ANNEX D continued
SALVAGE STRATEGY AND EXECUTION - PERIOD 5 General D.5.1 Period 5 covers the time from 0900 hrs to 2245 hrs on Monday 19 February. The wind veered to the north during this period, mainly force 6/7 which generated a moderate sea. There were occasional periods of poor visibility due to snow. The weather forecasts issued at 0815 hrs, 0825 hrs and 2054 hrs on Monday 19 February, predicted a northerly wind of force 5/6 gusting to force 8/9 but easing slightly after midnight. The two morning extended forecasts predicted that the wind would veer overnight towards the northeast, force 5/6 with gusts to force 8. Over the rest of Tuesday the wind would continue to ease to force 4/5 with gusts of force 8 and would be mainly force 4 by Wednesday morning. Predicted low water at Milford Haven was at 1243 hrs with high water at 1839 hrs. Sunset on Monday was at 1742 hrs. Narrative and Discussion D.5.2 Two of the MPCU advisers had been airlifted to the casualty at about 0830 hrs. There had been a misunderstanding between the salvors, MPCU and the helicopter pilot, and eight salvors had to travel to the casualty by boat. They arrived on board at 0900 hrs, at which time the casualty was reported as having grounded to the north of Middle Channel Rocks Light with ANGLIAN DUKE (100 tbp) and ANGLIAN EARL (84 tbp) attached. Not long after this the Acomarit superintendents and four of SEA EMPRESS's engineering staff boarded the casualty. At this stage it was the salvors' intention, as stated at the meeting the previous evening, to hold the casualty in position whilst preparing for a planned refloating which would enable it to be taken to the position where it was proposed to moor the casualty with ground tackle. D.5.3 It was the salvors' intention upon returning to the casualty on Monday morning to restore the main electrical supply and the boilers, thus permitting the use of the inert gas plant and the deck machinery. Having experienced difficulties with activating the generators the previous day, the salvors requested and received the services of SEA EMPRESS's engineers to carry out this work. D.5.4 At a meeting convened by the Marine Team at 1030 hrs, the senior MPCU adviser, acting on behalf of MPCU, made a point of officially expressing concern about the late arrival on site of the salvors and what he perceived as a lack of overall control. Further, the salvors were criticised for not preparing a list of the mooring equipment required from the Admiralty Salvage and Mooring Depot, and for not having a formal salvage plan readily available. Questions were also raised as to who in the salvage consortium was in charge, and who was the responsible person. D.5.5 The Senior Salvage Master vigorously defended the salvors' position by explaining that MPCU had advised the salvors that there was a problem with helicopter transport, and that this was why they had travelled to the casualty by boat. Further they were, at the time of the meeting, still considering their requirements for mooring equipment before making a formal request. He concluded by stating that Smit Tak were in charge both ashore (his role) and on board the casualty through the Salvage Master. This position was confirmed by the representative from Cory's. D.5.6 Once the electrical supply was restored on board the casualty the salvors once again commenced pumping out the water from the pump room. They then commenced to prepare the cargo and ballast tanks ready for pressurisation. However an assessment of the damage indicated that any eventual transfer of cargo would have to be over the top. Meanwhile with the aid of the MoD Chinook helicopter the salvage equipment, including two compressors and an inert gas plant, was transferred to, or moved around the casualty. Simultaneously measurements were taken of the oil remaining on board. D.5.7 During the morning the MPCU advisers continued to express their concern about the low priority given to controlling the movement of the casualty. There was no pilot on board and moreover the main engine was not being made ready at this time despite the possibility that the casualty might float off on the afternoon's high tide. These concerns were communicated to those ashore, to the Salvage Master on board, and to the Acomarit superintendents. In reply it was stated by the Salvage Master that he did not wish to use the main engine because of the possibility that the shaft might be out of alignment due to previous groundings