PART III ANALYSIS OF INCIDENT (SALVAGE OPERATION) continued
13. ONSHORE MANAGEMENT OF SALVAGE OPERATION
Onshore Management Structure
13.1 It was recognised in the very early stages of the incident that a significant management system needed to be set up ashore to deal with marine aspects of the emergency. On advice from MPCU, a Marine Group was set up to deal with matters concerning the salvage and the at-sea pollution. Other non-marine aspects of the emergency including the considerable problem of shoreline clean up and the media response were handled separately.
13.2 Initially the MPCU Local Commander was appointed to lead the Marine Group. As procedures evolved the casualty and its salvage was handled separately to at-sea pollution by a Marine Team principally consisting of, but not limited to, the Harbour Master, MPCU, Acomarit and the owners of the cargo. Meetings of the Marine Team were chaired by the Harbour Master.
13.3 The Marine Group was located in a single room, the Emergency Planning Room of the Coastguard Station, which became the Marine Response Centre (MRC) for the incident. As the incident progressed a large number of persons, each of them with a legitimate interest in the casualty and its salvage, arrived at the Coastguard Station and, through lack of an alternative base, were accommodated in the MRC. Each of these persons had a pressing interest in the considerations of the Marine Team and thus aspects of the casualty and its salvage were discussed widely although the principal team members retained the decision making role.
13.4 In the early stages the salvors were not represented within the Marine Team but the Harbour Master and the MPCU were represented on board the casualty by the pilots and the MPCU advisers respectively. Acomarit also had their superintendents on board the casualty. These groups fed back information to individual members of the Marine Team. In the afternoon of Friday 16 February a need for the salvors to present their plans to the Marine Team was perceived and the Assistant Salvage Master came ashore to perform that role as well as to co-ordinate the procurement of equipment. This provided another, separate, line of communication between the casualty and the Marine Team. Later in the incident the newly arrived additional Salvage Master from Smit Tak (who for sake of clarity was termed the Senior Salvage Master) performed the liaison role. There were also a number of other interested parties on board the casualty who were relaying information back into the MRC.
13.5 It would appear that prior to the grounding on Saturday night the Marine Team meetings were informal discussions with no minutes being taken. The MPCU Local Commander had a desk and telephone adjacent to that of the Harbour Master in the MRC and decisions seem to have been taken between these two persons, and others present in the room, as the need arose. After the events of Saturday night the meetings became more formal and were held in the Harbour Master's Office although the MRC continued as the central office for the Marine Group. These more formal meetings were minuted by a representative of Texaco, the cargo owners. They were attended by a number of the other interested parties in addition to the principal team members and representatives of the team that had, by this time, been set up ashore by the salvors.
13.6 The MPCU Overall Commander was based at the MEOR in Southampton for most of the incident and moved his command to Milford Haven on Wednesday 21 February.
Marine Team
13.7 The role of the Marine Team as a group, although not specifically identified, could be broadly stated to have been to assist the salvors by co-ordinating the efforts of all those with a legitimate interest in the casualty and its salvage in order to monitor the salvage operation and approve the salvage plans; to assist the salvors as much as possible with equipment and specialist and local knowledge and; as far as possible, to ensure that the operations were being carried out safely and efficiently.
13.8 In addition to the group role, individual organisations within the Marine Team had their own priorities including the avoidance of further pollution and protecting the best interests of the general public, port users, owners and insurers.
13.9 In order to fulfil their group role the Marine Team needed good quality timely information. They needed to control the information flow and to act as a focus for communications to and from the salvors. As the numbers of persons using the MRC increased and the number of persons on board the casualty increased the ability to keep control over the flow of information decreased. The situation was further complicated as MPCU began to think that some of the advice being received from their advisers portrayed a lack of expertise in the salvage of this type of vessel, and the exchange of information between the Harbour Master and the pilots was not good.
