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DECLARATION AND REGISTRATION OF INTERESTS 5.1 Rules governing the declaration and registration of personal interests are central to any regulatory system designed to ensure high standards of propriety. In the present context, by 'registration' we mean the recording of interests in the House of Lords Register of Interests, and by 'declaration' we mean the disclosure of interests in the course of parliamentary proceedings and other circumstances where, in a communication, members of the House of Lords are using their influence as members of the House.1 5.2 Arrangements relating to the declaration and registration of interests have a direct bearing on the practical implementation of the Seven Principles of Public Life2 - in particular, on the principles of Openness and Honesty. Effective disclosure of relevant interests also provides a mechanism for ensuring that the principles of Selflessness, Integrity and Accountability are being upheld. 5.3 One of the most important issues considered by the Committee has been whether the current rules in the House of Lords relating to the declaration and registration of interests are satisfactory as they stand or are capable of improvement. Present rules on declaration and registration Declaration 5.4 The practice in relation to the declaration of interests is based on a long-standing custom that members of the House of Lords speak on their personal honour and where a member has a direct pecuniary interest in a subject being debated in the House, he or she should declare it. 5.5 Subsequent guidance has extended the rule to include interests other than direct pecuniary interests. In the 1974 Report of the Lords' Sub-Committee on Registration of Interests, the Sub-Committee took the view that the original rule, limited to direct pecuniary interests, "[did] not go far enough".3 The report stated:
5.6 The 1974 Sub-Committee suggested that the House of Lords Companion to the Standing Orders should be redrafted to include the following statement:
5.7 No action was taken by the Procedure Committee on the Sub-Committee's report and, as noted in paragraph 4.8 above, it was never published or debated. In 1990, however, the Procedure Committee again considered the practice of the House in relation to interests and, following its report,6 the guidance on the declaration of interests was revised and the rule extended to include indirect and non-pecuniary interests as well as direct pecuniary interests. These revisions closely followed the recommendation of the 1974 Report quoted in the paragraph above. The current Resolutions (adopted in 1995 on the recommendation of the Griffiths Report)7 have retained the broad scope of the declaration rules:
5.8 It is of interest to note that whereas paragraph 15 of the 1974 Report (quoted in paragraph 5.5 above) stated that many indirect or non-pecuniary interests "may act as a profound influence" and should be declared to a peer's audience "if they influence his speech", this language about potential and actual influence was omitted from the recommendation finally made by the 1974 Sub-Committee and from the formula adopted in 1990 and 1995. 5.9 The conclusion which may legitimately be drawn from this is that in the case of the indirect and non-pecuniary interests mentioned, it was thought to be vain to invite enquiry in an individual case into whether any such interest had the potential to exercise "a profound influence" or did in fact influence what the speaker said in the House. Instead, the test adopted has been: is the interest of such a character that the peer's audience needs to be aware of it in order to form a balanced judgement of the arguments advanced? This approach contemplates the possibility that a peer might have an indirect or non-pecuniary interest (such as, say, being an unpaid office-holder in an 'interested organisation') where the peer would say: "This office has absolutely no effect on anything which I say in this debate or on how I vote", but where none the less the audience (including those who have access to the record) needs to be put into the position of being made aware of this interest so that not only the listening peers but also other persons outside the House can themselves form "a balanced judgement" about the motivation of the speaker. Registration 5.10 Rules relating to the registration of interests are relatively recent. They are the result of the recommendations of the Griffiths Committee and they were adopted in November 1995. 5.11 The 1974 Sub-Committee considered the arguments for and against a register and concluded that they did not "feel able to advise that a register should or should not be adopted, and that this is a decision which must be left in the first place to the Procedure Committee and ultimately to the House."9 However, they took the view that "in terms of practical necessity", the case for a register had not been proved. They gave the following reasons:
5.12 The 1974 Sub-Committee also cited the 'involuntary' character (in most cases) of membership of the House of Lords:
5.13 The Sub-Committee rejected the argument that the Lords should necessarily follow the practice of the House of Commons in introducing a register of interests:
5.14 The Griffiths Committee, in 1995, reviewed the case for and against introducing a register of interests. Whilst appreciating the force of the arguments against such a development, the Committee took the view that "the time has come when the House should have a register".13 It did not, however, favour a comprehensive, mandatory register, on the grounds that:
5.15 The Griffiths Committee drew a distinction between, on the one hand, parliamentary consultancies and financial interests in firms engaged in lobbying and, on the other, all other relevant interests. Whereas the view was taken that the latter should be registrable on a discretionary basis, the former were "directly relevant to the manner in which Lords discharge their Parliamentary duties" and should be subject to a mandatory registration requirement. The Committee therefore recommended that the Register of Lords' Interests should have three categories, two 'mandatory' and one 'discretionary':
