PART III ANALYSIS OF INCIDENT (SALVAGE OPERATION)

10. INTRODUCTION

10.1   For the purposes of this Report the salvage operation is considered to have commenced from the time just after SEA EMPRESS initially grounded until the time the casualty was successfully refloated and taken to Herbrandston Jetty. The total time for this operation was six days but it can be divided into seven well defined periods. Each period ended with a significant event which, in general, necessitated a change in direction for the salvage operation. The times stated below should not be taken as the precise time an event took place, they are just convenient times for the start and finish of the periods.

Period 1

10.2   This period covered the time from when SEA EMPRESS reported that she required assistance until the arrival of the first salvage team from the co-salvors, Smit Tak.

The period began at 2007 hrs on Thursday 15 February and finished at 1300 hrs on Friday 16 February.

Period 2

10.3   This period covered the assessment of the casualty's condition by the salvors and the formulation of their salvage plan. It was during this period that the casualty was turned towards the impending gale force winds. The period finished when the casualty was swept aground onto Saint Ann's Head Shoal.

The period began at 1300 hrs on Friday 16 February and finished at 1830 hrs on Saturday 17 February.

Period 3

10.4   In the early part of this period the salvors needed to rapidly reassess their plans. With SEA EMPRESS's anchors no longer available the problem of holding the casualty had increased. Attempts to pin the casualty on Saint Ann's Head Shoal were unsuccessful and the period finished when SEA EMPRESS was swept across the Channel to ground on Middle Channel Rocks.

The period began at 1830 hrs on Saturday 17 February and finished at 0900 hrs on Sunday 18 February.

Period 4

10.5    The atrocious weather precluded full scale salvage activity. This period was essentially used as a holding period when the salvors rested and tugs made repairs while they awaited the arrival of extra personnel and tug power. It was during this period that the casualty drifted in the eastern portion of the 'pool' and the tug DE YUE (200 tbp) was unsuccessful in holding SEA EMPRESS. The period finished with the casualty being aground once again off Middle Channel Rocks Light.

The period began at 0900 hrs on Sunday 18 February and finished at 0900 hrs on Monday 19 February.

Period 5

10.6 SEA EMPRESS grounded to the north of Middle Channel Rocks Light at the start of this period. Plans had been made, during the previous evening, to board the casualty and, with the assistance of some of her crew restore power and inert gas supplies. On refloating, tugs were unable to hold SEA EMPRESS and this period finished with her once again aground off Saint Ann's Head.

The period began at 0900 hrs on Monday 19 February and finished at 2245 hrs on the same day.

Period 6

10.7   SEA EMPRESS was again unmanned at the beginning of this period. Plans were made to reboard the casualty the following morning, Tuesday, and make preparations for refloating, this time with the aid of the casualty's main engine. This period finished with the refloating operation having failed and SEA EMPRESS still remaining aground off Saint Ann's Head.

The period began at 2245 hrs on Monday 19 February and finished at 2000 hrs on Tuesday 20 February.

Period 7

10.8   The casualty was successfully refloated and the period finished with SEA EMPRESS alongside the Herbrandston Jetty.

The period began at 2000 hrs on Tuesday 20 February and finished at 2400 hrs on Wednesday 21 February.

10.9   During each of the above periods a number of activities were taking place, both on board SEA EMPRESS and ashore. All of these activities contributed in one way or another to the salvage operation. Each period has been analysed thoroughly and the details are given in Annex D. However, the major factors associated with the execution and strategy of the salvage are analysed in the following sections of this Report.

