| Intelligence and Security Committee - The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report | ||||
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ANNEX E - DETAILS OF EVENTS 1. 'C', the Chief of the SIS, Sir Colin McColl, informed the Foreign Secretary (Douglas Hurd) about Mr Mitrokhin orally in April 1992. On 1 May 1992 the Foreign Secretary was briefed, in a written submission, on the general points on Mr Mitrokhin, who was known by the code word GUNNER. Part of that submission has been reproduced in paragraphs 12 to 14 of the main Report. On 21 August a submission to the Foreign Secretary sought authorisation for GUNNER (Mr Mitrokhin) to visit the UK to help the work on his archive and on 23 October another submission sought authority for the exfiltration of GUNNER (Mr Mitrokhin) and his family and his resettlement in the UK. 2. On 6 October the Prime Minister's Private Secretary was told about GUNNER (Mr Mitrokhin) and the Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) at the Home Office, Sir Clive Whitmore, was consulted by 'C' on 4 November to ensure that Mr Mitrokhin and his family's stay in the UK was regularised. Sir Clive Whitmore replied on 6 November. There is no documentary evidence that the Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon. John Major, was briefed on Mr Mitrokhin until 13 January 1993, when he saw 'C'. 3. As soon as Mr Mitrokhin's material reached the UK the SIS passed that relating to the UK to the Security Service in unprocessed form for them to take matters forward and investigate1. Material relating to the USA and Canada was read by the SIS and then passed, through liaison channels, to the CIA and FBI at Director level and to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in July 1992. Material relating to Australia was passed to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation in September 1992. 4. In February 1993 the Cabinet Secretary (Sir Robin Butler) and the Intelligence Co-ordinator were briefed on the Mitrokhin case, Mr Mitrokhin's code word having been changed from GUNNER to JESSANT when he came to the UK. Additionally, the Security Service briefed the Cabinet Secretary on the UK individuals named in the archive and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Chairman was briefed on Mr Mitrokhin by the Intelligence Co-ordinator. 5. On 3 March Sir Robin Butler chaired a meeting that was attended by the Chief of the SIS, the Director General of the Security Service (Mrs Stella Rimington), the Prime Minister's Private Secretary and Sir Clive Whitmore, the PUS at the Home Office. At this meeting Sir Robin indicated that Ministers should be alerted to Mr Mitrokhin's existence and it was agreed that 'C' would write to Sir Robin to allow him to alert the Prime Minister. 6. 'C' wrote to the Cabinet Secretary on 11 March and this briefing was passed to the Prime Minister on 12 March, whose Private Secretary confirmed on 15 March that the Prime Minister had seen the note. 'C's letter was copied to Sir Clive Whitmore, Mrs Rimington and to Sir David Gillmore, the PUS at the FCO. There is no evidence that the Home Secretary, then the Rt. Hon. Kenneth Clarke, was told about Mr Mitrokhin. 'C's letter was shown to the Foreign Secretary on 27 March, who hoped that the European Allies could be briefed reasonably soon, and it was noted that the PUS in the FCO (Sir David Gillmore) had been briefed on Mr Mitrokhin by 'C'. 7. On 27 May the Rt. Hon. Michael Howard replaced Kenneth Clarke as Home Secretary. There is no evidence that Michael Howard was briefed on Mr Mitrokhin on his appointment. 8. Some of the material provided by Mr Mitrokhin was relevant to the activities of Michael John SMITH, who was tried under the Official Secrets Act in 1993 and convicted for offences he committed between 1990-92. The Director General of the Security Service briefed the Prime Minister on the SMITH case and Mr Mitrokhin in June and October 1993. 9. In April 1994 the Foreign Secretary was briefed on Mr Mitrokhin, who was due to visit the USA. In July David Spedding, who was due to replace Colin McColl as 'C' in September, mentioned Mr Mitrokhin and his archive to the new PUS at the Home Office, Richard Wilson. However, partly due to a misunderstanding between Richard Wilson and his Private Office, Richard Wilson was not shown any of the material that had been sent to his predecessor, Sir Clive Whitmore. Additionally in August, 'C' briefed the new PUS at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Sir John Coles, on Mr Mitrokhin. In November the new 'C', David Spedding, briefed the Foreign Secretary on Mr Mitrokhin and, in questioning, the evidence of KGB penetration of the UK, USA and other European countries was discussed. 