KGB's work he wanted to expose. We are aware that the Western Intelligence communities are extremely grateful for Mr Mitrokhin's material, which has shown the degree to which the KGB influenced and penetrated official organisations. Historians also find The Mitrokhin Archive of tremendous value, as it gives a real insight into the KGB's work and the persecution of dissidents. 12. The material Mr Mitrokhin brought with him has been described by the SIS as ''a case of exceptional counter-intelligence significance, not only illuminating past KGB activity against Western countries but also promising to nullify many of Russia's current assets''. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) described the material as ''the most detailed and extensive pool of CI (counter-intelligence) ever received by the FBI". The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) described the Mr Mitrokhin's material as ''the biggest CI bonanza of the postwar period". To have carried the initial contact with Mr Mitrokhin right through to his and his family's successful exfiltration, together with all his material, represents a major achievement by SIS. In addition the management of the material and its dissemination, as appropriate, to foreign liaison services was well handled. The Committee wish to pay tribute to this outstanding piece of intelligence work. How Mr Mitrokhin reached the UK 13. On 24 March 1992 Vasili Mitrokhin walked into the British Embassy in the capital of a Baltic State and asked to see a member of staff. *** *** Directorate from 1948-84 and had written a number of volumes
detailing KGB activities abroad, drawing on his experiences. He mentioned
volumes concerning the UK, Australia, Canada***. 14. The Embassy then arranged for a SIS interview team to be in *** for Mr Mitrokhin's visit, which took place on 9 April. Mr Mitrokhin provided his full name and personal details, stating that he had served in the First Chief Directorate in Moscow, and under alias abroad in the 1950s. He also handed over 10 envelopes, containing over 2000 closely typed pages of information apparently culled from KGB files. *** *** by codename, with sufficient detail to allow identification in most cases. There was a similar but shorter list of agents and confidential contacts in the UK volume. 15. Mr Mitrokhin said that his main objective in writing and handing over these volumes had been to inflict as much damage as possible to the old KGB and party nomenklatura. He agreed to return in June with additional material and commented that he had unsuccessfully offered the documents to the Americans ***. 16. The above is taken from the submission from the SIS to Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd, then Foreign Secretary, on 1 May 1992 and explains how Mr Mitrokhin came to pass on his archive to the UK. Mr Mitrokhin had a further two meetings with SIS officials before agreeing in September 1992 to come covertly to the UK for two months to help officials understand his archive. Permission was then sought from Douglas Hurd to exfiltrate Mr Mitrokhin and his family in October 1992, approval was given and the operation was successfully completed. 17. Once Mr Mitrokhin's material reached the UK it was translated and assessed by the SIS and passed to the Security Service or liaison services as appropriate. This process started in May 1992 and continues. The SIS and Security Service produced summary reports for ministers on Mr Mitrokhin's material in July 1995. There then followed a discussion on how to fulfil Mr Mitrokhin's wish that the material was published and the Government's view that any publication would need to be controlled. There was also a risk that the story might leak, particularly due to the prosecution of a Mitrokhin identified agent in the US, and the Government would then lose control of the publication agenda. 18. A submission was put to the Foreign Secretary, Rt. Hon. Malcolm Rifkind, in March 1996 for authority to start the publication project and for Professor Andrew to work with Mr Mitrokhin's material. The submission also established that there would be further submissions before actual publication and recommended the establishment of an interdepartmental working group to oversee the publication project. Malcolm Rifkind agreed to the publication project and established criteria for any naming of people in the publication. 19. In the submission to Malcolm Rifkind it was stated that a parallel submission was being made to the Home Secretary, Rt. Hon. Michael Howard. In the event Michael Howard did not see a written submission but was advised orally. The interdepartmental working group was then established to oversee the draft publication and to ensure that the book was cleared by liaison services and that the Rifkind criteria were met. 20. In October 1997 the new Foreign Secretary, Rt. Hon. Robin Cook, was informed about the publication project and he informed No. 10 to ensure the Prime Minister was content with the publication project. In December 1998 the Home Secretary, Rt. Hon. Jack Straw, was informed about the publication project and told that the book would raise the issue of a KGB spy known to the Security Service but who had not been prosecuted. The submission did not identify the spy. 21. In March 1999 the Security Service consulted the Law Officers to see if they could take action against Mrs Norwood with a view to a prosecution under the Official Secrets Act. The Attorney General, Rt. Hon. John Morris, stated that there was no decision for him to take as 1992 had represented the last opportunity for any prosecution. The Security Service then took no action against Mrs Norwood. 22. Later in March 1999 Robin Cook was asked to authorise publication of the book. He was told in the submission that both the Home Secretary and the Attorney General were being consulted and clearing the details of the UK chapters. This was not the case. Robin Cook authorised the publication in April 1999, and a copy of the draft book was passed to David Rose who was making a TV documentary on espionage matters for the BBC. 23. The interdepartmental working group was briefed in June 1999 that David Rose had identified Mrs Norwood as the spy code-named HOLA in The Mitrokhin Archive and that he planned to interview her. The working group initially declined to allow Professor Andrew to name Mrs Norwood in the book, but when it became clear that her name was going to be made public elsewhere they agreed to Mrs Norwood being named. This was a breach of the Rifkind criteria. At this time media lines to take were being developed by the working group, the FCO and the Home Office. These lines to take were submitted to ministers in September 1999. 24. The working group was informed that The Mitrokhin Archive was to be serialised in the Times prior to publication and the BBC programme. The book was also being trailed in the US and on Radio 4. This developed into a media race and on 11 September 1999 the Times published a story naming Mrs Norwood. 25. A full description of the events in the handling of the Mr Mitrokhin's material can be found in Annex E, with a brief summary of key dates over.
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