11. TUGS USED DURING THE SALVAGE OPERATION

Tugs which were Prompt/Available

11.1 In the early stages of the incident the salvors and/or their brokers were aware of a number of tugs which were prompt/available but account also had to be taken of their location. In addition to the Milford Haven harbour tugs there were a number of other harbour tugs, with similar tonnes bollard pull (tbp), in ports such as Avonmouth, Cobh, Liverpool and Swansea (see Annex C for explanation of tonnes bollard pull). A number of powerful anchor handling/tug/supply vessels (AHTS) with bollard pulls ranging from 125 tonnes to 178 tonnes were in Aberdeen. The distance from Aberdeen to Milford Haven, north about, is 657 miles so at 15 knots, steaming time is 1 day 20 hours and this would probably be increased due to adverse weather conditions. There were also two AHTSs in Great Yarmouth. In this case the distance to Milford Haven is 491 miles so at 15 knots, steaming time is 1 day 9 hours, however this would probably increase due to adverse weather in the Channel. In addition there were a number of other tugs and AHTSs in the Thames area and the English Channel, including an ocean towing salvage tug in Falmouth. Distance from Falmouth to Milford Haven is 148 miles so at 15 knots, steaming time is 10 hours. There were also the two Coastguard emergency tugs, both AHTSs, one stationed in the Dover Straits and one at Stornoway. (General details of various types of tug and the hiring of tugs is given in Annex C.)

11.2   All the above were prompt/available and are not to be confused with many other tugs based in the UK and near Continent which were brought to the notice of the salvors and/or brokers but which were already committed to other duties. However a number of tug operators who were aware of the incident and had their tugs committed to other duties negotiated release from those contracts in anticipation of taking part in the salvage.

Tugs Offered and Used during the Salvage Operation

11.3   Acomarit, the managers of SEA EMPRESS, accepted an offer of assistance from a salvage consortium within three hours of the initial grounding. By that time the four harbour tugs from Milford Haven, DALEGARTH (45 tbp), STACKGARTH (43 tbp), THORNGARTH (45 tbp) and TITO NERI (50 tbp) were attending the casualty. As Cory Towage was part of the salvage consortium this meant that the four harbour tugs at Milford Haven were immediately available and on scene. Two Klyne tugs, ANGLIAN DUKE (AHTS 100 tbp) and ANGLIAN EARL (AHTS 84 tbp) were committed to the operation, the former was in Falmouth and the latter in the English Channel. Also there were a number of other Cory harbour tugs in Liverpool, Cobh and Avonmouth but at that stage none were committed to the operation. With this in mind, although the salvors were aware of the other tugs and their locations which were prompt/available they did not consider it necessary to charter any of them.

11.4    ANGLIAN DUKE (100 tbp) arrived in Milford Haven at about 0800 hrs on Friday 16 February and was therefore able to assist in holding the casualty in the 'pool'. At about 2035 hrs the tug VANGUARD (23 tbp) was engaged by MHPA for general duties, but this agreement was later taken over by Cory. Cory's tug from Cobh, ESKGARTH (50 tbp), and ANGLIAN EARL (84 tbp) then arrived at 0650 hrs and 0848 hrs respectively on Saturday 17 February to support the operation. With the arrival of these two additional tugs it is considered that the total amount of tug power available to the salvors was adequate for the operations which were envisaged, namely turning the casualty, holding her in the 'pool' in line with the main tidal stream, with the assistance of her anchors and engine, and lightening her. However, once the turning operation ran into unforeseen difficulties, including the loss of the casualty's anchors, the amount of tug power available was inadequate.

11.5   At about 1810 hrs on Saturday, shipbrokers were informed by Klyne Tugs of the situation regarding the casualty. In the next hour and fifteen minutes the shipbrokers had established that the Chinese registered ocean going salvage tug DE YUE (200 tbp) was still prompt/available in Falmouth, although her agents in Rotterdam had to check with the tug's owners in China. They identified also the following vessels as being available. In Falmouth the coastal tug TOWING WITCH (42 tbp) was only available for a limited period. DEA CAPTAIN (AHTS 43 tbp) was prompt at Lyme Bay and whilst not being fixed was mobilising and proceeding towards Penzance in order to be closer to the casualty. CANMAR IKALUK (AHTS 165 tbp) was currently engaged in a rig shift off Great Yarmouth and may have been available later. MAERSK PUNCHER (AHTS 178 tbp) and MAERSK MASTER (AHTS 170 tbp) were prompt and available in Aberdeen.