'C' stated that the Security Service was investigating the leads but that the degree of penetration in the UK was considerably lower than elsewhere. 10. In January 1995 'C' spoke to the Cabinet Secretary and agreed that the Leader of the Opposition, The Rt. Hon. Tony Blair, should be briefed on Mr Mitrokhin. This would be in the context of a discussion on the reliability and status as a source of Oleg Gordievsky, another KGB defector, to show that other defectors had corroborated Gordievsky's information. The meeting took place a few days later. Additionally it was agreed that 'C' would prepare a note for the Foreign Secretary, which would be copied to the Prime Minister through the Cabinet Secretary, on possible publicity surrounding Mr Mitrokhin's defection. The Prime Minister agreed that a line to take should be prepared and the Cabinet Secretary tasked the SIS, in consultation with the Security Service, to make the necessary arrangements. 11. At the beginning of July 1995 The Rt. Hon. Malcolm Rifkind replaced Douglas Hurd as Foreign Secretary, although neither the FCO nor the SIS briefed him on Mr Mitrokhin on his appointment. At the end of the month, both the SIS and the Security Service provided details to the Private Secretaries of the Prime Minister, the Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary. These were also copied to the PUSs at the Home Office, the FCO and the MOD as well as to the Intelligence Co-ordinator. The SIS provided an account of the Mitrokhin case as a whole and their current thinking on it, while the Security Service provided a report on the UK leads provided by Mr Mitrokhin's material. Of note, the Security Service report made reference to the KGB acquiring ''some details of nuclear technology in the immediate post-war period". 12. When these reports were produced, they were used to brief Malcolm Rifkind on Mr Mitrokhin. There is no record of the Home Secretary, The Rt. Hon. Michael Howard, having seen these reports, at this time although he believes that he did - this could have been his first exposure to Mr Mitrokhin. The Prime Minister saw the material and regarded Mr Mitrokhin as ''a remarkable catch'' and copies of the letter from his Private Secretary were sent to Ministers' Private Secretaries at the Home Office and FCO. 13. In December 1995, 'C' discussed the forthcoming arrest of one of the KGB agents in the US named in Mr Mitrokhin's papers with the Foreign Secretary. It was agreed at that meeting that there ''should be suitable publicity rather than the story being frittered away as a result of an uncontrolled leak", a view that was endorsed by Malcolm Rifkind. 14. On 1 March 1996, the Security Service wrote to the PUS at the Home Office warning that the trial of the US agent, LIPKA, could result in the exposure of Mr Mitrokhin, as he could be called as a witness, with the resulting publicity that would occur. This letter was passed to the Home Secretary a week later. On 6 March the Foreign Office minuted the Foreign Secretary seeking authority for the SIS ''to make arrangements in principle for publication of material from the JESSANT [Mr Mitrokhin's] archive. Actual publication of material would be the subject of further submissions." 15. The submission stated that ''the Security Service concurs'' with the proposal and that a parallel submission was being sent to the Home Secretary. The recommended publication route was for Mr Mitrokhin to work on selections of his material in conjunction with a British editor, who would be responsible for finding a publisher. The SIS nominated Professor Christopher Andrew, who had seen some of Mr Mitrokhin's material in late 1995 and had expressed an interest in producing the book. This submission did not reach the Foreign Secretary until 11 March at the earliest, as various Foreign Office officials commented on the merits of the proposal on its way to the Foreign Secretary. 