5.16 This recommendation was embodied in a Resolution of the House of Lords in November 1995 which remains in effect.15 5.17 In addition to the rules on declaration of interests, this chapter will focus on category (3) of the Register. (Categories (1) and (2) are considered in the following chapter, Chapter 6, on lobbying and the ban on paid advocacy.) Relationship between declaration and registration of interests 5.18 The Committee heard different opinions about the relative importance of declaration and registration. For example, the 1974 Sub-Committee took the view that: "Registration can ... be contemplated as a supplement to declaration but not as an alternative to it".16 This view was endorsed by the Griffiths Committee: "registration should be supplementary to declaration".17 5.19 Mr Michael Davies, the Clerk of the Parliaments, took a similar view in his evidence to us:
And the Rt Hon Lord Wakeham told us that "the most important thing is a declaration of interest at the time of debate".19 5.20 Other witnesses, by contrast, argued that declaration and registration fulfilled different functions: whereas declaration is essentially inwardly focused, registration informs the external audience. For example, Lord Flowers said:
And Baroness Young of Old Scone said:
5.21 Peter Riddell argued that registration was necessary because not every member of the House of Lords who participated in a vote would have had occasion to declare his or her interests prior to the vote: "The point about declaring in speeches is all very well, but ... what matters as much is votes, and there you have to have a register".22 Purpose of declaration and registration of interests Purpose of disclosure of interests 5.22 Disclosure of interests - whether by declaration or registration - can be said to serve two broad purposes:
5.23 In the 1974 Report, emphasis is placed on the second of these purposes:
5.24 Lord Marlesford, in his evidence to us, took a similar view: "The value of declaration of interest is not just to prevent concealment but to emphasise the focus of views expressed".24 Difference between declaration and registration of interests 5.25 The 1995 Resolution governing declaration describes the purpose of declaration in a way which encompasses both the elements identified above: members of the Lords are required to declare those interests "of which their audience should be aware in order to form a balanced judgement of their arguments". 5.26 Declaration, when made in the course of parliamentary proceedings, is oral and, by its nature, transitory and ad hoc. It informs those participating in, or observing, proceedings in the House25 and the content of the declaration will be specific to the subject of debate. 5.27 It is self-evident that a declaration in Parliament can only be made by those who speak in proceedings and that members of the Lords who vote but do not speak cannot fall within the scope of the rules on declaration. It is interesting to note that prior to the 1995 Resolution on declaration, the House of Lords' guidance advised that:
The Griffiths Report recommended, on practical grounds, that this advice should be discontinued:
We agree with the view of the Griffiths Committee. 5.28 Registration, in contrast to declaration, provides a consolidated public record of interests, available to members of the public and to the media. Under the present rubric of the voluntary part of the Register (category (3)), members are invited to register "particulars relating to matters which Lords consider may affect the public perception of the way in which they discharge their parliamentary duties". Members therefore are required to make a judgement about which interests are sufficiently significant as to warrant including in a standing register (if they choose to make an entry under category (3)), that significance being determined by reference to what members "consider" (possibly 'speculate' would be a more appropriate word) would be the public perception of their conduct as legislators. 5.29 Unlike declared interests, registered interests will tend to be more general because a declaration of interest will be made in response to a specific issue before the House. The need to make a declaration may arise quite suddenly in the course of debate: as where, for example, an earlier speaker raises some new - possibly unexpected - point which a following speaker thinks that he can support or destroy (as the case may be) but needs to declare a relevant interest. Key issues 5.30 The Committee has considered whether the present rules governing declaration and registration in the House of Lords are satisfactory, both in their practical operation and in the context of a developing culture of transparency and accountability throughout public life. Declaration 5.31 The Leader of the Opposition, the Rt Hon Lord Strathclyde, described the rule on the mandatory declaration of interests as "enormously powerful and strong ... a tough regime".28 We received few adverse comments about the declaration rules, save that it was said that on occasions the extent of declaration could be distracting and time-consuming.29 This latter issue is a procedural rather than a standards issue and a matter for the House itself. We make no recommendations for changes to the guidance on declaration of interests. Registration 5.32 As regards registration and in particular the voluntary element (category (3)) of the Register, the key issue is whether that element should be mandatory and, if so, what sort of interests members of the House of Lords should be required to register. Whether the Register should be mandatory or voluntary 5.33 We received evidence both for and against making category (3) a mandatory category. Arguments for maintaining a voluntary register 5.34 The following arguments
were advanced in favour of maintaining the current voluntary status
of the Register:
The current Register has been in effect since 1995 and no references have been made to the Sub-Committee on Lords' Interests alleging that an individual member of the House has breached the terms of the Resolution on declaration or registration.
