| Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 1999-2000 | ||||
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From the Chairman: the Rt. Hon. Tom King, C.H., M.P. INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE
70 Whitehall 9 August 2000
The Rt. Hon. Tony Blair, M.P. In accordance with the Intelligence Services Act 1994, I submit herewith the Annual Report of the Intelligence and Security Committee for 1999-2000. Depending on the date of the general election, this may well be my last as Chairman, and I wanted to give you some thoughts on the experience so far. I was appointed in 1994 by your predecessor, John Major, as the first Chairman of the newly established Committee, and I was reappointed by you in 1997. No such Committee, with MPs being given wide access to the top secret workings of the Intelligence and Security Agencies, had ever existed previously. The Intelligence Services Act defined the ambit of the Committee as the three Agencies, SIS, Security Service and GCHQ. It soon became clear that the Committee needed to look more widely at the whole intelligence community and the law enforcement bodies that are making increasing use of intelligence in their work. This has included the MOD, as the largest single customer of GCHQ, and particularly the Defence Intelligence Staff, with its own substantial intelligence capability. On the law enforcement side, there is an increasing involvement of the Agencies with the police and HM Customs & Excise in the field of organised crime, in particular in drugs, immigrants and excise evasion, as well as the close co-operation in anti terrorism work. The final element in the intelligence community is central co-ordination, with the Ministerial Committee, the Cabinet Office co-ordinating and assessment staff, and the Joint Intelligence Committee. This much more comprehensive range of intelligence related bodies, none of these previously looked at by any Parliamentary Committee, is now covered by the Committee. The Intelligence and Security Committee came into existence not long after the end of the Cold War. The Soviet threat had been a principal pre-occupation of the Agencies for nearly 50 years. There was an understandable expectation that this new situation would allow considerable reduction in the scale of resources devoted to intelligence and security. That started to happen, but more recently new demands have emerged, and it will be necessary to maintain a sufficient level of resources for this work. In contrast to what was the fixed defensive line of the Cold War, well documented and studied, British troops, and our allies, now find themselves deployed on active service at short notice in hitherto unfamiliar territory such as Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and most recently Sierra Leone. Their first requirement is fast accurate intelligence. This requires greater flexibility in redirecting intelligence effort, and a rapid response capability, and is a challenge for the Agencies which it is essential they continue to meet. One particularly unwelcome consequence of the end of the Cold War has been the boost it has given to international serious organised crime. There is less control over materials for weapons of mass destruction, and the illegal trades in drugs, immigrants, and cigarettes are on a truly global scale. In the face of the volume of traffic entering this country the chances of preventing criminal activities are not good. The briefest study of Heathrow or Dover reveals immediately how fragile our present defences are, and without intelligence they would be virtually non-existent. On the security front, the risks from international terrorism continue, while the dissident Irish republican groups require attention as well. The Intelligence Services Act includes in the Committee's remit oversight of the finances of the Agencies and we have developed this role significantly with the assistance of the National Audit Office. In addition to reviewing the on-going costs, we have particularly noticed the exceptional costs of the new headquarters for both SIS and the Security Service, and the challenge of GCHQ's New Accommodation Project, the largest expenditure ever in the intelligence and security field, and which will need the closest interest of Ministers. Initially there was undoubtedly some apprehension in the intelligence community about passing on sensitive information to the Committee, but gradually that has improved. In part I believe this is due to the closer contact with Parliamentarians (for some for the first time!) and an acceptance of their integrity. In part it is due to the recognition by most in the intelligence community that it is in their own interests to be as frank and forthcoming as possible. They see that if the Committee is to reach fair judgements, it must be well informed. I believe the Security Service and GCHQ recognise this and try and achieve it. SIS seem to find it more difficult. In general I believe the Committee has made a good start and that there is a good basis of confidence and trust with the Agencies which is essential if oversight is to work. At the start the Committee's membership was almost entirely ex-Ministers. After the last election there was a substantial change in membership with the new members drawn more widely from the back benches, but no change in the responsible and keenly interested approach that all have taken. That approach has been further reinforced by the appointment of an investigator to support the Committee. I believe your decision to invite us to conduct the Mitrokhin inquiry and to make available all relevant papers, including exceptionally advice to Ministers, reflected that confidence. In our findings, we sought to reflect both the mistakes that were made that needed to be addressed, but also the context of an outstanding intelligence achievement, which it certainly was. The Times leader described the inquiry as "a strikingly successful piece of public accountability" from which the Agencies, albeit subject to some criticism, could expect to draw benefit from public confidence in their accountability. One final thought, Prime Ministers have differed in the degree of interest they have taken in the Intelligence and Security Agencies, for which they have had ultimate responsibility. The Ministerial Committee on Intelligence, which the PM chairs, has met, under both recent administrations, very infrequently. Efficient, fully accountable Intelligence and Security Agencies are vital to our country and that importance should be formally and regularly recognised. I therefore hope you will accept the Committee's recommendation that the Ministerial Committee should meet at least on an annual basis.
It has been a most interesting challenge to chair this new Committee and I am grateful for the active involvement and support of my colleagues. In particular it has been a privilege to work closely with those who serve in our Intelligence and Security Agencies. Mistakes are made and we will criticise failings as we find them, but these should not detract from the recognition of the generally high quality and commitment, and at times, great courage of those who serve our country in these essential tasks. TOM KING
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