11.6   In light of the fact that the casualty's anchors had been slipped during the operation to turn her the Salvage Master required additional tug power. He called his Head Office in Rotterdam at about 1830 hrs on Saturday requesting an AHTS with a multi-role capability and at least 100 tbp. He was informed about DE YUE (200 tbp) and that the Smit owned VIKINGBANK (AHTS 62 tbp), on passage in the southern North Sea, was available.

11.7    At about 1925 hrs DE YUE (200 tbp) had been selected by the salvors. She was fixed and would be in Milford Haven on Sunday morning. There were discussions between shipbrokers and the salvors about other tugs but these were considered to be either too small or too far away. Cory Towage had also arranged for two of their harbour tugs from Liverpool, ELDERGARTH (42 tbp) and YEWGARTH (50 tbp), to be sent to Milford Haven to take over port duties to allow the Milford Haven Cory tugs to be committed to the salvage operation. These were due to arrive at Milford Haven in the early hours of Sunday morning.

11.8   However DE YUE (200 tbp) arrived after the casualty had drifted free and regrounded on the southern side of the 'pool' and with this change in circumstances this tug did not provide the answer to holding the casualty in the desired position. DE YUE (200 tbp) has the typical characteristics of an ocean going salvage tug, including a deep draught and heavy cumbersome towing gear, and therefore was not really suitable for holding the casualty in the relatively confined waters of the 'pool'. Although the disadvantage of the towing gear was overcome to some extent by the salvors providing her with a specialised high strength, easy to handle, synthetic towing line, the problems of deep draught and restricted manoeuvrability could not be overcome. From the time she arrived at Milford Haven, a salvors' representative (a tug master from Klyne Tugs who was to act as liaison officer) was on board to advise the Master what was required of his vessel. The Master questioned some of the actions which were required and offered alternative suggestions based on his knowledge of the capabilities of his vessel. These suggestions were not accepted though it is impossible to say with certainty whether there would have been a better outcome if he had been allowed to do things as he thought best. Because of DE YUE's (200 tbp) apparent lack of manoeuvrability in such a situation, it was accepted that she was not suitable and took no further part in the salvage operation.

11.9   It is worth clarifying also the much publicised role of the interpreter from a local Chinese restaurant. The Master of DE YUE demonstrated no knowledge of the English language but some of his senior officers spoke reasonable English therefore there was no real problem of communication between the salvors' liaison officer and the crew. However, the questioning by the Master of some of the actions required of him and the resultant discussions with the liaison officer, when relayed to those ashore, was interpreted by them as a language problem, whereupon the services of a Cantonese speaking person to act as interpreter were obtained. Although this person did pass messages to DE YUE in Cantonese which were understood by the Master the real problem was not a difference in language but a difference of views on the operation of his vessel.

11.10   On Monday 19 February following the unsuccessful attempt to hold the casualty with DE YUE (200 tbp) (supported by some of the other tugs) the salvors took measures to find a more suitable replacement, namely the nearest large AHTS vessel which was immediately available. Enquiries were made concerning MAERSK PUNCHER (178 tbp) and MAERSK MASTER (170 tbp) but these were no longer available as Aberdeen had been closed at 1430 hrs on Sunday due to the weather. (Aberdeen reopened at 2323 hrs on Monday.) The nearest tug which would fulfil the salvors' requirements was ARILD VIKING (AHTS 145 tbp) which was at Great Yarmouth. She was fixed immediately, sailed for Milford Haven and expected to arrive at midnight Tuesday or early on Wednesday.