13.10 In the period up to Sunday 18 February the Marine Team's monitoring of the salvage operation was apparently an ad hoc process. The salvors were not required to produce written plans. However, there were reasonable communications between the Salvage Master and MPCU representatives and others on board. News of the salvage plans, and changes to the plans, was communicated, by the various channels available, to those ashore as the situation developed and became known to the representatives on board. On receipt of information in the MRC, members of the Marine Team who were present would discuss any developments and consult outside with others, including the MPCU Overall Commander in Southampton and the MHPA's General Manager. By this means decisions would be reached and if necessary, through the various channels, communicated back to those on board.
13.11 Information was reaching the key members of the team, decisions were being taken and approvals were being given, but the ad hoc nature of the processes and the number of lines of communication and persons involved gave rise to the possibility of key facts being overlooked, or misinterpreted, by the principal members of the Team. It is apparent from the evidence that some important information was missed, not collected or misinterpreted.
13.12 Examples of the above include:
i) The salvors had calculated on Friday evening that the casualty's draught could have been reduced to a minimum of, perhaps, 19.17 metres by pressurising the ballast tanks to 0.5 bar. This fact was not made known to the Harbour Master and Acomarit.
ii) The salvors on board the casualty received the message that they must reduce the draught to 18.3 metres or less before being allowed to take the casualty further into the Haven. This appears to have been interpreted as a blanket restriction without question.
iii) As the incident progressed the strength and direction of the tidal streams in the area of the 'pool' became a very important issue. The casualty had been caught by unexpected tidal streams on Saturday, Sunday and Monday. There was no recorded data on the tidal streams in the 'pool' and yet the collective view of experienced pilots or others with practical experience was not sought.
iv) The pilots who experienced problems in holding the casualty in the 'pool' on Friday night were not debriefed on coming ashore.
v) There was confusion when the MPCU adviser requested permission for the casualty to be taken to sea as it drifted in the channel on Monday. The Harbour Master thought that there was a pilot on board and he thought the casualty was heading to seaward; the Overall Commander thought that the request had come from the Salvage Master and he was unaware that the intention had been to take the casualty to sea stern first. Although permission was granted, under certain conditions (which were not met), the reply was received on the casualty as negative.
13.13 Under such circumstances those ashore were not able to maintain an accurate picture of the problems being experienced on the casualty and the options for salvage which were available to the salvors. In consequence their ability to take the correct decisions would have been seriously affected by this.
13.14 After the events of Saturday, the Marine Team meetings became more formal, minuted events and occasionally a pilot was invited to attend one of the meetings. Also, the salvors were requested to provide their plans for approval on a more formal basis. This request coincided with the arrival of the Senior Salvage Master from Smit Tak. From this time the salvors' broad plans were formed ashore by the Senior Salvage Master.
13.15 At about this time the salvors moved out from the MRC to less crowded offices in the town and the Senior Salvage Master communicated with the Marine Team principally through the Harbour Master. The salvage plans were generally presented to meetings of the Marine Team where they were discussed, but the meetings were of limited value to the salvors. Salvage plans were changing rapidly, twice in the middle of meetings and the plan approval process could not keep pace with events.
13.16 The salvors ideally needed to channel their communications through one body which had the authority to approve and facilitate their plans for the casualty as well as the necessary contacts to help them with local and specialist advice and possibly logistic support. After the salvors moved out from the MRC they clearly looked to work principally with the Harbour Master as the casualty was within the Port Authority area, and the Harbour Master had the principal day-to-day authority for the onshore management of the salvage operation until and unless MPCU intervened. This strategy was only partly successful due to MPCU becoming more active as the incident progressed. For example the MPCU Overall Commander who was still based at the MEOR in Southampton, required to personally approve the salvors' plans. The MPCU representatives were also critical of the salvors' performance and on Tuesday evening required the salvors to consider radical alternative plans. With MPCU active on the casualty and ashore, the Harbour Master could clearly not take decisions without consultation. It was during this period, especially, that the question of "Who's in Charge" became an important issue.