and that further damage might be sustained by its use. D.5.8 There is conflicting evidence concerning the preparation of the main engine for use during Monday. Once the main generators and the boiler had been restarted SEA EMPRESS's engineers commenced warming through the fuel lines of the main engine, which contained heavy fuel oil. The heavy fuel oil had been cooling for about eighteen hours and thus was increasing in viscosity. This procedure could be seen as a preliminary measure to starting the main engine, and the conflict in the evidence makes it unclear whether this procedure was undertaken on the initiative of the casualty's engineers or at the request of the salvors. D.5.9 At about 1228 hrs with the casualty still aground on an easterly heading, to the north of the Middle Channel Rocks Light, ANGLIAN DUKE (100 tbp) disconnected to change the Dyneema rope for her wire pennant. At 1352 hrs she reconnected the tow line through the centre lead aft while ANGLIAN EARL (84 tbp) was still fast forward. Consideration was given by the Salvage Master to using DE YUE (200 tbp), which was still at anchor, but he dismissed the idea as he considered she was not manoeuvrable enough. TITO NERI (50 tbp) had been standing by the casualty since about 0900 hrs that morning. Small local craft were being utilised to ferry personnel and equipment to the casualty. Repairs to STACKGARTH's (43 tbp) engines had been completed at 1315 hrs and she was ordered to the casualty, arriving at 1415 hrs. She stood by awaiting orders and at 1700 hrs was instructed to ferry stores and equipment from ashore to the casualty. D.5.10 ESKGARTH (50 tbp) was ordered to proceed to the casualty at 1445 hrs where she arrived at about 1600 hrs. However, the port was still open and immediately after connecting the tow line the tug was given fresh instructions to assist in berthing another vessel which had arrived at the port. D.5.11 At 1500 hrs the Salvage Master on board SEA EMPRESS advised the Senior Salvage Master ashore that he intended to hold the casualty in place overnight using additional tugs to those already on scene. At 1530 hrs THORNGARTH (45 tbp) and VANGUARD (23 tbp) respectively connected their forward tow lines immediately forward and aft of the casualty's port side manifold. Later TITO NERI (50 tbp), which was unable to maintain station due to her bow slipping on oil on the casualty's side, was repositioned to push on the port quarter. D.5.12 At 1540 hrs ANGLIAN DUKE (100 tbp) and ANGLIAN EARL (84 tbp) were ordered to tow on the casualty's starboard quarter and bow respectively. VANGUARD (23 tbp), TITO NERI (50 tbp) and THORNGARTH (45 tbp) were simultaneously instructed to push on the port side of the casualty to keep her against the north side of the Middle Channel Rocks. However their combined power was insufficient to control the vessel when she refloated. D.5.13 At 1630 hrs the Marine Team convened a meeting to discuss, amongst other topics, the outline proposals for the mooring of SEA EMPRESS. The senior MPCU adviser confirmed that a list of the equipment required had been received from Smit Tak and that rapid progress was being made to collect the various items together. The Senior Salvage Master estimated that the moorings would be laid by Wednesday. D.5.14 In reply to a question from the Harbour Master on whether seven tugs, the number stated earlier in the meeting, were enough to hold SEA EMPRESS, the Senior Salvage Master said that they would be sufficient. The meeting was later interrupted and adjourned for an hour by news that the casualty was moving up the channel. D.5.15 Despite the efforts of the five tugs that were trying to hold the casualty at the time, at about 1700 hrs, approximately 1 hour 40 minutes before the predicted high water, driven by the tidal stream the casualty began to move in a northerly direction into the channel. Clearly, the salvors had not anticipated that the casualty would refloat as they were not on the bridge at the time. As the casualty moved northward she turned to port until she was on the line of the 040/220 leading lights, with the bows heading 070° and the stern pointing towards the entrance to the Haven. D.5.16 At this stage one of the MPCU advisers on board contacted MPCU ashore and requested permission for the casualty to be taken to sea. This request was passed to the Overall Commander (The Coastguard Agency's Chief Executive) in the MEOR in Southampton. It was apparent that a