16. On 6 March the Director General of the Security Service wrote to the PUS at the Home Office (Richard Wilson), attaching a copy of the submission to the Foreign Secretary. In her letter, Stella Rimington recommended that, if publication was to go ahead, a working group should be established to co-ordinate the publication project. Our evidence is that the submission was not shown to Michael Howard, but that Richard Wilson made the Home Secretary aware of the project. On 8 March the Cabinet Secretary, who had been copied the submission to the Foreign Secretary, wrote to the Prime Minister's Private Secretary. In his note, Sir Robin Butler stated ''There is no immediate action for the Prime Minister because the submission is to the Foreign Secretary, and the Home Office will also be making sure that the Home Secretary is aware of it and the Security Service view on it." 17. On 12 March the Prime Minister's Private Secretary wrote to the Cabinet Secretary stating that the Prime Minister had seen the submission and had noted it. On 13 March the Foreign Secretary's Private Secretary wrote stating that Malcolm Rifkind ''sees value in the publication of JESSANT's [Mr Mitrokhin] material". However, the Foreign Secretary requested that the names of any people the KGB had targeted for recruitment or attempted to influence only be made public if they had been prosecuted and convicted or had agreed to the release of their names. He thought that ''it would be grossly unfair if unproven allegations were published with our agreement.'' The letter continued ''This means that he [Malcolm Rifkind] is not willing for the Security Service to decide whether or not names should be revealed." 18. On 19 March the SIS informed the Security Service that the Foreign Secretary had approved the submission, with qualifications. The SIS copied all the comments from the Foreign Office officials to both the Security Service and the Intelligence Co-ordinator. The Director General of the Security Service, Stella Rimington, and her designated successor, Stephen Lander, had a meeting with the Home Secretary on 20 March during which the arrest of LIPKA and possible publicity about Mitrokhin were discussed. The PUS at the Home Office, Richard Wilson, was present at that meeting. On 27 March the PUS at the Home Office wrote to the Director General of the Security Service supporting the establishment of a working group to oversee the publication project, particularly in light of the Foreign Secretary's view on publishing names. 19. There then followed a series of correspondence between the SIS, Cabinet Office, Home Office, FCO and Security Service between 23 April and 21 June about the establishment of the working group to oversee the publication project. It was agreed that the Intelligence Co-ordinator would chair the working group; the membership of the group was to be Cabinet Office, Home Office, FCO, SIS and Security Service; and the agenda was agreed for the first meeting, which was held on 28 June 1996. 20. At the first meeting of the working group, the SIS gave a briefing on Mr Mitrokhin, stating that Mr Mitrokhin's motivation (for defecting) was the publication of his material. The Security Service outlined the reporting on the UK. Responding to a question from the Co-ordinator about Mr Mitrokhin's information on known British cases, the Security Service representative thought that some of this could be interesting if published but there was little new information and nothing sensational or harmful; a great deal had already been published about these cases. The meeting also discussed the book's structure, copyright, SIS's reasons for publication and the countries (12) with whom material had been shared and who were aware of the publication project. 21. On the 15 July the SIS wrote to members of the working group, attaching Professor Andrew's proposed synopsis for the first book, and again on 18 September with the draft chapters 2-5. 22. On 4 November 1996 the Security Service wrote to the PUS at the Home Office to alert him to press reports (on 31 October) that MI6 had passed the names of 300 French agents to the French authorities prior to the Home Secretary's meeting with his counterpart, M Pasqua. This note was passed to the Home Secretary on 6 November, who also had a meeting with the Director General of the Security Service that day in which the matter was discussed. 23. The second meeting of the working group took place on 12 November and the drafts of Professor Andrew were examined. The structure of the book was now changing to three volumes; the first covering espionage against the western allies, the second to cover KGB activity in the rest of the world and the third volume to be a lexicon of KGB operational terms. The SIS confirmed that while Professor Andrew had seen 60% of the material, he had only seen the historic cases contained in the UK material and that Security Service agreement would be sought before any further material was passed to him. 24. The working group met again on 10 March 1997. It discussed possible publicity due to the forthcoming trial of LIPKA and other leaks in the press. It was agreed that it was preferable to brief Ministers before the trial, rather than have to react to events and the Chairman, given the imminent UK election, recommended briefing incoming Ministers at an early stage. Also discussed were the issues concerning consultation with foreign services over the inclusion of material relating to their nationals/interests and the need to have a watertight legal contract with Professor Andrew. 