Effectiveness of the Marine Team and Ideas for Improvement
13.17 Although all parties in the onshore management of the incident worked closely together, and there was co-operation and a degree of integration and co-ordination, the effectiveness of the onshore management of the salvage operation was not fully satisfactory for a number of reasons. These are discussed below, together with some ideas for improving matters for any future incidents where there is a major salvage operation in which the Government becomes involved.
13.18 The MPCU Overall Commander, who performed a major decision taking role in the management of the incident, was based in Southampton for most of the incident. It is considered that the person with the Secretary of State's delegated responsibility would have been better placed in Milford Haven in direct contact with the casualty and the other key members of the Marine Team.
13.19 The role of the Marine Team as a group was not clearly identified. It became too large a group to fulfil efficiently its role in a fast moving salvage incident, it did not have a clear authoritative leader, it functioned with team members each having individual objectives and the decision making arrangements within component bodies in the team were too unwieldy. The fact that the Marine Team was not a cohesive unit placed demands on the salvors' resources. It is considered that a team of three or four working closely together and with a single reliable line of communication with the ship would have been better able to cope with the demands of the situation.
13.20 It is believed that individual members of such a team should have the personal authority to approve the salvors' plans on behalf of the organisations they represent. Such a team would provide a unified command team approach to the monitoring of the incident, however, it is advisable for one person to be designated to lead the team. It is likely that the person with the greatest legal authority for the incident should be selected for this role, for example the MPCU Overall Commander.
13.21 In any salvage incident like that of SEA EMPRESS which is clearly of national significance, MPCU will be fully involved and seeking to influence the salvage operations. This, along with their greater legal authority, should be recognised and MPCU should accept full responsibility for their role. This might be achieved by intervening, positively and in general terms, at an early stage and then leading the onshore management team. The salvors' broad plans should be submitted to the Marine Team for approval of the team thus eliciting a single considered response
13.22 A small authoritative Marine Team, such as that outlined above should be available 24 hours a day to assist the salvors, debrief pilots and others coming off the casualty and monitor the situation. They should be dedicated to the purpose and they should have the facility to seek local and specialist advice. They should be represented on board the casualty by a properly briefed and experienced person whenever the casualty is manned and official communications between the casualty and the Marine Team should be channelled through this one person.
13.23 The Marine Team and its clear role to assist the salvor should be made known to the salvors at the earliest opportunity.
14. INTERVENTION
General
14.1 A number of problems were encountered during the six day salvage operation. As these problems unfolded there were demands that the Secretary of State for Transport powers of intervention should be invoked either by the Secretary of State himself or by those to whom they are delegated. This section of the Report discusses those powers, together with other powers of direction, to determine whether or not they should have been invoked and whether they are adequate in the circumstances of an incident of the magnitude of SEA EMPRESS.
Powers of Intervention
14.2 The powers derive from the Intervention Convention 1969 and Article 221 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). They are currently set out in section 137 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 and the Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Pollution) (Intervention) Order 1980 and permit the Secretary of State for Transport to intervene after an accident has occurred to a vessel which will cause pollution or has the potential to cause pollution to UK waters and/or the UK coastline.
14.3 Three conditions have to be met before the powers are exercisable. These are:
- an accident has occurred to or in a vessel (this includes, but is not limited to, the loss, stranding, abandonment of, or damage to a vessel); and
- in the opinion of the Secretary of State, or the person acting on his behalf, oil or other harmful substance from the vessel will or may cause pollution on a large scale in the United Kingdom or in the territorial waters thereof; and
- in the opinion of the Secretary of State, or the person acting on his behalf, the use of the powers is urgently needed.