decision was needed very rapidly and he granted permission for SEA EMPRESS to proceed to sea on the basis that; the request had come from the salvors, the Harbour Master was in agreement, the tugs were confident of success, and that the main engine started. The MPCU adviser on board recalled receiving a negative response to this request but this is not supported by the overwhelming evidence from those making the decisions ashore. The Overall Commander was not in possession of all the facts and what he had been told was misleading. He was unaware that there was not a pilot on board and unaware that the vessel would be taken out stern first and it had been inferred that the request had originated from the salvors. This indicated a weakness in the communications between the Overall Commander in Southampton and his advisors on board. The Harbour Master had agreed to the request but there had been a misunderstanding in the communication as the salvors had not initiated it. In any case the question became academic when the engine was reported as unready to start. The Salvage Master apparently was unaware at the time of the above mentioned events. D.5.17 The Salvage Master recalled that with SEA EMPRESS afloat, in the channel and heading towards the port, he requested the use of the casualty's main engine, fully expecting it to be ready for starting. However, the SEA EMPRESS's engineers were still heating the heavy fuel oil to clear it from the system and the main engine could not be started. The Salvage Master has stated that, had the main engine started, his intention was to either try to hold the casualty in the 'pool' or run her into the channel towards the port until she grounded. Had he been able to take advantage of this opportunity the outcome of the incident may have been significantly altered. D.5.18 Despite the efforts of the tugs SEA EMPRESS drifted under the influence of the tidal stream north and then west towards the rocks off the southeast corner of Saint Ann's Head so that the tugs on the port side were working in increasingly shallow water. Eventually they had to be released, leaving ANGLIAN DUKE (100 tbp) and ANGLIAN EARL (84 tbp) to work on the casualty from the starboard side. D.5.19 By the time the 1630 hrs Marine Team meeting was reconvened SEA EMPRESS was once again aground. Under the influence of the tidal stream she had been swept aground at 1815 hrs and she lay, heading 040°, 3.3 cables south-southwest of Saint Ann's Head (see Figure 4 Image 97k). On this occasion the casualty had grounded at the top of high water and in effect the situation had therefore been stabilised by default, albeit in a very exposed location. D.5.20 The tow line of ANGLIAN DUKE (100 tbp) was fouled on the bottom and after it was cleared she extended it to 400 metres and, in company with ANGLIAN EARL (84 tbp) which was secured at the bow of the casualty, awaited instructions. TITO NERI (50 tbp) was instructed to return to Milford Haven to collect a new tow line. D.5.21 As the tide dropped the casualty grounded along her entire length, and the list reduced from 10° to 7°. The explosive level was high in all the damaged tanks and the salvors commenced to purge all tanks with inert gas to reduce the risk of explosion in the event that the casualty started to break up. D.5.22 A further meeting of the Marine Team took place at about 2100 hrs. The salvors who had moved out of the Coastguard Station into offices in Milford Haven did not attend this meeting. From this point onward the salvors' principal contact with the Marine Team was through the Harbour Master who passed on their plans and views to the meeting. A broad outline salvage plan, that had been formulated by the Senior Salvage Master in conjunction with the Salvage Master, was presented to the meeting by the Harbour Master. This indicated that all the damaged tanks would be air locked at low water to provide the necessary buoyancy to float the vessel on the high water at 0703 hrs the following morning. The main engine would be prepared for manoeuvring and at the next high water, with the assistance of one of the additional tugs which was due to arrive imminently, the casualty would be refloated. Thereafter the casualty would be beached in a position south of the Angle Buoy (see Figure 5 Image 95k). Apparently the meeting went on to discuss amongst other topics the prerequisites for towing the casualty free, namely that the casualty should be on an even keel, upright