| Intelligence and Security Committee - The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report | ||||
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ANNEX H - SECURITY SERVICE PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING INVESTIGATIVE LEADS This is the written evidence of the Security Service, taken from their response to the ISC Questionnaire. 1. In the Security Service, when leads to spies, agents, confidential contacts, etc are received from whatever source, cases are allocated to staff taking into account factors such as the complexity of the case and workloads. Existing leads are always re-checked to determine whether they may be relevant to new investigations. Since 1991, a computerised database with field and free text search capability has facilitated this. It contains all leads and cases going back to the early 1970s. New leads, progress achieved in investigations and outcomes are all recorded. 2. As there are at any one time a large number of leads, new cases are categorised so that appropriate attention is given to the most important. During the period that the leads identified in the Mitrokhin material were being received, they were divided into four categories. Judgements were either made or endorsed by senior staff. The categories were: Category A
A major investigation into a lead assessed as likely to involve serious and continuing damage probably involving the continuous loss of classified information. Only *** of the Mitrokhin cases were accorded this priority. *** Category B A significant investigation into a lead assessed as likely to involve damage at some stage including a loss of classified information. NORWOOD was in this category. Category C An investigation into a lead of limited security significance, in which the national interest and classified information did not appear to have been at risk. Category D An investigation into a lead of marginal security significance. This category allowed enquiries to be made into incomplete or imprecise leads to determine whether more detailed investigation would be justified. 3. Most of the new cases in the Mitrokhin material fell into Categories C and D. Many others referred to individuals who had already been prosecuted or who were dead. In some instances, the material received was obscure or confusing. In those cases, the Service referred back to SIS for Mitrokhin to provide clarification if possible. Often he was unable to add detail as he was not directly involved in the cases. But his ability to reinterpret his notes was useful. 4. Cases were moved between categories in the light of developments. As investigations progressed, advice was sought from the Service's in house lawyers. For all categories, an understandably strict 'need to know' and very tight restrictions on investigative action operated in relation to the Mitrokhin material for most of the first year. A gradual relaxation then occurred over time influenced by the need to take into account parallel requests for action from overseas liaisons. Nevertheless the Service retained close 'need to know' controls within the Service on its own investigations. Where those investigations continue, the controls remain. 5. A formal process was (and remains) in place for closing investigations. This always involved the head of the section concerned or his deputy and sometimes the Service's in house lawyers. Cases are closed either because they have been resolved or because it is impossible to make progress towards resolution as a result of the nature of the lead information and/or the results of investigation thus far. 6. In addition to the categorisation system and regular discussions between managers and their staff on progress in the casework, a formal case review system operates. This provides for a six monthly re-evaluation of all current casework by management in the section. Also a weekly discussion between the Head of the section and the Director covers progress in the higher priority cases and the most important developments are referred to the Director General and Deputy Director General. Management information systems provide a further check on the performance of the section in handling its investigations. 7. These procedures have existed for many years, being refined and adjusted from time to time, for instance when Oleg Gordievskiy was firstly run as a source in the London KGB Residency and then handled as a resettled agent. The speed at which the Service investigated leads, however, varied with the resources available for the work. The procedures for handling investigative leads have continued to evolve post Mitrokhin to incorporate refinements designed to give priority to important cases. The system described above was expanded in 1994, to allow more effective handling of 'aftercare' of spies who had served prison sentences and other old cases where new, although not usually investigative, work was required. The system was further reviewed in 1997, to allow for greater priority to be given to cultivation cases, which could lead to damage. All these changes were designed to manage a volume of leads that exceeded the resources available by ensuring that cases where damage might be continuing were handled first. Further changes are being made in the light of recent events.
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