When the above three conditions have been met directions may be given in respect of the vessel or its cargo. These directions can only be given to the following people:
14.4 A direction can require the person to whom it is given to take or refrain from taking any action of any kind whatsoever, including requiring the vessel to be moved, or not to be moved to a specified place; the vessel to be removed from a specified place or locality; the oil or other cargo to be or not to be unloaded or discharged; and specified salvage measures to be or not to be taken. However, in a case where the powers to give directions are considered to be inadequate or are proved to be inadequate, the Secretary of State, or the person acting on his behalf, can take any action of any kind whatsoever including, but not limited to, sinking or destroying the vessel.
14.5 The Secretary of State for Transport's powers of intervention are exercisable by the Chief Executive of The Coastguard Agency, the Director of MPCU or the Chief Coastguard. These persons can also further delegate the powers to a Coastguard Regional Controller or Deputy Regional Controller by name for a specific incident.
14.6 In circumstances where the intervention powers are enforced there is provision for compensation to be paid by the Secretary of State for Transport. This would happen only when:
- the action directed or taken was not reasonable to prevent or reduce pollution or the risk of pollution; or
- the action taken or directed was such that the good that it did or was likely to do, was disproportionately less than the expense incurred or the damage suffered as a result of the action.
Wherever possible, the person exercising the powers should seek Ministerial consent before intervening. Where this is not possible the designated persons have the authority to act without consent, however they are advised, where practicable, to seek legal and professional advice. It is obvious that the Secretary of State for Transport would also need to seek similar advice before giving an intervention order.
Harbour Master's Powers
14.7 In addition to the Secretary of State for Transport's powers of intervention, a Harbour Master also has powers to direct those in control of a vessel. Under the Dangerous Vessels Act 1985 he may give directions to those in charge of a vessel, where:
- there is grave or imminent danger to the safety of any person or property; or
- there is grave or imminent risk that the vessel may, by sinking or foundering in the harbour, prevent or seriously prejudice the use of the harbour by other vessels.
The direction may prohibit the vessel's entry into, or require its removal from, the harbour.
A Harbour Master has further powers under The Dangerous Substances in Harbour Areas Regulations 1987, namely to:
- regulate or prohibit the entry into;
- require the removal from;
- regulate the handling, movement or position within;
the harbour or harbour area of a vessel which is carrying a dangerous substance and where there is a risk to the safety of any person because of the condition of the substance or of the vessel.
14.8 MHPA also has extensive powers under the Milford Haven Conservancy Act 1983 to give directions and even, in extreme cases, take control of a vessel in the harbour which is sunk, stranded or abandoned and is discharging oil or, in the opinion of MHPA, is likely to discharge oil into the Haven or into adjacent waters. However, no directions will be given if, in the opinion of MHPA, every practicable measure is being taken with all reasonable diligence for the purposes of preventing or reducing oil pollution, or the risk of oil pollution.
14.9 It might appear that there could be conflicts between the powers of the Secretary of State for Transport and those of the Harbour Master. However the Secretary of State can overrule a direction given by a Harbour Master and in the Dangerous Vessels Act it is stated that directions given by a Harbour Master shall not affect the exercise by the Secretary of State of his powers of intervention and direction. Also, with respect to the Milford Haven Conservancy Act it is apparent that, although the Harbour Master has specific responsibilities to protect the safety and commercial interests of the port, where there is danger of large scale pollution, the Secretary of State and the person with his delegated authority has the overriding authority.
14.10 As reputable salvors had been appointed and were expending effort to bring the incident to a successful conclusion, it is considered that MHPA did not have cause to use their powers during the SEA EMPRESS incident.
Possible use of the Powers of Intervention
14.11 The powers of intervention were conceived for dealing with a situation where those in control of a polluting or potentially polluting vessel were blatantly not complying with the wishes of the Secretary of State for Transport by failing to employ competent salvors for instance or by refusing to take a tow or refusing to proceed to a designated safe haven, or were unable to proceed with the salvage operations due to unforeseen developments. It was not envisaged that they would be used to intervene in a situation where competent salvors were clearly doing all they could to bring a salvage incident to a successful conclusion.