and at a draught to ensure a good chance of success; also that the engine and steering gear were to be operational. The matter of where to place the casualty after it was refloated was mooted and it was generally agreed that the target area for beaching was to be south of the Angle Buoy. The proposition that the casualty should be taken directly to Herbrandston Jetty was rejected because this would entail proceeding along the main channel. If the casualty foundered during transit she would block the channel and close the port for an indefinite period. The meeting was adjourned indefinitely when it was advised that loud noises were emanating from the casualty, and that the salvors had been evacuated. D.5.23 At about 2115 hrs the casualty had started to pound against the sea bed, and the decks were seen to flex. By 2155 hrs she was pounding heavily and as all the damaged tanks were still at explosive levels the Salvage Master ordered that nobody was to proceed forward of amidships. At 2200 hrs there were reports of heavy cracking/banging sounds in way of amidships and the Salvage Master decided that the casualty should be evacuated. At 2215 hrs THORNGARTH (45 tbp) was ordered alongside the casualty to evacuate the 21 people on board. D.5.24 By 2245 hrs all those on board had been evacuated and THORNGARTH (45 tbp) then proceeded to anchor. ANGLIAN DUKE (100 tbp) and ANGLIAN EARL (84 tbp) remained connected to the casualty on extended tow lines with instructions to act as necessary in the event of an emergency. By 2257 hrs the wind was north-northeasterly 20 knots, gusting 30 knots. Conclusions D.5.25 Whilst tugs were available they were deployed in insufficient numbers. This is considered to be indicative of an underestimation of the tug power needed to hold the casualty in position aground which was a consequence of a lack of understanding of the effects of the tidal streams in the area. D.5.26 There should have been better communications between the salvors and Acomarit representatives concerning the preparations necessary to run the main engine. D.5.27 The suggestion from the MPCU adviser that the casualty should be taken to sea stern first through a narrow entrance, without a pilot on board, was ill conceived and little more than a desperate measure.
SALVAGE STRATEGY AND EXECUTION - PERIOD 6 General D.6.1 Period 6 covers the time from 2245 hrs on Monday 19 February to 2000 hrs on Tuesday 20 February. The wind remained from the north, or north-northeast, force 6 but reducing to force 4 towards the end of the period. The weather forecast at 0817 hrs on Tuesday, predicted a north-to-northeasterly wind of between force 5/7 gusting force 8/9. For the second half of the period, the forecast issued at 2050 hrs predicted the wind to decrease to force 3/4 with gusts to force 6 at first. The Tuesday morning extended forecast predicted that the wind would decrease to force 4 by midday on Wednesday from the northwest. Predicted low water at Milford Haven on Tuesday was at 0103 hrs, followed by high water at 0659 hrs, then low water again at 1326 hrs and finally high water at 1922 hrs. Sunrise on Tuesday was at 0724 hrs, and sunset at 1744 hrs. SERS was activated at 0940 hrs and remained operational until stood down at 2335 hrs. During this time they provided information on longitudinal bending moments and shear forces, refloating draughts and angles of list for the casualty. Narrative and Discussion D.6.2 At about 0840 hrs the Smit Tak salvage team comprising 11 people, together with the MPCU advisers, returned on board the casualty, to be joined at 1015 hrs by some of SEA EMPRESS's engineers. Whilst the casualty's staff prepared the generators, boilers and main engine for use, the salvors assessed the condition of the tanks, together with the damage that had been sustained during the night. They also assessed the work to be undertaken to prepare the casualty for refloating and beaching her in the target area previously specified. D.6.3 At a meeting of the Marine Team at 1100 hrs the Harbour Master re-iterated the plan which had been made the previous evening for refloating the casualty on high water on Tuesday evening and beaching her in the previously specified area. No one from MPCU, their advisers or the salvors was present, however an experienced pilot was. He expressed concern about a lightening operation in the specified beaching area due to its exposed location. It was suggested that the "Explosives" mooring