11.11   By Tuesday morning two other tugs had arrived on the scene, VIKINGBANK (62 tbp) and Cory's harbour tug PORTGARTH (50 tbp) from Avonmouth. The former tug joined the other available tugs in the unsuccessful attempt to refloat the casualty on Tuesday afternoon. This failed because there was still insufficient tug power attached to the casualty to turn her against the current. The tug power was insufficient because as the casualty began to turn, one end would have come up against the seabed and prevented her from turning further. It has been calculated that a total bollard pull which would have been required to be made fast to one end of the vessel would have been about 900 tonnes.

11.12   ARILD VIKING (145 tbp) arrived late Tuesday evening in time to take part in the successful refloating of the casualty. Although her arrival did increase the total tug power available quite considerably, the refloating operation was successful mainly because the casualty was at such a low draught that she was clear of the shoal ground.

Conclusion

11.13   There was sufficient tug bollard pull to carry out the holding operations but only in reasonable weather and tidal conditions. However, the smaller tugs were not suitable when these conditions deteriorated because neither they nor the towing equipment on board was designed for such sea and weather conditions. This situation could have been foreseen by the salvors and they should have made contingency plans to bring to the site more suitable larger tugs, such as AHTSs which have heavy towing equipment. Too great an emphasis was placed by the salvors on the summation of the total nominal bollard pull rather than the types of tugs which apply that bollard pull. Although DE YUE (200 tbp) had a high bollard pull and heavy towing equipment her handling characteristics did not make her truly suitable for the task given to her.

Availability of Coastguard Tugs

11.14   In parallel with the salvors search for suitable vessels on Monday 19 February, the MPCU's Overall Commander (see Annex B for details of MPCU command structure) based at the Marine Emergency Operation Room (MEOR) in Southampton enquired as to the availability of the two Coastguard tugs, FAR TURBOT (AHTS 100 tbp) and SMIT LLOYD SAFE (AHTS 126 tbp) stationed at Dover and Stornoway respectively. It was reported that it would take the former 26 hours and the latter 36 hours to reach Milford Haven. However because of a scheduled crew change at 1600 hrs that afternoon and also because she would have to refuel en route, it would have taken longer than 36 hours for SMIT LLOYD SAFE (126 tbp) to reach Milford Haven. FAR TURBOT (100 tbp) was unable to leave due to bad weather in the Channel and her services might have been required in her designated area. However as ARILD VIKING (145 tbp) had been fixed it was felt that the Coastguard tugs were not required.

11.15   Nevertheless, the question has to be asked whether consideration should have been given at an earlier stage to calling in the Coastguard tugs. HM Coastguard have submitted to the Inquiry that factors which would have to be taken into account include distance, weather, urgency and the availability of other tugs.

11.16    However strong these considerations, when there is an emergency anywhere around the UK coastline which has the potential for loss of life and/or extensive pollution, and there is no emergency in their own sector, it is considered that these tugs should be automatically mobilised towards the scene. Their place could be substituted by units from the market if this was deemed necessary. It is considered that if the two Coastguard tugs had been mobilised as a matter of routine their use, in addition to the other tugs, would have made a major contribution to the holding and salvage operation.

Donaldson and Belton Reports

11.17   Both at the time of the incident and afterwards there were a number of claims from some quarters that if a salvage tug had been positioned in the South Western Approaches in accordance with Lord Donaldson's Report the incident would not have escalated. LordÊDonaldson's Report only identified two key areas, the Dover Straits and northwestern Scotland and this was acted upon by the Government. However, the Report went on to identify the South Western Approaches as the area to be considered next. A further study into the costs and benefits of emergency towing vessels was commissioned from a study team headed by Captain Belton RN. The report concluded that Dover, Hebrides and South Western Approaches should be considered as Primary Areas in terms of risk. A third emergency towing vessel has been stationed in the South Western Approaches as part of the winter 1996/97 trial, since the SEA EMPRESS incident.