14.12 A reputable firm of international salvors was appointed in the early stages of the SEA EMPRESS incident and the Secretary of State for Transport monitored the salvage through the MEOR, the MPCU advisers on board the vessel and MPCU representatives ashore. For the powers of intervention to be used, the Secretary of State through the Overall Commander would have to make a judgement that an alternative course of action to that proposed, or being followed, by the salvors should be pursued. Broadly speaking there are two reasons why the Overall Commander might hold a different opinion to that of the professional salvors. They are that the advice given to the Overall Commander disputes the professional salvors' judgement or it is believed they have been influenced by commercial considerations in forming their judgement to the detriment of the wider public interest.
14.13 It is considered highly unlikely that a situation could have arisen in the SEA EMPRESS incident where the first of these reasons would have applied with the level of confidence necessary for intervention to be considered. Those advising the Overall Commander did not have the expertise or experience of commercial salvage on the scale of SEA EMPRESS which would enable their opinion to counter the considered professional opinion of a reputable international salvage organisation such as Smit Tak. It is possible that the salvors' plan had not been thoroughly thought through, but the proper course of action in such a circumstance would have been to advise the salvors of this fact in order to avoid the need to intervene. Intervention might have been provoked by the second set of circumstances outlined above, but this is considered improbable for the following reasons.
14.14 Possible commercial factors that would influence the salvors' plans might arise from the salvors' own considerations, or from restrictions placed on them by another party such as the Harbour Master. However the 1989 Salvage Convention (incorporated into Lloyd's Form of Salvage Agreement) effectively guarantees to the salvor who is assisting a vessel which by herself or her cargo threatens damage to the environment, a refund of all expenses incurred, plus, if the service actually prevents or minimises damage to the environment, a "bonus" of up to 100% of the expenses (see Annex A). This is designed to give the salvor more freedom of action in the case of a casualty which threatens to cause environmental damage but where the potential salved value is small, and should, therefore, reduce the likelihood of commercial considerations influencing the salvors' decisions.
14.15 Another factor that should be taken into account is the effect on the salvors' conduct of the salvage operation of invoking the intervention powers. Although the Secretary of State for Transport can give directions to any salvor that specified salvage measures are to be, or are not to be, taken it is questionable whether the exercise of such powers would ever be appropriate where a salvage contract has been concluded between the owners of the casualty and a reputable salvor such as Smit Tak. The conduct of a salvage operation demands a high degree of original thought in conditions of danger and stress, and action by outsiders, even governments, could be perceived as interference.
14.16 It is concluded that, whatever the strict rules of law, if the Secretary of State for Transport had seriously interfered with the conduct of the SEA EMPRESS salvage operations, there was a realistic possibility of the salvage team walking off the job. This is not to say that a salvor such as Smit Tak would have flagrantly disregarded their obligations under the salvage contract, but the motivation and management of the personnel involved would inevitably have deteriorated, and the salvage operation would have been prolonged even further with the risk of increased damage to the vessel and increased loss of cargo and pollution.
14.17 In the SEA EMPRESS situation, intervention was the ultimate sanction to be held in the background as the symbol of the Government's legal authority but its use would have been restricted to extraordinary circumstances and even then with extreme care. The very existence of the powers should, in all but the most extreme circumstances, be sufficient to influence the salvors and avoid a confrontational situation.
Actual use of the powers
14.18 The Secretary of State for Transport did not intervene in the SEA EMPRESS incident but on one occasion actions taken did give rise to confusion as to whether he had or was about to. It was after the unsuccessful float-off attempt on Tuesday evening when one of the senior MPCU representatives ashore called a meeting with senior representatives of the owners, salvors and MHPA. At the meeting the salvors were told to consider all possible solutions to the problem irrespective of costs. It is arguable whether this actually constituted intervention. The salvors were told to consider radical solutions but not to actually carry them out.