should be used but it was rejected as it would involve use of the main channel with subsequent risk to the port. The pilot then suggested that the operation should have a proposed ultimate goal but with options to proceed to other areas if, in the event, it proved necessary or sensible. This was accepted in theory so long as it did not involve moving the casualty in the combined part of the channel. As it was felt that there might be communication problems with the tug masters who were unfamiliar with the port it was agreed to place a pilot on each of these tugs. D.6.4 On board the casualty the salvors intended to establish which tanks were damaged and then pressurise the ullage spaces of a selection of these tanks with inert gas at low water. Thereafter they proposed to seal these tanks so that the rising tide would increase the pressure within the tanks producing sufficient buoyancy to raise the casualty. The salvors were aiming to attempt a refloating on the evening high water, which involved an extremely intensive work schedule if preparations were to be completed in time. Further salvage equipment was ordered from ashore to assist in achieving this aim. D.6.5 Electrical power was restored at 1040 hrs and pumping out of the pump room resumed. Despite the ebbing tide the casualty continued to work against the rocky bottom and was occasionally noted to pound. At about 1045 hrs, after one particularly severe movement, copious quantities of oil were seen flowing from the forward starboard side of the hull. A further eight salvors from Smit Tak joined the vessel at 1230 hrs. D.6.6 In the early afternoon the Overall Commander reminded the MPCU Local Commander that he needed to formally approve all salvage plans. A copy of the plan that had been tabled and discussed at the Marine Meeting held on the previous evening was faxed to the MEOR. After discussing this plan, as updated by subsequent events, with the Harbour Master and MPCU Local Commander it was formally approved by the Overall Commander. The plan was explained to the Secretary of State for Transport who was content, as was the Secretary of State for Wales. A letter was drafted and a faxed copy was passed to Cory Towage indicating the formal acceptance of the general plan. D.6.7 With the approach of low water, and the condition of the casualty rapidly deteriorating, the Salvage Master decided that, if there was going to be a realistic chance of refloating the casualty on the next high water, the ballast tanks would have to be pressurised with air, notwithstanding the safety factor, and not the slower process of using inert gas. By low water, the Fore Peak and No 4 Starboard Ballast tank had been closed off ready for pressurisation. However due to lack of time pressurisation with compressed air was not commenced and in the latter stages pressure was generated by the rise of the tide. By 1400 hrs No 1 Centre Cargo tank and Nos 1, 5 and 6 Starboard Cargo tanks were similarly prepared but at 1610 hrs pressurising of the ullage spaces with inert gas was stopped. D.6.8 In the interim the main engine had been prepared and, together with the steering gear, were tested and found to be satisfactory and an experienced pilot was on board. The tugs ANGLIAN DUKE (100 tbp), ANGLIAN EARL (84 tbp), DALEGARTH (45 tbp), THORNGARTH (45 tbp) and the newly arrived VIKINGBANK (62 tbp) were made fast to the casualty. The tugs STACKGARTH (43 tbp), ESKGARTH (50 tbp) and TITO NERI (50 tbp) were in attendance to push where and when required. By 1615 hrs they were ready for the attempt to refloat SEA EMPRESS. D.6.9 Prior to attempting to refloat the casualty there was a disagreement between the salvors on board about the plans for the casualty. This was settled by the Salvage Master who stated that the agreed plan was to beach the casualty to the south of Angle Buoy. In a separate incident the pilot suggested that he had in mind an alternative plan for the casualty. Concern about this was relayed back to MPCU ashore by their adviser on board. As a result the MPCU Local Commander and the senior MPCU adviser went to the Signal Station armed with an Intervention Order to prevent any deviation from the agreed plan. The Signal Station had been locked so that those within would not be disturbed during the float-off attempt. They were eventually let in to see the Harbour Master who instructed the pilot on board that he was to comply with the agreed plan. D.6.10 However, the agreed plan was