25. On 23 October FCO officials wrote to the DUS, Kevin Tebbit, recommending that the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, be made aware of the Russian defector, Mr Mitrokhin, and of plans to publish some of his material. Mr Tebbit supported the submission and recommended that No.10 be informed of the project. The submission was passed to the Foreign Secretary on 24 October, who agreed. On 2 December the Foreign Secretary's Private Secretary wrote to the Prime Minister's Private Secretary outlining the Mitrokhin story and publication project. After correspondence (8 and 22 December) considering Russia's possible reaction to publication, the Prime Minister gave authority for the project to go ahead as planned on 6 January 1998. 26. On 23 January 1998 the SIS passed to the Security Service the draft chapters 6-15, 17 and 20. On 2 February 1998 the Security Service wrote forcibly to the SIS, copied to the Intelligence Co-ordinator, complaining about a lack of information on the project in a number of specific areas, including the lack of a contract with Professor Andrew. SIS responded on 3 February, copied to the Intelligence Co-ordinator, to answer the specific points raised by the Security Service. 27. On 19 February Professor Andrew signed a legal agreement on publication with the SIS. On 15 June the Security Service wrote to the Intelligence Co-ordinator to inform him that they had cleared much of the material on the UK and passed it to Professor Andrew for inclusion in the UK chapter of the book. On 8 October the SIS wrote to the Intelligence Co-ordinator and the other members of the working group attaching a synopsis of the contents of the draft text of Volume 1 of the project. Also included in the letter was a record of the current status of the clearances given for the text by departments and foreign governments. The letter noted that further work was necessary on the UK chapters, which the Security Service had in hand, in particular work on HOLA (Melita Norwood). 28. In December 1998 the SIS told David Rose, who was working on a BBC documentary series about cold war espionage, that they might be able to provide him with material but that it would be dependent on Ministerial clearance for publication. 29. On 10 December Home Office officials minuted the Home Secretary, The Rt. Hon. Jack Straw MP, and David Omand, the PUS about Mitrokhin, the publication project and the planned working group meeting in January 1999. The submission stated that ''[Mr Mitrokhin's information] may also lead to the prosecution of an individual in the UK: an 86 year old woman who spied for the KGB 40 years ago. The Security Service are currently considering whether to recommend her prosecution.'' This was a reference to HOLA or Mrs Melita Norwood but not by code word or name. His Private Secretary confirmed that the Home Secretary saw the submission that day. 30. On 13 January the SIS sent members of the working group copies of the two draft chapters on the UK and the introductory chapter on Mr Mitrokhin. On the same day the Security Service, prompted by a question from the Home Office and in preparation for the forthcoming meeting of the working group, sent the Home Office some extracts from the UK chapters of the draft publication. These contained details on HOLA (Mrs Norwood), Michael John Smith and SCOT (John Symonds). Additionally, the Security Service stated that last year (1998) they had ''reviewed their earlier decision not to approach HOLA. Our conclusion is that the decision taken at that time remains valid; because of HOLA's age and the lack of hard evidence against her, the chance of a successful prosecution is negligible. Our legal advisor is currently consulting the Attorney General's office for confirmation of this view. The presentation of the HOLA story in Mr Mitrokhin's publication is likely to be the subject of further discussion." 31. The working group met on 15 January 1999 to discuss the publication
project; the use of UK-related material, including Mrs Norwood; ***.