11.18   Both reports appertain to rescue/salvage capability in the open sea, rather than in the grounding of a vessel in a harbour area. It is clear that a salvage tug based in the South Western Approaches could not have prevented SEA EMPRESS going aground in the first instance. However, if a powerful and manoeuvrable tug such as an AHTS had been based there and summoned to assist in the very early stages of the salvage operation it would have improved the chances of safely holding the casualty in the 'pool'.

12. CONTINGENCY AND EMERGENCY PLANS

General

12.1   During the salvage operation reference was made to the National Contingency Plan and MHPA plans for dealing with such emergencies. The Inquiry has therefore considered this important aspect to determine whether these existing plans are adequate, whether they were implemented and if so how successfully.

12.2   The National Contingency Plan is the repository of MPCU's philosophy and strategy and sets out the arrangements for dealing with pollution from ships into the marine environment with the objective of ensuring a fully integrated and co-ordinated response. The MPCU advises local and port authorities on the formation of their own plans so that they are consistent with the National Contingency Plan and that the response approach and policies accord with those of the Government. However the plan is not a legal document.

12.3   The plan was being revised at the time of the incident to take account of, among other things, the establishment of The Coastguard Agency and Lord Donaldson's recommendations. The document discussed in this report is that current at the time of the accident.

12.4   Most Harbour Authorities currently do not have a statutory responsibility to prepare oil pollution emergency plans. Although the Government has ratified the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 1990 which requires sea ports to have such plans, primary legislation is required to make the requirement mandatory. However Milford Haven, in common with most large UK port authorities, has a "Pollution Plan". It also has an "Emergency Plan" which fulfils the requirements of the Dangerous Substances in Harbour Areas Regulations 1987.

Milford Haven's Emergency Plan

12.5   This plan takes the form of a section dealing with emergencies in general, followed by six separate sections giving the action to be taken in particular categories of emergencies. There are a number of appendices indicating contact numbers, possible control posts, the initial action to be taken at the Signal Station and the resources available.

12.6   The plan does not deal specifically with an incident like that of SEA EMPRESS but one chapter does deal with an incident "which is a collision or emergency other than a fire or explosion involving vessels within the Haven". The plan makes it quite clear that in such an incident the Harbour Master would be in charge for the Authority, that he would liaise with the Master of the vessel on actions to be taken, would nominate a suitable beaching area if necessary, would nominate someone to co-ordinate tugs and other services and he would on discussion with the Master determine individual responsibilities depending on the circumstances. The plan indicates that the Harbour Master would normally be stationed in the 'Forward Control Point'.

Milford Haven's Pollution Plan

12.7   This plan concentrates on dealing with the oil once spilled, reporting procedures and the roles of MHPA, the jetty owner and ship's Master. Nevertheless one clause states: "It should be appreciated that the Government's power to intervene in respect of salvage operations would apply within the port area if the port authorities were dissatisfied with the conduct of such operations from an environmental risk point of view." This seems to imply that MPCU would intervene at the request of MHPA.

This plan was submitted to MPCU for approval in 1991 at their request and they were involved with subsequent revisions.

Milford Haven's Plans and the Marine Pollution Control Unit

12.8   Neither of the plans referred to above make express reference to the National Contingency Plan. No allowance is made for the role that MPCU personnel and their advisers play in connection with a major casualty and its salvage within the Haven (as opposed to their role in connection with at-sea and on-shore pollution) and how that role and the Command and Control Structure, as laid out within the National Contingency Plan, fits in with the Milford Haven Emergency and Pollution Plans. In these respects the plans fall short of adequately covering important aspects of an incident of the magnitude of SEA EMPRESS.

12.9   Nevertheless the Harbour Master has stated that unless and until MPCU intervened officially he felt he was in charge of the salvage operation from MHPA's point of view and MPCU's role was to assist him. The initial stages of the emergency were handled well under the Milford Haven plans and the correct people were mobilised in good time. However, it is clear that the plans were not designed to cope with an accident of the scale of SEA EMPRESS which continued over a number of days, involved international salvors and government authorities and was of national and even international significance.