changed at the last moment with the agreement of MPCU. Soon after the visit to the Signal Station by the MPCU Local Commander and the MPCU's senior adviser, the MHPA General Manager contacted MPCU concerning the possibility that the casualty could go directly to Herbrandston Jetty should the float-off attempt prove successful. This plan was verbally agreed by MPCU under certain conditions. During the initial stages of the float-off attempt the Harbour Master passed this permission to the Senior Salvage Master in the Signal Station who in turn passed it to those on the casualty. D.6.11 Although the casualty was probably afloat at an observed mean draught of about 16.6 metres, despite all the tugs' efforts and the use of the main engine, she could not be pulled clear of the bank on the high water. Whilst the casualty's heading could be changed about 15° to port and starboard, she could not be moved bodily from the location. The assumption at the time was that the vessel was pivoting about a pinnacle of rock at some point near the midsection of the hull. However from a subsequent examination of the circumstances it is more probable that it was the force of the tidal stream on the casualty's beam which kept her pinned in position. By 1945 hrs when the tide was falling, it was realised that the operation to refloat the casualty had failed. D.6.12 Again the casualty grounded, probably over the greater part of her length (see Figure 4 Image 97k). There were creaking sounds from low down in the area of amidships and it was decided to evacuate her for the night. Prior to departure the salvors depressurised the cargo tanks in order to reduce the buoyancy in the hull. The tugs which had been pushing were dismissed but ANGLIAN DUKE (100 tbp), ANGLIAN EARL (84 tbp) and VIKINGBANK (62 tbp) remained made fast to the bow of SEA EMPRESS by their tow lines, though they extended the length of them and also anchored. Plans were then made to obtain more salvage equipment for the following day's operations. Conclusions D.6.13 The salvors had insufficient time to allow an adequate number of tanks to be closed down and pressurised enough before the attempt to refloat her. D.6.14 The casualty was not pivoting about a pinnacle of rock but was being held against Saint Ann's Head Shoal by the strength of the tidal stream. (See Figure 9 Image17k.) D.6.15 The available tug power was insufficient to overcome the forces of the tidal stream acting on the beam of the casualty. D.6.16 As the tide increased in height that afternoon and after the casualty refloated, the strong tidal stream on the beam moved her to the west and into shallower waters.
SALVAGE STRATEGY AND EXECUTION - PERIOD 7 General D.7.1 Period 7 covers the time from 2000 hrs on Tuesday 20 February to 2400 hrs on Wednesday 21 February. The wind abated on the night of the 20/21 February but remained northerly. For the period of the salvage operation on Wednesday the conditions were calm with a few snow showers. The weather forecast issued at 0817 hrs predicted the wind to be northerly force 3/4 gradually backing to westerly for later that evening. Predicted low water at Milford Haven on Wednesday was at 0145 hrs, followed by high water at 0742 hrs, then low water again at 1408 hrs and finally high water at 2003 hrs. Sunrise on Wednesday was at 0722 hrs, and sunset at 1746 hrs. SERS was activated at 1045 hrs and stood down at 2200 hrs. During this period they again provided detailed naval architecture support to the on board salvage operations. In addition a prediction of the refloating condition was calculated. Narrative and Discussion D.7.2 Immediately following the unsuccessful attempt to refloat SEA EMPRESS on the high water of Tuesday evening, a meeting was convened in the MHPA General Manager's office. Those present included the MHPA General Manager, the Senior Salvage Master, the Harbour Master and the senior MPCU adviser. The senior MPCU adviser chaired the meeting, which he opened by indicating that the Government were considering taking a more active role and as a consequence the salvors were to prepare a new salvage plan and assume no financial limitations; the cost for radical solutions would be considered for Government funding. The salvors returned to their offices in order to prepare a revised salvage plan. It was about this time that they heard that the casualty was going to be evacuated for the night. D.7.3 Immediately after the meeting the Harbour Master warned