14.19 Although the Secretary of State for Transport did not intervene the powers of intervention were the basis for his authority in the salvage incident. The Secretary of State for Transport representatives held a broadly termed intervention notice ready to use if it became necessary but their policy was to monitor the situation, approve all plans and try to influence the salvage by persuasion and only to intervene as a last resort.
14.20 MPCU did not have the expertise, experience or resources to take control of the salvage from the salvors. The Secretary of State for Transport needed the salvors and MPCU needed to work with them to form and expedite the plan. Reputable salvors had been engaged and they were clearly expending effort under difficult circumstances. As long as they continued with their efforts use of the powers of intervention would have been inappropriate except, perhaps, to assist the salvors to overrule any decisions imposed on them by others.
14.21 Unless and until MPCU intervened for the Secretary of State for Transport, the Harbour Master remained in charge ashore and the salvor in charge on board. It follows that unless and until the Secretary of State intervened the responsibility for the salvage lay firmly with the salvors and to a lesser extent MHPA. In order to ensure that commercial considerations do not outweigh those of the greater public interest it is suggested that consideration be given to changing the guidelines on the use of the intervention powers to allow an intervention in general terms at the beginning of a salvage incident like that of SEA EMPRESS. Such an intervention notice should be worded so as to firmly place those representing the Secretary of State for Transport alongside and working with the salvors and, where necessary, accepting responsibility for their role and influence. It is considered that, if properly managed, this would provide a firm foundation for the planning and execution of a potentially catastrophic salvage incident like that of SEA EMPRESS. On Tuesday evening the salvors were told by the senior MPCU advisor to plan as if costs were not a consideration. There is an argument that this should have been the case throughout the incident. It is not possible to identify with certainty whether the outcome would have been altered had it been so, however, it is possible to speculate that more tugs might have been mobilised at an early stage and greater consideration might have been given to the other early options.
Possible Changes to the Intervention Powers
14.22 It is accepted that the 'stick' of intervention needs to be available for wielding against irresponsible owners and masters and incompetent salvors. However it should be recognised that, in other circumstances, the powers can be used positively. In this respect if they had a wider application they could be a powerful tool to assist competent salvors in the expedition of complicated and controversial salvage incidents.
When considering changes to the intervention laws, particular consideration should be given to including the power to issue a direction straight to a Harbour Authority, harbour master or pilot, or the power to intervene in the chartering of lightening tonnage, tugs and helicopters. In the former case such intervention powers could be used to ensure that a casualty threatening pollution damage is allowed to enter a port of refuge. This would, incidently, be a recognition of the Government's treaty obligations under Article 11 of the Salvage Convention. It is recognised that this would involve legislation and, in application, possibly involve Government in compensation but it is felt that wider powers coupled with a positive approach could substantially assist in bringing a future incident to a successful conclusion.
15. SALVAGE OPTIONS
15.1 During the whole of the salvage operation the casualty was within the confines of the 'pool'. The Inquiry has examined whether there were other options open to the salvors, and if so, whether they were feasible options and also whether they were known to the salvors.
Option to take the Casualty to Sea.
15.2 At several points during the salvage operation the prospect of taking the casualty to sea was raised and discussed and, with one exception, always rejected. Many observers, not directly involved with the operation, have in their submissions to the Inquiry suggested that the pollution could have been largely avoided if the casualty had been taken to sea at the earliest opportunity. The arguments for and against taking the casualty to sea are discussed here.
15.3 Initially the casualty was being held in the 'pool'. This was a difficult task in such an exposed location where movement of the casualty was limited by the surrounding rock shoals. Due to the worsening weather and growing tidal strength the salvors' task was becoming increasingly difficult. Some parties were of the opinion that it was imperative to remove the casualty from the 'pool' at the earliest opportunity. Taking the casualty to sea would remove her from these dangers and allow her freedom to manoeuvre.