The Griffiths Committee found this argument persuasive when it was considering whether there should be a mandatory register.30 The Rt Hon Lord Strathclyde, the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Lords, made a similar point in his written evidence:
Lord Strathclyde told us that he was aware that "some existing
members of the House - not many" would not wish to continue in the
House if the rules on the registration of interests were to change.
Lord Griffiths recalled that this had been an issue in 1995 as well
(see paragraph 4.18 above).32
This argument was advanced by Lord Strathclyde.
He took the view that "a written register might well tempt peers
to forget about giving a declaration during the course of the debate".33
Lord Wakeham agreed that a mandatory register could create such a risk:
as to whether a peer ought to declare an interest, he said, "If it
is all registered, one would not necessarily think so carefully about
it." 34
The 1974 Sub-Committee drew attention in its report
to a significant distinction between the House of Commons and the House
of Lords: the Commons, unlike the Lords, has power over its members
to the point of expulsion whereas "the scope for disciplining a recalcitrant
peer is small".35 The Sub-Committee
took the view that this difference between the two Houses was "of
the first importance" and fundamental to the argument against a
compulsory register. The Clerk of the Parliaments, in his evidence to
us, said that the absence of sanctions remained "a fundamental difficulty".36
The Chairman of the House of Commons Standards and Privileges Committee, the Rt Hon Robert Sheldon MP, expressed to us his concern about what he described as the "tit-for-tat situation" in the Commons. He said:
Sir Archibald Hamilton MP said that he thought the Commons' regime was "getting very intrusive".38 He urged that this Committee should "not put their lordships in the same straitjacket which we [Members of Parliament] put ourselves in".39 Lord Strathclyde tentatively sounded a similar warning:
Arguments for recommending that the Register should be mandatory 5.35 The following counter-arguments
were advanced:
The 1974 Sub-Committee acknowledged that it was important "that the procedures of the House should be accepted as open and honest by the public as well as by Peers".41 Speaking in the House of Lords, the Leader of the House, the Rt Hon Baroness Jay of Paddington, has also commented on the need for openness:
Baroness Hilton of Eggardon in evidence to us expressed the same thought:
A number of witnesses urged the view that the same principles governing standards of conduct should be applied in the two chambers. Comments about this issue by some of those witnesses are set out in paragraph 4.41 above. The Griffiths Committee also recognised the force of this argument:
This is the counter-argument to the argument for maintaining a voluntary register set out in paragraph 5.34(b) above. It was put by a number of witnesses. For example, Earl Russell took the view that the fact that members of the House of Lords will normally have other sources of income arguably made a case for more regulation rather than less.45
In the 1974 Report it was suggested that the "major" practical advantage of a register was that it overcame "the problem of voting with an undeclared interest".47 We have already indicated that we share the view of the Griffiths Committee that this 'problem' cannot, for practical reasons, be surmounted by requiring peers with relevant interests to speak (and therefore be given an opportunity to declare) on any occasion on which they wished to vote. A register would, of course, only meet the problem part way. This
is because registrable and declarable interests are not always of the
same character: there will be occasions on which a member votes on an
issue about which he or she has a declarable interest (had that member
spoken in the preceding debate), but the interest is not one which he
or she would have been expected to register (see paragraph 5.27
above).