other members of the Marine Team that it looked as though the Government were about to take over the salvage. The Surveyor representing the Owner's P & I interests, having been advised that the salvors had been told by the senior MPCU adviser to prepare a new salvage plan regardless of cost implications, placed the salvors on notice that if they took unreasonable action he would not recommend compensation, if he considered it to be appropriate. D.7.4 The salvors submitted a written plan to a further meeting of the Marine Team at 2340 hrs that evening. MPCU, through the senior MPCU adviser, restated the Government's position, in that all innovative solutions were to be considered and that the Government would consider providing indemnity where necessary. The salvors stated that for the implementation of their latest salvage plan they would require all the available tug power in the port. The Harbour Master agreed to declare the port closed in order to concentrate on the salvage operation, thereby releasing three extra tugs. It was agreed that SEA EMPRESS should be taken to Herbrandston Jetty should the refloating attempt be successful. There followed a brainstorming session on possible actions if the attempt proved to be unsuccessful. The possibilities raised and briefly discussed included burning the remaining oil, destroying the casualty, and lightening her off Saint Ann's Head. D.7.5 In parallel, a meeting was held at the hotel being used by the salvors, between the salvors and the Acomarit representatives to resolve problems between the parties. Following the salvors' relocation of their office from the Coastguard Station there had been a lack of ready communication between the two organisations. The outcome of this meeting was a better understanding of their respective points of view, and it was resolved to hold regular meetings to improve communications. D.7.6 During the night some salvage equipment was prepared on board SMIT ORCA, and at about 0710 hrs all the Smit Tak salvage team returned to the casualty. A little later they were joined by the MPCU advisers, the Acomarit Superintendents and some of SEA EMPRESS's crew. D.7.7 The salvage plan followed the same pattern as that of Tuesday, with the addition of deballasting the Aft Peak and No 2 Port Ballast tank. However, the salvors did not contemplate an attempt to refloat the casualty on the high water in the morning as they needed more equipment and time for the necessary preparation work. A heavy-lift helicopter chartered by the salvors arrived at about 0715 hrs and was employed in air lifting large amounts of equipment during the daylight hours. D.7.8 During the morning Cory personnel and the pilots discussed the disposition of the tugs for the attempted refloating operation. In addition to the tugs used for the operation on Tuesday the additional Cory tugs in the port, ELDERGARTH (42 tbp), YEWGARTH (50 tbp) and PORTGARTH (50 tbp), together with VANGUARD (23 tbp) and the latest tug organised by Smit Tak, ARILD VIKING (145 tbp), would be available. In total 13 tugs were to be used, giving a combined total nominal bollard pull of 789 tonnes. D.7.9 The basis of the tug plan was to make an initial rotation of the casualty on to a northwesterly heading, with enough tug power to manoeuvre the casualty astern away from Saint Ann's Head, and swing her into the main channel. It was calculated that the casualty would not float until predicted high water at Milford Haven, by which time the tidal stream would be flowing in the ebb direction. Therefore it was important for ARILD VIKING (145 tbp), the tug with the greatest bollard pull, to hold the starboard quarter of the casualty up to the tide. D.7.10 The above plan was put to the Marine Team who approved it. It was also agreed that if the refloating was successful each phase of the passage of the casualty, with the attendant tugs, towards Herbrandston Jetty would be closely monitored. A number of contingencies were agreed should the passage not follow the agreed plan. Additionally it was agreed that if the casualty did not refloat and remained fast on the rocks then a lightening operation would commence the following day. D.7.11 The Overall Commander, Chief Executive of The Coastguard Agency, who had been based at the MEOR in Southampton throughout the incident, arrived in Milford Haven early on Wednesday morning. He had meetings with MPCU, MHPA and the salvors and was brought up-to-date on the latest