32. The meeting also agreed to circulate copies of all the draft chapters ''to the Home Office, FCO and Cabinet Office, particularly as parts of the book would need to be cleared by the Home Secretary as well as the SOSFA (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs). The Prime Minister's authority might also be required." 33. On 25 February the SIS wrote to the Intelligence Co-ordinator, copied to the Security Service, informing him that the SIS had been in discussion with the journalist David Rose, who was planning a number of TV programmes. The SIS planned, subject to the Foreign Secretary's final authority for the publication, to co-operate with him on one of the programmes, with the aim of telling Mr Mitrokhin's story. 34. On 10 March the Security Service wrote to the Legal Secretariat to the Law Officers (LSLO), seeking advice on the prosecution of Mrs Norwood. In the submission, the Security Service outlined Mr Mitrokhin's defection and material together with the information they had on Mrs Norwood. The Service had judged that police action in 1992 was inappropriate, ''given in particular the age of the individual and the passage of time since her espionage activities'' and the need to protect Mr Mitrokhin's security. The purpose of the submission was to ''seek the Attorney General's view on whether it would be appropriate for action to be taken against the individual [Mrs Norwood] with a view to her prosecution.'' The LSLO replied on 22 March ''that that [the decision in 1992 that police action was inappropriate] represented the last opportunity for the authorities to proceed by way of criminal investigation/prosecution. Accordingly there is no decision which he [the Attorney General] can properly be asked to take." 35. Also on 22 March 1999, the FCO wrote to the Foreign Secretary informing him that the text of the first volume was complete. The contents of the volume had been cleared with SIS' European partners and allied services, the FCO representative on the working group and HM Ambassadors in Rome and Warsaw. The submission stated that ''The SIS wished to authorise the prospective UK and overseas publishers to begin work on the text... Publication is planned for September this year, and the SIS will be closely involved in the process... The Security Service are currently clearing the detail contained in those chapters [those concerning the KGB operations in the UK] with the Home Secretary (who was briefed on the project in 1998, and is supportive) and the Attorney General.'' The submission also stated that the ''SIS' view [is] that this [publication] should be done in a controlled and unsensational manner", a view endorsed by FCO officials. 36. On 21 April the Foreign Secretary's Private Secretary wrote that the ''Secretary of State is content with the proposed approach.'' On 27 April the SIS gave the BBC a redacted copy of Professor Andrew's synopsis of the book, together with the first chapter. Soon after that, the BBC was passed the majority of the text. 37. On 22 April in a submission to the Home Secretary, the Home Office updated the ''progress towards the publication, planned to begin in September, of the revelations of a former senior KGB officer, now resident in the UK.'' The submission stated ''There had been the question whether to prosecute an individual in the UK: an 86 year old woman who had spied for the KGB for 40 years. The Attorney General's office has now sent guidance that prosecution is now inappropriate. This is due to: her age, the lapse of time since her spying activities (mainly in the 1930s and 40s with intermittent contact with the KGB until the 70s), and the lapse of time since her activities became known (1992).'' The submission continued ''The SIS are presently seeking the Foreign Secretary's approval for publication in September of the first of two volumes of the JESSANT [Mr Mitrokhin] book". The submission recommended that the Home Secretary took note. On the 4 May the Home Secretary's Private Secretary wrote acknowledging that the Home Secretary had seen and noted the submission. 38. On 7 June the working group met and was updated on the situation. The group was told that the Foreign Secretary had approved the submission and that the Home Secretary was aware of the project. The group agreed that there should be further bilateral discussions between the Home Office and Security Service over the line to take on the decision not to prosecute HOLA, in view of the Attorney General's comments on the case. The group also agreed that HOLA should not be named as this was contrary to the terms of the original agreement. The Intelligence Co-ordinator agreed to write to the Cabinet Secretary to update him on progress and the SIS told the group that the BBC were keen to devote a programme to Mr Mitrokhin's case, which would not use material which was not in the book. Additionally, the book would be serialised in the Times on 16-18 September. The working group agreed that draft possible press questions and lines to take would be prepared for discussion at a further meeting. 