The Clerk of the Parliaments' Foreword to the 2000 edition of the House of Lords' Register makes clear that the absence of an entry in the Register cannot be a basis for speculating about a peer's interests:
Baroness Young of Old Scone found this situation unsatisfactory:
Contrary to the view that a mandatory register would be an unwarranted intrusion, the argument was put to us that the register would protect members of the Lords and, indeed, the reputation of the institution itself, from allegations of secretiveness. For example, Lord Newby said:
5.36 As we have already noted (in paragraphs 4.5 and 5.12 above), an argument against a mandatory register which was identified by the 1974 Sub-Committee was that many peers - the hereditary element of the House - were members of the House 'involuntarily'. This is no longer true. The House of Lords Act 1999 has removed all but 92 of the hereditary peers (and, of those 92, 90 have with their full consent been elected from their own political party or cross-bench group).50 5.37 The Committee has considered the countervailing arguments set out above with care. We have concluded that the balance is strongly in favour of a fully mandatory register. We take this view principally on the ground that the House of Lords, as a vital institution in public life (and one in which the public at large and the media are likely to show a growing interest), should adopt rules requiring greater transparency in order to reassure those outside the House that the highest standards of conduct are being maintained within. 5.38 We find unconvincing the argument that the absence of complaints demonstrates that the current system is working well: not only is a voluntary system unlikely, by its nature, to generate many complaints but, in our view, the absence of complaints does not preclude the possibility that the system is capable of improvement. 5.39 We have no firm evidence about whether or how many members might be deterred by a mandatory register. In contrast to Lord Strathclyde's evidence, the Rt Hon Lord Williams of Mostyn, the Attorney General, said that he knew of no member who would be deterred (although he speculated that there might be "one or two").51 We have already noted (in paragraph 3.9) that peers who do not wish to attend the House may apply for Leave of Absence: those, therefore, who hold very strong views against complying with a mandatory register and, on that ground do not wish to attend the House, have that option available to them. 5.40 As for the risk that the
House of Lords system might be exposed to the mischief of 'tit-for-tat'
allegations, we believe that measures could be taken by the House to
reduce the likelihood of such a development. We consider what these
measures might be in Chapter 7 below. In the
same chapter, we also consider the question of sanctions. We shall not
therefore deal with the issue here, save to make the following points:
first, that the rules on declaration and categories (1) and (2) of the
Register have been mandatory for five years without any problems having
arisen and, secondly, that the weight of the evidence we received was
that the informal sanction of 'naming and shaming' is likely to be an
effective one.
The content of the mandatory register 5.41 The Committee is aware that the issues relating to the content of a mandatory register are likely to be at least as contentious as the debate on whether or not the register should be mandatory or voluntary. The importance of 'proportionality' 5.42 In Chapter 2, we emphasised the importance of 'proportionality' in drawing up rules for conduct.52 As we have said already, in Chapter 4, during this enquiry we have considered the relevance of the Code of Conduct and Guidance for the House of Commons. In that context our attention was drawn to the increasing detail of the Commons' rules. Although we believe that the same general principles of conduct should be applied in both Houses of Parliament, we do not think that those principles need to be applied by the same mechanisms. In particular, we do not believe that it would be proportionate to suggest that the detail of the Commons' Register is, currently, necessary in the House of Lords. 5.43 The Rt Hon Lord Richard, former Leader of the House of Lords, shared this view. He said:
5.44 Peter Riddell took a similar line:
5.45 The present Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, Ms Elizabeth Filkin, agreed that the extensive guidance governing the House of Commons' Register would not necessarily be needed in the House of Lords. The test and guidance 5.46 The current test set out in the rubric of category (3) of the Lords' Register is that members should register particulars relating to matters "which they consider may affect the public perception of the way in which they discharge their Parliamentary duties". We received evidence suggesting that this rubric has caused some uncertainty. Lord Plant, for example, told us that the third category "is, in my judgement, far too vague".55 Lord Tugendhat said: "Perhaps this is an example of misunderstanding but I have interpreted the interests that I should declare as being those from which I derive earnings". 56 Baroness Turner favoured more guidance: "I think that there is a need to have some very clear guidance, particularly for new peers, about what one should or should not register,"57 and Lord Dubs, when asked about the same issue, said: "If it is left to individual peers to decide, the danger is that we might all behave differently from the best of motives" .58 5.47 However, bearing in mind our concern about 'proportionality', the category (3) test is appealing in its simplicity. We also believe that its focus on "public perception" is right. Furthermore, retaining the test accords with our view that it is best to build on the firm foundation of the existing conduct rules. 