ANNEX G - WHAT HAPPENED IN THE
SECURITY SERVICE

This is the written evidence of the Security Service, taken from the Director General's letter to Committee.

1. The information from The Mitrokhin Archive concerning the spy HOLA reached the Security Service's spy investigation section in June 1992. It confirmed the conclusion that the Service had reached in 1966 following its investigation of the VENONA decrypt intelligence into the spy TINA, viz that Melita Norwood had spied for the Soviet Union, in particular in providing atomic reactor information in the immediate post war period.

2. The Mitrokhin material provided some additional details, including about a civil servant codenamed ''HUNT'' who was said to have been recruited by Norwood to work for the KGB in 1967. ''HUNT's'' intelligence was reported to be regarded as of low value by the KGB.

3. Following receipt of the Mitrokhin material HOLA was assessed as a Category B case (a significant case but no current or recent damage) and assigned to a desk officer to investigate. Initial enquiries surfaced the Service's earlier investigations, indicated that Mrs Norwood was still alive and showed that she had still been a member of the pro-Soviet Communist Party of Britain as recently as 1991. It was noted that *** had not heard of the case.

4. Although The Mitrokhin Archive had a garbled name, enquiries into ''HUNT'' identified him as a junior civil servant, who had worked *** on unclassified work. He had died ***.

5. During 1992 and the first months of 1993 there was a clear understanding that the Mitrokhin material needed to be subject to restrictive handling procedures to protect Mitrokhin's security and the international handling of his spy leads. This meant that it could not, for that period, be used as the basis for an interview of a suspect. As the only realistic way in the HOLA case of turning the intelligence in the archive, and the other information in the Service's possession, into evidence that could be used in court was to interview Mrs Norwood, such an interview had to wait until well into 1993 until those sensitivities had reduced.

6. At that point the HOLA desk officer consulted the Service's Legal Adviser about the case and a possible interview. The latter advised that the Mitrokhin intelligence was not evidence and would very probably not be admissible in the UK courts. He though that there was little prospect of a prosecution. Mrs Norwood remained a hard-line Communist and was unlikely to incriminate herself at interview. Moreover, she was extremely elderly and the actions for which she might face charges had taken place nearly 50 years ago. To pursue her now that the Cold War was over might open the Service up to criticism for having harassed an old lady.

7. Given this internal advice, which was not referred externally to the Law Officers as it should have been, the section decided not to pursue an interview of Mrs Norwood at that stage. However, the case was not closed to investigation. This was because of its historic significance and because the section management judged that opportunities for further action might arise in future.

8. Pressure of work on other Mitrokhin cases and on Stasi and other leads, however, resulted in this case slipping out of sight of the investigators and no further action was taken on it between November 1993 and August 1998, when it resurfaced in connection with The Mitrokhin Archive publication project. At that stage, and in the light of changed perceptions of the significance of espionage in the post Cold War world, the possibility of an interview was re-examined. Such an interview would have aimed to gather evidence relevant to a prosecution, not intelligence about Mrs Norwood's past, about which the Service was already well informed.

9. The first step towards an interview was to establish whether Mrs Norwood would be capable of responding meaningfully to questions given her age. This was not straightforward, but eventually a covert means was found to establish that she was. However, it was decided to defer a final decision on an interview until the case had been put to the Law Officers, as it should have been in 1992/93.

10. In the light of the Law Officers' view that a prosecution could no longer be considered, it was concluded that no useful purpose would be served by an interview and the idea was dropped. It was reconsidered briefly in the summer of 1999 in the light of JESSANT Working Group discussion of whether Mrs Norwood should be seen. It was agreed at official level with the Home Office that this was a matter for the Service, and it was concluded by the Service that, since evidence gathering was no longer an issue, contact with Mrs Norwood would serve no useful national security purpose.

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