The National Contingency Plan

12.10   The content of the National Contingency Plan is necessarily broad based to cover a wide range of possible incidents. Much of it deals specifically with pollution on the sea surface or on the shoreline and methods of combatting and controlling that pollution. The general sections of the plan include some references which, although obviously aimed principally at MPCU's responsibilities in the clean-up and control of the pollution, could be, and perhaps are meant to be, construed to include their involvement with the casualty and its salvage. The potential for confusion is increased, in a case like that of SEA EMPRESS, by no clear definitions of the terms "at-sea" and "offshore" and particularly whether these terms encompass harbour waters. For instance it states that in a major incident MPCU "will direct offshore operations". Should this be interpreted to include the casualty and if so does it include a casualty within harbour waters? There might be circumstances where MPCU will direct operations offshore to deal with the pollution but not necessarily with the casualty. In addition, the mechanism whereby an incident changes into a "major" incident and where MPCU will assume greater control is not described.

12.11    Three sections of the plan, those entitled "Intervention", "Response to At-Sea Pollution" and part of the section entitled "Counter Pollution Operations At-Sea", do deal more specifically with a casualty and its salvage. Intervention is discussed elsewhere in this Report as are aspects of the section entitled Response to At-Sea Pollution. The section on Counter Pollution Operations At-Sea is divided into two parts, one dealing with the casualty and the other dealing with the spilt oil. As the remit of the Inquiry does not extend to the handling of the pollution, the following comments relate to the section of the plan which addresses the matter of dealing with the casualty.

Role of the Marine Pollution Control Unit

12.12   The section dealing with the casualty outlines MPCU's role in the vessel and salvage aspects of an incident. It explains that the role of MPCU, where salvors are actively engaged in dealing with the casualty, might be limited and involve no more than monitoring the activities of the other parties to satisfy itself that the wider public and environmental interests are being safeguarded. It also allows for MPCU to assume "a central role", including possible use of the powers of intervention. The role and responsibilities of the Harbour Authority are not considered. It could be construed that this assumes the casualty to be outside harbour limits where MPCU would undoubtedly be the principal authority with responsibility for the casualty.

12.13   There is no doubt that MPCU, in the case of SEA EMPRESS, as well as monitoring the situation assumed a "central role" although they did not actually use their powers of intervention. From the Inquiry it is apparent that there was some confusion as to who was in charge ashore. The Harbour Master clearly felt that he had the responsibility unless and until MPCU intervened on behalf of the Secretary of State. This view seems to be largely echoed by MPCU, although confused by references to MPCU assuming overall command, but not "executive overall command". This issue is further confused as MPCU cannot use its intervention powers directly to the harbour authority under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 even though the Secretary of State, and those with his delegated responsibility, clearly have the greater legal responsibility.

12.14   In the case of SEA EMPRESS, MPCU did not intervene although the National Contingency Plan was undoubtedly used as the basis for MPCU's actions. This points to the conclusion that, in terms of the salvage at least, the Harbour Master retained the responsibility and was the person in charge. MPCU's role until such time as they assumed a greater responsibility should therefore have been to monitor the activities of the other parties, including MHPA. They clearly went beyond that and assumed a central role as envisaged by the National Contingency Plan by personally approving plans, stationing their advisers on board the casualty, providing help and advice, and chairing meetings ashore.

12.15   There is no doubt that MPCU acted in good faith and at a level appropriate to the magnitude of the emergency. The confusion arises because the National Contingency Plan deals inadequately with this aspect of the command and control of the incident. The plan should make it very clear under what circumstances MPCU assumes overall command, exactly what that entails and where it fits in with the salvors and other authorities which have legitimate responsibilities.

Specialist advice available to the Marine Pollution Control Unit

12.16   The National Contingency Plan outlines the sources of specialist advice available to MPCU to assist in a incident involving a casualty. The first of these organisations is the Surveyor General's Organisation, now the Marine Safety Agency (MSA). MSA were informed of the SEA EMPRESS incident soon after the initial grounding. The local MSA surveyor advised on matters related to lightening and other small vessels, but did not take any formal role regarding the casualty until after berthing at Herbrandston Jetty.