5.48 We have one significant reservation, however, about the current category (3) test, and this concerns its subjectivity: whether an interest falls within the scope of category (3) is determined by whether or not it is an interest which the member considers may affect the public perception. The element of subjectivity has the effect of making the category (3) test a very loose and uncertain one. We believe that it should be amended so that it is a more objective test, measured against what could reasonably be thought to affect public perception. If this proposal were accepted, the rubric of category (3) would require the registration of "other particulars relating to matters which may reasonably be thought to affect the public perception of the way in which they discharge their Parliamentary duties." 5.49 In addition, we recommend that the general (category (3)) test should be supplemented by brief written guidance. The purpose of the guidance would be, inter alia, to list those interests which the House has decided are unequivocally registrable. It would be a matter for a member's discretion to decide whether to register a non-listed interest, applying the general test (and, if necessary assisted by guidance from the Clerk of the Parliaments and the Registrar). The range of registrable interests: financial and non-financial 5.50 We now turn to the issue of what the list of clearly registrable interests might include. We begin by considering whether members of the Lords should be required to register financial interests only or both financial and non-financial interests. Some witnesses took the view that if non-financial interests were registered there would be a risk that members would clutter the Register with too much information. For example, Lord Dubs said:
5.51 Others thought non-financial interests were relevant on the ground that they gave a more complete picture of the standpoint of a member. We found this argument more persuasive. As we have already said,60 in our view, the purpose of the Register is two-fold. It enables a member of the Lords (1) to disclose personal interests which might be perceived as influential and (2) to demonstrate his or her source of expertise. This two-fold purpose would not be served if the Register were confined to financial interests only. 5.52 In order to ensure that only those non-financial interests which are relevant are registered, we suggest that, first, the guidance should clearly set out the two-fold purpose of the Register as regards non-financial interests . Secondly, on the specific issue of participation in voluntary organisations, we suggest that the guidance should state that although most61 office-holders (including trustees) in voluntary organisations would be expected to register their interest in that organisation, those who are simply members of a voluntary organisation should consider carefully, before registering their membership, whether it does in fact constitute an interest which falls within the (revised) rubric of category (3). Although in some cases membership will be strongly indicative of a peer's position on an issue, we imagine that often it will not be necessary to register simple membership. 5.53 We believe that this approach to the registration of interests in voluntary organisations reflects our commitment to the principle of proportionality. We are aware that the guidance on declaration of interests (set out in the 1995 Resolutions and quoted in paragraph 5.7 above) refers to a range of declarable interests including "unpaid membership of an interested organisation". Our suggestion that it may not always be appropriate to register simple membership is not intended to derogate from that guidance. 5.54 In order to make the Register more easily understood, we suggest as a practical measure that the Register should be laid out in a format which distinguishes between financial and non-financial interests. The list of interests which are clearly registrable 5.55 The detailed task of framing the list of those interests which are clearly registrable is, of course, a matter for the House of Lords itself to determine (assuming that it elects to adopt a mandatory register). Bearing in mind the general test proposed above, we would expect the list to include all significant financial interests (for example, remunerated directorships, remunerated employment, shareholdings amounting to a controlling interest, other significant shareholdings and substantial landholdings)62 and, as we have mentioned above, relevant interests in voluntary organisations. We would not expect occasional income from remunerated speeches, lecturing and journalism to be registered. 5.56 A particular concern raised in the evidence we received was whether hospitality in the form of costs-paid overseas visits should be registered. Baroness Turner, for example, told us that she had not been sure whether she should register a visit to Gibraltar which had been at the invitation of the Gibraltar Government. She was advised by the Registrar that she should not.63 In evidence, Lord Dubs referred to a visit to the United States to examine energy policy when he was on the Opposition benches. He thought that it was important that such visits should be disclosed because "overseas visits are seen by the public as a great freebie, even if they involve hard work".64 Lord Walton, however, suggested that not all overseas travel should be registered:
5.57 Our general view is that hospitality and gifts which are received by a peer for a reason unconnected with his or her membership of the House of Lords should not normally be registered. On the specific issue of costs-paid travel, therefore, we suggest that costs-paid visits which are associated with a peer's parliamentary activities should be registered and those which are not so associated should not normally be registered. 5.58 In the House of Commons,
MPs are not required to disclose the amount of outside income earned
(unless derived from an employment agreement "which involves the
provision of services in his capacity as Member of Parliament".66
We see no grounds on which to distinguish the House of Lords in regard
to this issue. We, therefore, recommend that members of the Lords should
not be required to disclose how much they earn from their outside interests
(save, as we state in paragraphs 6.41 and 6.42 below, the income derived
from parliamentary consultancies registrable under category (1) of the
Register).
