Conclusions and Recommendations

106. On the basis of the evidence we have taken this year, our conclusions are as follows:

Central Intelligence Machinery

A. We believe that there should be a clear recognition and demonstration of the lines of responsibility and authority for these important Agencies. We recommend that CSI should meet, under your Chairmanship, at least annually to allow Ministers to approve the National Intelligence Requirements and endorse or approve the Agencies' budgets (para 19).

B. With the increasing involvement of the Agencies in the fight against serious crime, we are concerned that interests of law enforcement are not properly represented within the JIC. We recommend that a NCIS representative be appointed to the JIC, in addition to the Home Office representative. Additionally, we believe that HM Customs and Excise's interests should be directly represented (para 21).

C. We believe that the joint position of JIC Chairman/Intelligence Co-ordinator will only be successful if the post holder has sufficient authority and influence to formulate and implement policy, as well as offer guidance to the Agencies. We seek your assurance that this will be the case (para 23).

D. In the Committee's view JARIC is a national resource and could be better tasked from the national level. The Committee believes that this administrative move would recognise that JARIC supports national interests and therefore opens the way for JARIC to be funded in part from outside the MoD budget (para 25).

E. The Committee believes that the Government should seek the ***
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We believe that the UK cannot afford not to be involved in this work. We will continue to monitor this matter (para 26).

Personnel and Management Issues

F. We believe that the staff surveys and the more recent Burton report were valuable, and we shall continue to monitor them, and the management responses to them (para 28).

G. We expect to be consulted on the Rules of Procedure for Employment Tribunals and to see them carried into effect without any further delay (para 32).

H. We support the development of sensible, quantifiable measures of outputs for the Agencies, but believe that more work is needed in this area (para 34).

I. We believe that it is important for us to see the classified annexes of the Commissioners' reports to be able to establish the corrective action that the Agencies have introduced following the Commissioners' identification of errors and thus fulfil our statutory requirement to oversee the Agencies' administration processes (para 35).

The Investigator

J. In respect of the Investigator's report on security policies and procedures in the Agencies, we recommend:

- that a more co-ordinated and rigorous project-based approach to psychological testing is adopted, building on US experience;

- that all three Agencies adopt an ASA procedure based on the GCHQ approach as representing best practice;

- that the periodic (generally 5-yearly) DV review process is strengthened to detect lifestyle mismatches and the possession of unexplained wealth by holding more DV review interviews at the subject's home;

- that SIS and the Security Service give serious consideration to adopting GCHQ's 7-point Risk Rating system as best practice, despite their belief that this is an unnecessary addition to their procedures; and

- that where best Agency security practice is identified, it should be considered for application by the wider UK DV community (para 38).

K. In respect of the Investigator's report on IT in the Agencies, we recommend:

- that a Project Manager is assigned to ***;

- that the situation in which the Agencies are unable to offer the market pay rates needed to retain or recruit all the skilled and specialist IT staff they require is reviewed to ensure that the Agencies can provide the best value-for-money service; and

- that there should be more active interchanges between the Agencies and the DIS, their largest single customer, in particular to resolve outstanding *** relating to the storage and use of Agency products (para 41).

L. In respect of the Investigator's report on the use of laptop computers in the Agencies, we recommend:

- that where there is a loan pool of laptops, they must be issued by the competent IT organisation for a specific period on a "recall and wipe" basis;

- that when laptops are issued for extended personal use there must be a procedural system to ensure the laptop's contents are monitored regularly to ensure there is no excessive build-up of classified information and to remind the user of their security obligations;

- that Kilgetty Plus is developed to keep up with hardware and software developments and that robust funding arrangements are put in place to cover this work. Assuming this is done, the Committee recommends:

- that Kilgetty Plus ***
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- that Agencies ensure that their security procedures are laid out as clearly as possible and regularly reviewed, that staff know whom to consult in case of doubt, and that there are periodic publicity campaigns on the importance of observing the set procedures (para 42).

Expenditure Issues

M. We request that you give further consideration to the publication next year of the Agencies' budgets (para 43).

N. Our biggest concern was the GCHQ Resource Account, which showed that GCHQ had not developed a suitable system of locating, tracking and agreeing ownership of its assets (para 45).

O. The Burton review confirmed in the clearest terms the scale of the challenges that the NAP presents GCHQ, and the range of high risks that could affect its successful completion (para 58).

P. The Committee is in substantial agreement with the conclusions of the review and believes that Sir Edmund Burton can play a very important role in the NAP to facilitate its successful completion and we recommend that he remains involved in an advisory capacity (para 59).

Q. The Committee believes that the NAP represents a very substantial additional responsibility to the already demanding responsibility of managing the normal operations of GCHQ. It is essential that this is recognised and that the Director gets the support necessary for this dual responsibility (para 60).

Other Matters

R. We intend to monitor the new systems in place in the Security Service to consult the Law Officers about prosecutions of spies and will report to you in due course (para 63).

S. The Committee will continue to take an interest in the consultation procedures for *** to ensure that the Agencies' views can be taken into consideration ***
in future conflicts (para 67).

T. The Committee believes that the UNIRAS system should be reviewed to ensure that it is able to give far more timely warnings of serious virus attacks to both UK organisations and allies (para 77).

U. We will continue to monitor the system established under the Data Protection Act 1998 to allow individuals who believe that the Agencies have incorrect or inappropriate information stored on them to pursue the matter and will report again in due course (para 84).

V. We believe that increasing the funding to combat excise evasion would result in a net benefit for the Exchequer (para 88).

W. We were told that more is being done in the fight against drugs but we are still not convinced that enough is being done. We noted that the Agencies have bid for additional funds to increase the work they do against drugs as part of the CSR, and that this will be reviewed later in the year (para 89).

X. We were told that GCHQ and Security Service have also produced intelligence on illegal immigration, but accept that they could do more. We believe that directed and focussed use of the Agencies could assist the Immigration Service and even help to prevent tragedies such as the death of the 58 Chinese in June this year (para 90).

Y. It clearly took too long for the Annual Report 1998/99 to be published, responded to, and debated. We look to the Government to ensure much prompter handling of this Report (para 103).

We welcome your comments on this site. Prepared 2 November 2000