12.17   The second potential source is named as the Committee on Salvage -Panel of Salvage Experts. In recent years there has been a move away from the concept of a panel of salvage experts to greater reliance on the Ministry of Defence (MoD) Salvage Officers for assistance and advice although MPCU maintains a list of contacts in the industry from whom advice can be sought if deemed necessary. With the demise of the UK salvage industry the number of potential experts who would be available to MPCU has diminished considerably and the probability of any of them being available to advise MPCU has reduced. In the case of SEA EMPRESS no direct approach was made for advice from a commercial salvage expert and of course a large number of the principal experts were already commercially involved in the SEA EMPRESS incident.

12.18 The third source is named as MoD Salvage Officers. Their role, as envisaged in the plan, is to board the damaged vessel, advise MPCU and the Panel of Salvage Experts on the salvage operations and to monitor the conduct of those operations. They are not expected to assume any direct responsibility for those operations. A draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Directorate of Marine Services (Naval), MoD, and MPCU was drawn up in August 1995 which sets out the Terms of Reference for MoD Salvage and Mooring Officers seconded to MPCU. The MOU is more explicit on the role and authority of MoD Salvage and Mooring Officers seconded to MPCU than the National Contingency Plan is. (A copy of the draft MOU is at Annex F.) The MoD Salvage and Mooring Officers involved in the SEA EMPRESS incident were employed under the terms of the MOU and represented MPCU on board SEA EMPRESS soon after the initial grounding. Further support was given to MPCU by the secondment of the Chief Salvage and Mooring Officer who acted as senior adviser ashore, sometimes deputising for the MPCU Local Commander in accordance with the MOU (see Annex B for details of MPCU command structure). However, it is surprising that the Chief Salvage and Mooring Officer was not aware of the National Contingency Plan.

12.19   The role of MoD Salvage and Mooring Officers, acting as MPCU advisers on board the casualty, was purely to observe and specifically not to influence the salvage decisions. Also, they were to provide specialist advice to MPCU ashore and to undertake operations using MPCU resources under the control of the MPCU Local Commander. This is a very difficult role for men who are used to leading their own salvage operations. In fact they took more of an active role and assisted in tank soundings and position fixing and in many other ways without getting too involved with the actual salvage operation. They also took a very active role when the casualty was swept aground on Saturday evening in organising the safe evacuation of firstly nonessential personnel and then, eventually, all the crew and salvors. In these respects their presence on board was helpful to the salvors however, in other ways, they were seen by the salvors to be Government officials without responsibility.

12.20   It should be noted that MPCU did offer the salvors a great deal of assistance in terms of salvage and mooring equipment and personnel, helicopter assistance, and in many other ways. However it is a pity that, in terms of salvage planning, MPCU and their advisers who have, or should have, the powers to positively assist the salvors took the negative role on board of monitor, do not influence and veto if necessary. This did not assist the salvor and put the MPCU advisers on board the casualty in an awkward position and might even have been counterproductive.

12.21   The National Contingency Plan seems to recognise, in the reference to MoD Salvage Officers advising both the Overall Commander and the Panel of Salvage experts, that the Panel has something to offer notwithstanding the involvement of MoD Salvage Officers. It is believed that, while it may be impractical to recall the Panel of Salvage Experts in the form that formerly existed, new arrangements should be sought whereby independent commercial salvage advice can be gained by the authorities during an incident.