Treating members of the House of Lords equally 5.59 The House of Lords is comprised of a number of distinct (although in some instances overlapping) groupings:
5.60 Given the purpose underlying disclosure of interests, it seems reasonable to us that there should be a presumption that all members of the House of Lords should be subject to the same set of rules governing disclosure, unless an overriding reason to the contrary can be found. On this premise, we considered whether there was any justification for exempting any category of peer from the requirement to register relevant interests. We could find no convincing arguments for making any such distinction. We concur with the view of Lord Williams of Mostyn that no exceptions should be made68 and we agree with Lord Strathclyde, who said:
5.61 We envisaged that the position of the Lords of Appeal might require special consideration since the rules relating to them in their capacity as members of the House of Lords could possibly have some bearing on their activities as members of the judiciary and have a wider implication for the judiciary as a whole. We were also aware that in 1995, when the voluntary register was introduced in the House of Lords, the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary took a collective decision not to participate in the voluntary Register.70 However, the Senior Law Lord, the Rt Hon Lord Bingham of Cornhill, told us that, subject to the specific requirements of a mandatory register, such a register would be unlikely to cause the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary any difficulties:
5.62 We received no collective view from the Lords Spiritual. The Bishop of Portsmouth, however, told us: "I would not have any difficulty with a mandatory register, provided it does not get out of hand"72 and the Bishop of Guildford wrote:
The Bishop of Wakefield, whilst not arguing for an exemption, stressed the importance of proportionality:
R9. The mandatory register should apply to all members of the House of Lords.75 The Addison Rules 5.63 In our consultation paper, we referred to the specific rules - known as the Addison Rules - which concern members of the House of Lords who are members of a public board. The rules provide guidance in respect of the general rule that:
5.64 Similarly, a peer who is employed by a public board or a nationalised undertaking is not debarred from speaking in the House on a subject which affects the board or undertaking; but whether a member or employee of a public board, any peer intervening in a debate relating to the board is expected to declare his or her interest. 5.65 The Clerk of the Parliaments explained the origin and purpose of the Addison Rules:
5.66 A small number of witnesses referred to the Addison Rules. The Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the House of Lords, the Rt Hon Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish, for example, expressed his concern that members of the House of Lords who were also members of public boards should "appreciate the distinction between taking part in a debate on the subject of the board and answering for the detailed work of the board".76 Similarly, the Rt Hon Lord Jenkin of Roding wrote that he was not aware of the general rules on declaration and registration being misapplied "other than the failure of some Peers recently appointed to public bodies to understand or observe the Addison Rules".77 5.67 Whilst not wishing to diminish the validity of the concerns raised by witnesses about the application of the Addison Rules, in our view these rules are not principally to do with the maintenance of standards but, rather, they are about ensuring clear lines of Ministerial accountability. For this reason, we do not consider them further in this report. Opposition spokesmen and women 5.68 In our consultation paper, we also raised the issue whether there should be specific parliamentary rules governing opposition spokesmen and women and their financial interests.78 Since the issue affected both Houses of Parliament, we posed the following question: "Should the rules governing members of either House of Parliament make specific provision in relation to those who are opposition spokesmen and women for the divestment (or otherwise) of financial interests similar to that contained in the Ministerial Code?" 5.69 The Ministerial Code advises that:
5.70 In raising the issue, we acknowledged that there is a significant difference between the roles of Ministers, who have executive functions, and opposition spokesmen and women, who do not. We were also aware, however, that opposition spokesmen and women are able to exercise influence over parliamentary matters and over the wider political debate as a result of the positions they hold on the opposition front benches. 5.71 We received a great deal of evidence on this issue. The preponderance, by far, was against introducing any special new rule. For example, the Rt Hon Sir George Young, Shadow Leader of the House of Commons, said:
Lady Saltoun said:
5.72 Baroness Turner of Camden, a former opposition spokeswoman, said that had she been told that she would have to divest herself of her financial interests "I would not have continued on the front bench".82 5.73 Lord Dixon-Smith thought that opposition front-bench spokesmen and women had "a margin of more interest in their work from the point of view of future policy" but, in terms of the need to make a living, he saw no distinction between them and other members of the House.83 5.74 Sir George Young Bt MP made a similar point:
He feared that restrictions on the permissible outside interests of those on the opposition front benches would reduce the effectiveness of the opposition by narrowing the pool of people from which those on the front benches could be drawn. 5.75 We conclude that there
should be no change in the rules governing opposition spokesmen and
women. Our decision is based on two points. First, as a matter of principle
we do not see why a restriction which is no doubt necessary in the case
of those with executive power, namely Ministers, should be extended
to persons who have no executive power. Secondly, we are convinced that
the proposed change is unworkable in practice, in particular because
too many able men and women would be deterred from serving on opposition
front benches.
