| Intelligence and Security Committee - The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report | ||||
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PUBLICATION METHOD AND HANDLING 42. The Committee identified three particular questions concerning the method and handling of the publication of The Mitrokhin Archive. These were:
Why was The Mitrokhin Archive published? 43. Mr Mitrokhin's reason for compiling the archive and bringing it to the West was to have it published. Mr Mitrokhin tried to give his archive to the US Authorities before successfully giving the material to the UK. In his evidence to the Committee, Mr Mitrokhin stated that getting his material published was a condition of his co-operation with the UK authorities and had been recorded in a letter he gave to the Embassy staff when he first made contact. It therefore became incumbent on the Government to ensure that the material was published in a controlled manner. This meant that not only was ministerial approval required to start the publication project, but it would be needed prior to final publication. 44. The Government decided that the best route to publish the material would be to approach an historian to research and collate the archive, with Mr Mitrokhin, and act as the editor for the published volumes. This approach, the SIS argued, would ensure that the SIS retained control of all the papers and that none would be published without FCO and Security Service clearance. 45. The objective of the publication project was to place Mr Mitrokhin's material in the public domain in a controlled and unsensational manner. In the submission to Malcolm Rifkind the SIS stated that the project would provide ''an important insight into the internal workings of the KGB while documenting the external subversive and espionage activities of the former communist state, most of which was unknown not only within Russia but even within the current Russian intelligence service. [The work] would describe a significant and usually hidden part of the 20th Century history which, to be properly understood, needs detailed, unsensational, scholarly exegesis.'' Mr Mitrokhin told the Committee that he is not happy with the way the book developed. He had wanted his material to be published in full, with an editor to craft it for the Western market. Mr Mitrokhin is not content with the way in which the book was published and he feels that he has not accomplished what he set out to achieve. He made it clear to us that he wished he had had full control over the handling of his material. Why was Professor Andrew chosen? 46. The SIS first approached Professor Andrew in 1995 with a view to being invited to participate in the publication project. The SIS regarded Professor Andrew as a safe pair of hands, who had worked previously *** on the Gordievsky books. Professor Andrew was also security cleared and had signed the Official Secrets Act. Professor Andrew agreed to complete the project, knowing that ministerial approval would be required before the book could be published. The SIS nominated Professor Andrew as the editor for the book in the 6 March 1996 submission to Malcolm Rifkind, the Foreign Secretary. 47. The Committee regards Professor Andrew as a distinguished academic who has specialised in the espionage field. He was a good choice to undertake this work. How was the publication project managed? 48. The Committee has examined the submission of 6 March 1996, which was put to the then Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind. The Director General of the Security Service also copied the submission, in parallel, to the PUS of the Home Office, together with a letter covering her views on publication. In the submission, Malcolm Rifkind was invited to:
49. The submission was also sent to the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Robin Butler, who passed it to the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon John Major, on 8 March 1996. In his note, Sir Robin Butler stated ''There is no immediate action for the Prime Minister because the submission is to the Foreign Secretary, and the Home Office will also be making sure that the Home Secretary is aware of it and the Security Service view on it." 50. Malcolm Rifkind endorsed the publication project, but he imposed a number of criteria on the publication project. The names of the people the KGB had targeted for recruitment or attempted to influence could not be made public unless they had been prosecuted and convicted or they had agreed to the release of their names. Malcolm Rifkind made it clear that he did not want the Security Service to decide whether or not names should be revealed and that this point did not only apply to British names. 51. While no written submission was made to Michael Howard, the Home Secretary, the then PUS at the Home Office, Richard Wilson, made him aware of the project. There was a meeting of the Home Secretary, Richard Wilson, the Director General and the Director General designate at which publication was mentioned. Sir Richard Wilson stated in addition in his evidence that while he raised the matter ''I would have steered Michael Howard away from spending any time on this at all". In a letter to Stella Rimington of 27 March, Richard Wilson agreed that establishing an interdepartmental working group was the best way forward. 52. The interdepartmental working group was then set up, under the chairmanship of the Intelligence Co-ordinator, with representatives from the SIS, FCO, Home Office and Security Service. The working group did not have any formal Terms of Reference to guide its work. However, the Chairman of the group stated that the group members understood the role of the group to be ensuring that the interests of all agencies and departments affected by the publication project were properly considered. The Chairman continued by stating that ''this amounted very largely to ensuring the policy on the exclusion of certain categories of information from the book was complied with". The working group met in July 1996, November 1996 and March 1997. It did not meet again until 1999. However, in the Committee's opinion, the group successfully managed the publication project through to the end of 1998. This involved gaining approval for the text from allies and friendly liaison services and endorsing the structure of the book. 53. On 23 October 1997 the FCO wrote to Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary, informing him of the publication project. In his evidence Sir John Kerr, the PUS in the FCO, agreed that this note ''could have said more'' and could have been ''more felicitously drafted". Not only did the note not describe in any detail the restrictions that Malcolm Rifkind had placed on the publication project, it stated that no British national will be named without Security Service agreement, which was not in accord with one of the Rifkind criteria. 