39. On the 24 June the SIS wrote to the Intelligence Co-ordinator and members of the working group to inform them that at a meeting with David Rose on 23 June, Rose had informed the SIS that his research team had identified Mrs Norwood. This was based on details in the book ''The Haunted Wood", combined with his own efforts in Washington DC. Once he had Mrs Norwood's surname and initial, she had been traced through the London telephone book and electoral register. David Rose was proposing to interview her in early September. 40. On 25 June the Intelligence Co-ordinator wrote to the Cabinet Secretary informing him that the Foreign Secretary had cleared The Mitrokhin Archive for publication and that ''Considerable publicity may be generated at the time of publication, with some criticisms of the actions of previous governments. One significant new British case may get earlier publicity. Defensive material is being prepared.'' The submission drew the Cabinet Secretary's attention to Mrs Norwood, that she had not been prosecuted and that the Attorney General had agreed that prosecution was not now possible. The submission stated that ''The intention has been not to reveal HOLA's [Mrs Norwood] identity in the book but the BBC who are collaborating with Penguin (the publishers) have now correctly identified her from other sources of information; and they may be tempted to break the story before September". 41. The Intelligence Co-ordinator believed that it was not ''necessary for the Prime Minister to be further involved in clearing the project but he and other Ministers will need to be reminded of publication nearer the time and given briefing against the likelihood of media and parliamentary interest. The Home Secretary is being briefed about the possible early publicity for HOLA [Mrs Norwood], and defensive material is being urgently prepared.'' The Cabinet Secretary forwarded the submission to the Prime Minister's Private Secretary, having highlighted the areas concerning HOLA, on 28 June. It was not shown to the Prime Minister. 42. On 29 June the Home Office wrote to the Home Secretary ''An update on the JESSANT [Mr Mitrokhin] book, an alert of the potentially imminent public disclosure of the existence and identity of HOLA [Mrs Norwood], and the lines to take on the decision not to prosecute HOLA [Mrs Norwood].'' The submission informed the Home Secretary that the Security Service's interest in Mrs Norwood had begun in 1933 and ended inconclusively in 1966. When the investigation had been re-opened in 1992 on receipt of Mr Mitrokhin's material, the Security Service had judged ''that police action was inappropriate given the age of the individual and passage of time since her espionage.'' The submission then corrected the earlier submission (22 April) by accurately reflecting the Attorney General's view that there was no decision to make on prosecution, rather than that prosecution was inappropriate. The submission also contained the press lines to take, which the Home Secretary agreed on 6 July. 43. The working group met, without the Home Office and FCO representatives, on 19 July to discuss the implications from the naming of Mrs Norwood in the forthcoming book and the intentions of the BBC to interview her. The meeting agreed that ministerial guidance would be sought on whether the Security Service should interview Mrs Norwood before the BBC saw her, with the submission copied to both the Foreign Secretary and Attorney General. 44. Also on the 19 July 'C' wrote to the Cabinet Secretary, copied to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign Secretary, Home Secretary and Secretary of State for Defence and the PUS in these departments, together with the Director General of the Security Service and Intelligence Co-ordinator. The letter outlined the SIS success with Mitrokhin and that the book was about to be published with agreement of UK departments, European partners and allied Services. The letter did not mention Mrs Norwood or any of the UK cases. The letter was copied to the Prime Minister's Private Secretary on 23 July. 45. On 20 July the Security Service wrote to the SIS. In the letter, the Security Service stated that Home Office officials had briefed the Home Secretary on Mrs Norwood and that they agreed that ''the issue of Security Service contact with HOLA [Mrs Norwood]...was an operational matter and not an issue on which the Home Secretary should become engaged.'' On 24 August the Security Service wrote to the LSLO, copied to the Home Office and SIS, informing them that the SIS had told the Service that during an interview with David Rose on 10 August, Mrs Norwood had confessed to being HOLA and that she specifically admitted working for the KGB. The Security Service asked the LSLO if the BBC interview affected the Attorney General's position of 22 March, i.e that there was no decision for him to make. 46. On 31 August the Home Office wrote to the Home Secretary. In the submission it was stated that ''The Cabinet Office, in discussion with the Agencies, had