Shelter for Damaged Vessels

12.22   In a section entitled "Shelter for damaged vessels" the National Contingency Plan explains the philosophy of taking a damaged tanker into a sheltered area and even alongside a terminal where cargo transfer operations can be safely carried out. MPCU has undertaken a survey of the UK shoreline to provide information on possible safe havens. The document containing this information provides details of anchorages and ports including the maximum draught and length for a particular location, the quality of the navigational access, the local facilities, environmental factors and in the case of anchorages the quality of the shelter and the holding ground. Part of the foreword to this document should be noted in relation to the SEA EMPRESS incident because it states:

"It has long been established that whenever possible the best way of avoiding continuing and extensive pollution from a marine casualty is to remove the cargo oil from the damaged ship into a sound vessel. The longer oil remains on board a casualty, particularly in an exposed situation where subsequent hull damage is likely, the greater is the chance of substantial spillage. If a casualty can be removed to a sheltered place the risk of spillage is lessened; an emergency cargo transfer operation can more safely be mounted; and counter pollution resources can be more effectively deployed."

In a subsequent section of the foreword it is recognised that any safe haven will likely be close to the initial scene of the incident to keep movement of the casualty to a minimum.

12.23   In considering the safe havens which are identified for the area "South Wales and the Bristol Channel" it is apparent that no identified location could take SEA EMPRESS with a draught of 23.5 metres. The location with the largest maximum draught restriction is identified as Milford Haven with a quoted maximum draught of 20.4 metres at high water. Milford Haven is specifically identified in the document as "a port" as opposed to "an anchorage".

12.24   Of particular interest is that the National Contingency Plan highlights the fact that there might be opposition to a decision to bring a vessel into, or leave her in, a safe haven from the parties concerned. In such cases the Government can play a very significant role in assisting a competent salvor to minimise pollution damage by persuading a Harbour Master to allow a damaged tanker to enter his port despite the short term risk of some pollution and possibly commercial damage, but in so doing minimising the risks of a greater casualty. This principle is enshrined in Article 11 of the 1989 Salvage Convention. However if persuasion does not work the Secretary of State's powers of intervention may be used to direct those in control of the vessel to take, or not to take, the vessel to the specific sheltered area.

Emergency Cargo Transfer Operations

12.25   This section of the National Contingency Plan describes the sort of equipment held and kept in readiness by MPCU for use in emergency cargo transfer operations. This equipment was made available to the salvors at an early stage and much of it, along with personnel to assist in operating the equipment, was utilised by the salvors to good effect.

Command and Control

12.26   In another section of the National Contingency Plan entitled "Command and Control" the roles of the principal MPCU representatives are outlined. This section defines Overall Command as "full responsibility for the direction of counter pollution operations during a marine emergency". Counter Pollution Operations are defined as "any action taken to prevent, reduce, monitor or combat pollution or the threat of pollution arising from a spillage of oil or other harmful substance from a ship". The command structure seems to assume that MPCU will be in total control of the situation in that there is no allowance for a unified command for an incident like that of SEA EMPRESS where other authorities have legitimate responsibilities. It can be assumed from this that if the plan was "activated" the command structure in that plan would operate.

12.27   MPCU operated the command structure as set out in the plan during the SEA EMPRESS incident in respect of the at-sea counter pollution operation. However, command and control of a salvage incident like that of SEA EMPRESS is not covered specifically and as there is no mention of the role and structure of the Marine Team in either the National Contingency Plan or the Milford Haven Emergency Plan the basis for confusion existed. The objective stated in the National Contingency Plan that the involvement of MPCU will "ensure a fully integrated and co-ordinated response", was not achieved in relation to the casualty and its salvage.

12.28   In conclusion the plan, although broad based, does not deal clearly with the MPCU's potential involvement in a salvage incident where a tanker is damaged and is spilling oil within the jurisdiction of a port authority. The main thrust of the plan is towards pollution which has already taken place and the methods of control and clean-up. Key subjects such as "Command and Control" in the plan seem to be defined in relation to spilt pollution and clean-up operations with the casualty and salvage appearing to be of secondary importance. Quite clearly the plan needs to be reviewed and updated to take account of the inadequacies which the SEA EMPRESS incident has brought to light.