ANNEX F - WHAT HAPPENED IN THE SIS

This is the written evidence of the SIS, taken from their response to the ISC Questionnaire.

1. In its acquisition and handling of The Mitrokhin Archive since 1992, SIS has been guided by the following policies:

(i) The Service's function under Section 1 (1) (a) of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 is to obtain and provide information. One requirement for the intelligence laid on SIS by the JIC has been counter intelligence information about the Russian intelligence services. This was (and remains) a requirement, to which the Agencies are obliged to devote resources. Mitrokhin's information fell squarely within this requirement. Unprecedented in its scale, the material covers KGB efforts at espionage, sabotage and subversion in almost all significant countries, often in astonishing detail, and dating back in some cases to the immediate post-revolutionary period.

(ii) Regard for the obligation on SIS, which acts under the authority of the Foreign Secretary, to inform the Foreign Secretary of the day of significant operational developments and to seek his agreement, where appropriate, to SIS operational proposals.

(iii) Regard for the lead role of the Security Service in investigating and countering threats to British interests from espionage by foreign intelligence services. Accordingly all material from Mitrokhin containing prima facie evidence of actual or potential threats to British national security was provided by SIS to the Security Service for further action.

(iv) SIS's duty of care to Mitrokhin as an agent of the Service, including the duty to protect his security.

(v) Regard for SIS's role in passing information to intelligence allies and to friendly overseas liaison services, either in cases where reporting from Mitrokhin indicated prima facie evidence of hostile Russian intelligence activity in the countries concerned, or when SIS judged that the passage of information would contribute to an exchange of intelligence with a liaison partner. SIS's authority in passing information to its liaison partners derives from Section 2(1) of the ISA which gives the Chief of SIS the control of the Service's operations. Section 2(2)(a) obliges the Chief of SIS to ensure that no SIS information is disclosed except so far as necessary for various listed purposes. These include disclosure in the interests of national security. These interests are served by reciprocal exchanges of intelligence between liaison partners.

2. The Mitrokhin Archive deals with the external and internal activities of the KGB, and its predecessor organisations, between 1917 and 1984. The archive was passed by Mitrokhin to SIS in two tranches, in meetings in the Baltics in April and June 1992. It included ten 'chapters', in Russian typescript, documenting KGB external operations in different geographical theatres. These chapters covered: the US; the UK; Canada; ***.
***

(Material was not, however, completely compartmentalised by country: British material

was, for example, contained in the US chapter, and vice versa.) The American chapter alone consisted of 800 pages of dense typescript. There were also two books of technical or procedural information, while a further 27 envelopes and 107 exercise books contained contemporaneous manuscript notes, based directly on Mitrokhin's reading of KGB files. One of these envelopes alone contained details of 645 KGB agents and contacts. The material had to be translated, and the manuscript notes in particular required Mitrokhin's assistance with reading, translation and interpretation.

3. Much of the material relating to the UK was collected in a single chapter which was passed to SIS by Mitrokhin in April 1992. This was first shared in 'raw', unprocessed, form with the Security Service in instalments in the period up to 16 June 1992. It was primarily on the basis of this material and its bearing on counter-espionage cases already known to the Security Service that Mitrokhin's bona fides were assessed and confirmed. The material in the UK chapter was processed into individual reports by the Security Service for use, as appropriate, by their own investigating officers.

4. In the early stages, the highest priority was given to processing material bearing on UK and US interests. This was followed by material relating to other countries, and to the internal activities of the former KGB. The work of translation and processing was undertaken by SIS in the period 1992-98. The Security Service gave early assistance in translation work, and US agencies translated material relating to the USA. Mitrokhin's material - other than that contained in the UK chapter - was issued by SIS in the form of counter intelligence reports. Under established procedures for dissemination of counter intelligence reporting, these reports were copied as they were produced to the Security Service. SIS was also responsible for disseminating processed reporting bearing on the interests of the Intelligence Allies (US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and of liaison partners in other countries.

5. For reasons of source protection, knowledge of Mitrokhin's contact with SIS was tightly controlled in the period leading up to his resettlement in the UK. Awareness of the case was, at that time, confined to a small circle of indoctrinated officers in SIS and the Security Service, and in the US intelligence community. Senior officials in the Cabinet Office, the FCO and the Home Office were briefed in this period, as the need to do so arose.

6. After Mitrokhin's resettlement, the existence of his information remained on a strict 'need to know' basis for some time, in order to minimise the chance of leakage and the risk that the Russians might take prophylactic action to rescue active or former agents who were under investigation in the UK and elsewhere as a result of leads provided by Mitrokhin.

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