15.4 Taking the casualty to sea was first seriously proposed in the 12 hours after the initial grounding. At this time the casualty was listed by about 10° to starboard and trimmed by her head so that the forward starboard deck edge was immersed. She was no longer leaking significant quantities of oil but, because of the fear of renewed oil losses and increasing her draught even further, she could not be brought upright. The extent of the structural damage to the casualty was not known. It is probable that the damaged cargo tanks were no longer protected by inert gas, and inert gas could not be fed to them via the casualty's inert gas main because of the significant starboard list. The damaged Starboard Ballast tanks contained a hazardous atmosphere due to contamination by oil and these tanks were not protected by the casualty's inert gas system. The pump room was flooded with a mixture of sea water and oil, although it was anticipated that it could be pumped out by submersible salvage pumps. Clearly the casualty was not in a seaworthy condition. Consequently, it would have been imprudent to instruct the Master to take her to sea into an impending gale. The lives of all on board would have been put at risk by such an action, especially when one considers that the rescue services would have had to travel greater distances to perform their task thus prolonging the time required to evacuate the personnel.
15.5 The width of the navigable channel between the 'pool' and the open sea which would have been available to SEA EMPRESS - at a draught of 23.5 metres - was only about 220 metres, in effect about half the width at her original entry draught and some 50 metres less than her overall length. With her starboard list and head trim the casualty's manoeuvring characteristics would have been unpredictable and she would have been difficult to handle. Even neglecting the effects of wind and tide, and allowing for tug assistance, the transit of such a narrow entrance by a vessel in this condition would have allowed little room for error or equipment failure. The probability of the casualty touching the hard rocky sides of the entrance must be considered as having been high. If her engine room had consequently been holed she would most certainly have foundered, possibly blocking the entrance to the West Channel and possibly with the loss of all her remaining 127,500 tonnes of cargo and 2,300 tonnes of heavy fuel oil (see Section 19). Further, the subsequent wreck removal operation would have taken some considerable time during which the West Channel to the port would have been closed.
15.6 If it had been decided to take SEA EMPRESS to sea she would have had to negotiate the channel at a much lower speed than the normal 10 knot entry speed and she would thus have been exposed to the effect of the tidal streams for a longer period. In hindsight, and considering in particular the misjudgment of the tidal current which occurred on the evening of Saturday 17 February, it cannot be confidently concluded that the casualty would have successfully negotiated the narrow entrance of the Haven to the open sea.
15.7 Notwithstanding the difficulties of negotiating the entrance, of equal importance in considering the decision to take the casualty out to sea would have been an assessment of the consequences of this action if it had been successful. One such consequence would have been further oil losses as the casualty rose and fell in the seaway. This oil would have been pumped out of the vents to the damaged cargo tanks by the wave action, as occurred when the casualty was floating free on Sunday 18 February.
15.8 Another consideration was that, assuming that the salvors remained with the casualty, there would have been the considerable problem of successfully removing the 127,500 tonnes of oil remaining on board (see Annex D). The salvage work on the casualty's inclined and exposed deck would have been an extremely hazardous operation with large areas of the deck awash in any significant seaway. In addition, having removed the casualty further from the port, the logistical problems of transporting salvage equipment and personnel would have increased. The berthing of lightening tankers alongside the casualty at sea would also depend heavily on the sea state in order to prevent damage to both vessels. Thus the salvage operation would have become extended and acutely dependent upon the prevailing weather conditions.
15.9 Additionally, once out of territorial waters, it would have been likely that the casualty would not have been allowed back in to seek the sheltered waters necessary to complete the salvage operations. In the case of ANDROS PATRIA in 1978, this stricken tanker was not allowed to enter any of the closest states' territorial waters and was towed to the southern part of the North Atlantic where the calmer conditions were more suitable to carry out the salvage operations. SEA EMPRESS's damaged condition could have deteriorated further in the prolonged time necessary to shift her to other waters, increasing the danger to the vessel.