1 The Select Committee on Procedure of the House Sub-Committee on Registration of Interests, in its (unpublished) 1974 Report , took the view - from which this Committee does not dissent - that declaration is not only relevant to proceedings in Parliament but also, for example, to a meeting with a Minister which a member of the House of Lords is able to obtain by virtue of that membership (para 12). Under the present Resolutions governing the House of Lords, the rule on declaration is described as applying additionally "where Lords are using their influence as a member of the House in a communication with a Minister, Government department, local authority or other public body outside the House". The extension of conduct rules to meetings between Ministers and Members of Parliament was recently raised in a report by the House of Commons Standards and Privileges Committee (published on 11 July 2000), in which it was recommended that the ban on paid advocacy should cover such meetings (Fifteenth Report of the Committee on Standards and Privileges, 710 (1999-2000), p ix, paras 25-26). 2 These are set out in full in the inside front cover of this report. 6 The relevant extract of the 1990 report is set out in Appendix C to this report. 7 The Resolutions were adopted on 7 November 1995. 8 The relevant Resolution
is set out in full in Appendix D to this report. 13 The Griffiths Report, para 44. 15 The relevant Resolution is set out in full in Appendix D to this Report. 17 The Griffiths Report, para 48. 25 And those who have access to the record. 26 See para 5 of the Griffiths Report where the guidance, of which this is an extract, is set out. 27 The Griffiths Report, p 9, para 29. 29 Lord Craig of Radley GCB OBE, Convenor of the Cross-Benches, for example, said: "I think personally ... that if you could skip the declaration of interest at the beginning of each speech, it would speed things up" (Day 1 (pm)). 30 The Griffiths Report, para 44. 42 Hansard (HL) 10 May 2000, col 1709. 44 The Griffiths Report, p 13, para 43. 50 See paras 3.15 and 3.16 above. 61 We envisage that there will be some circumstances in which it would not be necessary to register an office held in a voluntary organisation. For example, the organisation may be a local group and unlikely to be relevant to any parliamentary proceedings. 62 In the Foreword by the Clerk of the Parliaments to the 2000 edition of the Lords' Register, it is indicated that, if asked, Clerks advise peers that it is recommended that they should not register shareholdings, although they may wish to indicate a controlling interest in a company. 66 The Guide to the Rules Relating to the Conduct of Members, p 14, para 34. 67 The Lords of Appeal include a number of sub-categories: (1) the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary (the 'Law Lords'), (2) retired Law Lords and other Lords of Appeal who are eligible to hear appeals and (3) retired Law Lords and other Lords of Appeal who, having attained the age of 75, are no longer eligible to hear appeals. 71 Written evidence (19/74). In making this statement, Lord Bingham was expressing the collective view of the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary (see fn 67 above). Lord Bingham made a similar point in oral evidence: "one has a constitutional reluctance to sign a blank cheque and, therefore, until one knows what is proposed one does not give unreserved assent to it. But ... I cannot imagine that this Committee would propose or that the House would accept any rule that would be one that we could not happily comply with if we had to." 75 Save those members of the House of Lords who have taken Leave of Absence. 76 Day 5 (pm). Lord Mackay also provided a submission dealing with the Addison Rules (see Appendix 2 to the submission from the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Lords, the Rt Hon Lord Strathclyde (19/68)). 78 See paras 3.29 to 3.33 of the Issues and Questions Paper, Standards of Conduct in the House of Lords. The issue was drawn to our attention by Mr Fraser Kemp MP. A copy of his letter, dated 14 February 2000, can be found on the CD-Rom in Vol 2 of this report.. 79 Ministerial Code: A Code of Conduct and Guidance on Procedures for Ministers (July 1997), p 38, para 117.
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