54. The Committee was also surprised to discover that Jack Straw, the Home Secretary, was only informed about the publication project on 10 December 1998. The submission and the accompanying note from SIS were informative and contained some detail about ongoing Security Service investigations. The submission stated that the Security Service was considering the prosecution of an 86 year old spy, however it did not specifically mention Mrs Norwood (HOLA) or Mr Symonds (SCOT) as potential problem areas. The Home Secretary was additionally informed that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were aware of the project. 55. The Committee views the events that took place in 1999 as confused and it is of the opinion that officials failed to provide Ministers with the necessary support and advice. When the final submission was sent to the Foreign Secretary on 22 March 1999, it stated that the ''Security Service are clearing the detail contained in those chapters [on the UK] with the Home Secretary (who was briefed on the project in 1998, and is supportive) and the Attorney General.'' This was not accurate. No one was clearing the UK chapters with the Home Secretary, who had only noted the publication project in December 1998, and the Attorney General had only been consulted on the detail of one case at the time the submission went to the Foreign Secretary. 56. The interdepartmental working group met four times in 1999, in January, June, July and September. However, the Chairman of the working group noted in his evidence that representatives did not necessarily inform their ministers and senior officials of the working group's work and decisions. There were two significant occasions when the group agreed a course of action that was subsequently not carried out by the Home Office. One concerned the failure to consult the Home Secretary on interviewing Mrs Norwood (paragraph 32) and the second that the working group agreed in January 1999 that the book would need to be cleared by the Home Secretary. The latter failure by the Home Office to carry out the working group's decisions was important because the FCO told the Foreign Secretary that the Home Secretary was clearing the UK related material in a submission (see paragraph 56), when in fact he was not. 57. Additionally, the group's membership had no real experience in publication and media matters and while it did highlight the key issues the press would focus on, it failed to establish their importance. 58. The working group's control of the project was further complicated by the decision taken by the SIS to make available material from The Mitrokhin Archive to the journalist David Rose, who was making the BBC documentary ''The Spying Game". Whether or not aided by material from The Mitrokhin Archive or from other sources, David Rose identified HOLA as Mrs Norwood and told the book's publisher that he would be including her in his documentary. In the light of this the working group was persuaded by the book's publisher to include the names of Mrs Norwood and Mr Symonds. The Committee notes that this was technically in breach of the Rifkind criteria. Additionally, the publishers decided to serialise the book in the Times and to inform the Today programme on Radio 4 and the US TV stations ABC/CBS of the book's content. This compounded the competitive pressure in the media to get the story out first and in a sensationalised manner. 59. At this time the media lines to take were being developed by the working group with support from the FCO and the Home Office. The Home Secretary saw the press lines in the week prior to the HOLA story appearing in the Times. The Foreign Secretary did not see them. 60. Once the story broke Ministers were unable to use the prepared press lines because they were inadequate. In his statement on 13 September 1999, the Home Secretary had the opportunity to reflect the view of the Security Service that Mrs Norwood's activities had not been as significant as represented in the media. However, he did not do so. As a result, the public's perception of Mrs Norwood is that she provided a real contribution to the Soviet atomic bomb development. The Security Service stated that Mrs Norwood provided the Soviets with intelligence on the cladding material used in the UK nuclear reactors, which the Soviets did not use because they copied the American design (Annex J). 61. When the authority to start the publication project was
sought in 1996, Mrs Norwood had ''slipped out of sight''
of the Security Service. The Director General of the Security Service
did not know about Mrs Norwood and Mr Symonds and she was therefore
unable to brief the PUS at the Home Office, Richard Wilson, or the Home
Secretary, Michael Howard. As far as she was concerned the main Mitrokhin
related leads, *** 62. While the Committee believes that the establishment of the interdepartmental working group to handle matters was a sound decision, the group was unable to fully brief senior officials and Ministers because it was likewise unaware of the significance of this UK material until late 1998. 63. The Committee believes that the October 1997 submission to Robin Cook should have included the Rifkind criteria for naming individuals. We believe that the submission could have done so within the rules governing the disclosure of information on previous administrations. 64. The submission sent to the Foreign Secretary on 22 March 1999 requested authorisation to proceed with publication. It stated that the ''Security Service are clearing the detail contained in those chapters [on the UK] with the Home Secretary (who was briefed on the project in 1998, and is supportive) and the Attorney General.'' This was not accurate. The Committee believes that it was a failing of the system that allowed the Foreign Secretary, under the false impression that the Home Secretary had been consulted, to authorise the publication of a book containing allegations about spies in the UK who had not been prosecuted by the Security Service. 65. The Committee believes that the Security Service and Home Office in particular failed to ensure that working group decisions were carried out, noting that on two occasions the Home Secretary was not consulted in the manner the working group had agreed. 66. The Committee believes that the above points were serious failures by officials either to inform Ministers of the true situation or to ensure that agreed actions were being carried out. The working group also failed to ensure that the Rifkind criteria were met. These failures by officials, some at senior level, caused Ministers to make decisions on the basis of incorrect information.
67. The Committee believes that the interdepartmental working group, as constituted, was not adequate to develop the necessary media strategy and ensure that publication was in a controlled and unsensationalised manner. The group were unable to alert ministers in a timely manner to the key issues and to provide them with appropriate and robust lines to take. 68. The Committee believes that misleading stories were allowed to receive wide circulation by a failure to anticipate the likely media focus and to have prepared and promulgated appropriate responses.
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