asked that you give guidance on whether the Security Service should see HOLA [Mrs Norwood] before the BBC could interview her - the Security Service were firmly against the idea. The Home Office had not been invited to the [working group] meeting [on 19 July] at which this was discussed and the note of the meeting was much delayed in coming to us". The submission continues by stating that the Security Service did not see Mrs Norwood but that the BBC interviewed her on 10 August, during which she admitted that she was HOLA. It also stated that the LSLO were being consulted to see if Mrs Norwood's admissions to the BBC changed the position on possible prosecution. Attached to the submission were revised press lines drawn up by the Home Office and FCO, together with the minutes of the 19 July working group meeting. 47. On the evening of 31 August the Chairman of the ISC had an informal meeting with 'C', during which he was briefed for the first time about Mr Mitrokhin and the publication project. 48. The working group met on 1 September to co-ordinate arrangements for press lines in advance of the JESSANT publicity. It was agreed at the meeting that the Intelligence Co-ordinator would brief the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Home Secretary, via the Cabinet Secretary, on The Mitrokhin Archive and other intelligence related publications due in the next few months. 49. The SIS told the meeting that the Chairman of the ISC had been informed of the publication project. The timetable for publicity was that in the week of the 13 September the Times would serialise the book and carry an interview with Mr Mitrokhin, on 19 September the BBC would show the interview with Mrs Norwood and the book would be published on 20 September. ABC and CBS (in the USA) and Radio 4 were also planning to cover the story. It was agreed that the FCO would co-ordinate the final press lines, which would be finalised by 8 September, and that Ministers should be advised to avoid, if possible, being interviewed for the 13 September Today and Newsnight programmes. 50. On 1 September the LSLO replied to the Security Service's letter of 24 August, stating that ''In the Attorney General's view, the position is unaffected by the fact that an interview has been given, and the little that is known of that interview. Please revert to me once more in the unlikely event that you consider, following the broadcast, that the position has changed." 51. On 2 September 'C' wrote to the Chairman of the ISC, outlining the Mitrokhin story, the archive and the publication project. On 3 September the SIS sent the Clerk to the ISC a proof copy of the book and a summary of content. Also on 3 September the Director General of the Security Service wrote to the PUS at the Home Office, copied to the Cabinet Secretary, outlining the publication programme for the book and highlighting the two stories that might cause adverse publicity - Mrs Norwood and Mr Symonds. 52. On 6 September the Home Secretary's Private Secretary confirmed that the Home Secretary has seen the submission of 31 August and the revised press lines provided by the Home Office Press Office. 53. On 9 September the Private Secretary to the Cabinet Secretary wrote to the Private Secretaries of the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Home Secretary, together with officials in the Security Service, SIS, GCHQ and MOD. The letter outlined a number of forthcoming publications on intelligence matters, including the planned serialisation in the Times of The Mitrokhin Archive, the BBC programme and the publication of the book. 54. The submission highlights that the revelation that Mrs Norwood was a spy could cause difficulty and stresses that press lines have been prepared. The submission also advises Ministers not to accept bids to discuss Mr Mitrokhin's book. The Home Secretary did not see this submission until after 11 September. 55. Also on the 9 September, the Security Service wrote to LSLO outlining the offences that they believe Mr Symonds (SCOT) to have committed under the Official Secrets Act although there was no admissible evidence. The purpose of the letter was ''to know whether the Attorney General considers it appropriate for there to be a police investigation with a view to Symonds' prosecution.'' The LSLO replied on 17 September that Symonds was granted immunity in 1984 but the Attorney General would wish to consider the content of any admissions made by Mr Symonds prior to making a decision in light of Mr. Symonds admissions to the BBC. 56. Additionally, the LSLO wrote to the Crown Prosecution Service on 20 September on HOLA, before the BBC broadcast, asking them for their view on:
57. The answers to these questions were given in the Solicitor General's statement to the House of Commons on 20 December 1999, in that there was no prospect of mounting a successful prosecution.
1 The translation of the material was undertaken by SIS, with Security Service assistance, over the following six years.
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