developments. D.7.12 On board the casualty deballasting the Aft Peak, pressurising the damaged ballast tanks with air and cargo tanks with inert gas continued. This process was completed by 1607 hrs when the inert plant was closed down. D.7.13 By about 1630 hrs the salvage team had prepared the casualty for refloating, with the exception of the pump room which was too badly damaged to be pumped out. Despite minor difficulties, caused by a temporary lack of manpower, the tugs were eventually secured in their designated locations. The tugs ANGLIAN EARL (84 tbp), VIKINGBANK (62 tbp), ANGLIAN DUKE (100 tbp), ARILD VIKING (145 tbp), THORNGARTH (45 tbp) and DALEGARTH (45 tbp) were fast fore and aft, while TITO NERI (50 tbp), YEWGARTH (50 tbp), ESKGARTH (50 tbp), STACKGARTH (43 tbp), PORTGARTH (50 tbp) and ELDERGARTH (42 tbp) were all pushing on the port side of the casualty. The tug VANGUARD (23 tbp) was in attendance. Two pilots were on board the casualty. The Senior Salvage Master took charge of the salvage operations on deck, the Salvage Master had charge of the bridge, Cory's local Fleet Manager co ordinated control of the tugs and the more experienced pilot had control of the manoeuvring of the casualty. D.7.14 At 1700 hrs the tugs commenced to take the weight on their tow lines. Despite the parting of at least one of the tugs' lines the casualty began to show signs of movement at about 1735 hrs. Problems were experienced in starting the casualty's main engine but at 1814 hrs these were overcome and the engine was then used. At 1900 hrs the casualty began to float and at 1915 hrs she was towed into the channel at an observed mean draught of 11.95 metres (see Figure 4 Image 97k). D.7.15 SEA EMPRESS then proceeded under her own power and with the aid of the tugs without further incident directly to Herbrandston Jetty The first lines were ashore at 2155 hrs and she was all fast alongside by 2400 hrs. Conclusions D.7.16 The salvors, whilst under a great deal of pressure to produce results, were methodical and experienced workers who set about sealing and pressurising the tanks until the job of refloating the casualty was completed. D.7.17 On Tuesday night there was confusion amongst a number of the parties concerned as to whether the Government was going to take over the salvage operation. D.7.18 The successful outcome of the refloating attempt was due in the main to the greatly reduced draught of the casualty which allowed her to float over all obstructions. It is noteworthy that the draught of the casualty was such that she would have floated free at high water, and if not restrained by the tugs, would on a westerly flowing tide have cleared Saint Ann's Head Shoal and drifted out to sea. (See Figure 9.)
ANNEX EBEAUFORT WIND SCALE(For an effective height of 10 metres above sea level)
* This table is only intended as a guide to show roughly what may be expected in the open sea, remote from land. In enclosed waters, or when near land, with an off-shore wind, wave heights will be smaller and the waves steeper. Figures in brackets indicate the probable maximum height of waves.
ANNEX FDATED 29 AUGUST 1995
MOD(N) SALVAGE AND MOORING OFFICERS (SALMOs) PREAMBLE 1. SALMOs are seconded to the Marine Pollution Control Unit (MPCU) of the Coastguard Agency to provide specialist salvage advice and expertise. During the period of secondment the SALMO will be considered to be in effect an employee of the MPCU and will be empowered to act/undertake duties on behalf of the MPCU. PRIMARY PURPOSE - THE ADVISORY ROLE 2. A SALMO's primary purpose is to: a. Provide specialist salvage advice and expertise to MPCU's designated overall On-Scene or Local Commanders, as appropriate. SECONDARY PURPOSE - THE EXECUTIVE ROLE 3. A SALMO's secondary purpose is to: a. Provide support to MPCU's designated On-Scene or Local Commanders, as appropriate. b. Deputise for MPCU's designated On-Scene or Local Commanders, as appropriate. SUPERIORS 4. Whilst on secondment to MPCU, SALMOs will be accountable to the Overall Commander through the On-Scene or Local Commanders, as appropriate. AUTHORITY 5. SALMOs on secondment to MPCU are authorised to: a. Supervise operations as directed. b. Undertake operations using MPCU resources or MPCU contracted resources under the control of the On-Scene or Local Commanders. c. Ensure, as far as reasonably practicable, that salvage operations are carried out in a safe manner.
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