15.10 A major consideration of, particularly, the salvors was the potential problem of returning the lightened casualty to Milford Haven or to any other port for the removal of the bulk of her cargo. There is no evidence to suggest that UK ports would be unwilling to accept the badly damaged casualty at a later stage of the salvage, but if they were the Secretary of State could, under the intervention powers, direct the casualty to a specific sheltered area. Nevertheless, the Salvage Master had, from previous experience, a quite understandable concern regarding this problem. One can only speculate as to the likely response of the authorities, public opinion, environmental groups and the media to a request from SEA EMPRESS to return to Milford Haven to complete the discharge of her cargo.
15.11 The salvors expressed the valid concern that damaged steelwork was hanging down from the bottom of the casualty as a result of the grounding, so effectively increasing her draught. When the casualty was safely alongside the Herbrandston Jetty, she was surveyed by the salvors' divers. The divers found that areas of steel structure were indeed hanging from the underside of the casualty over a length of some 30 metres in way of No 4 Starboard Ballast tank. In some places the steel extended 7 to 8 metres below the keel. Whether this was present at the outset of the salvage operation or whether this was the result of later groundings cannot be known. However, it has to be recognised that any structure which is hanging below the casualty is present because it has been torn out of the bottom or side of the casualty and is thus likely to be heavily distorted and relatively loosely attached to the main body of the hull. If it caught on the seabed the momentum of the casualty, even at only 2 knots, would be more than sufficient (probably by one or two orders of magnitude) to destroy the unwanted link. Thus the Inquiry does not consider that steel structure hanging from the underside of the casualty would unduly impede her progress or lead to further significant damage. The subsequent unrestrained movements of the casualty over the ensuing four days supports this contention. Nevertheless, taking account of all the other considerations the Inquiry concludes that the decision not to take the casualty to sea was correct.
Option to take the Casualty directly to Herbrandston Jetty.
15.12 In the very early stages of the salvage operation during period 1 (Annex D) a number of alternatives to holding SEA EMPRESS in the 'pool' were considered. One of these was to take the casualty directly to Herbrandston Jetty. The controlling factor in considering this possibility was the draught of SEA EMPRESS. She was listing to starboard with a maximum draught of 23.5 metres forward, therefore even with the six metres of tide predicted for 0342 hrs on Friday, her draught was too great to allow the casualty to be moved out of the 'pool'.
15.13 The possibility of reducing the draught of the casualty by the addition of sea water ballast so that she could be brought directly to the Herbrandston Jetty has been examined by the Inquiry. The conclusion was reached that by cross-flooding No 2 Port Ballast tank from the breached No 2 Starboard Ballast tank, and cross-flooding No 4 Port Ballast tank from the breached No 4 Starboard Ballast tank and then pressing up the Port tank to maximum capacity, and filling the Aft Peak with either of the two engine room bilge pumps, a draught of about 20.5 metres could have been achieved.
15.14 To carry out such an operation would take some time. If it had been commenced on Friday it is assumed that a draught of about 20.5 metres could have been achieved by the Saturday afternoon high water. The minimum charted depth in the main channel from the 'pool' to Herbrandston Jetty is 16.3 metres and the height of tide on Saturday afternoon was predicted to be 6.8 metres. Taking into account that a reasonable time for the casualty to travel to the Jetty would be about one and a half hours a tidal height of greater than 6.5 metres would have been held during the transit. Therefore the maximum draught on which the casualty could travel up the channel to the Jetty would have been, 16.3 metres (minimum charted depth) + 6.5 metres (height of tide) = 22.8 metres. With a safety margin of 10% this draught would be reduced to 20.73 metres. Therefore bringing the casualty in at a draught of about 20.5 metres would have been a practical alternative but one not without risk.
15.15 The Inquiry is concerned that the merits of this practical alternative were not discussed by the Marine Team and indeed that the Marine Team in general were not aware that the option existed.
15.16 The Inquiry does not wish to suggest that this alternative course of action should have been followed, this would be unfair since such a suggestion can only be made with the full benefit of hindsight. Operational decisions are made on the basis of the information which is available at that time. However, this significant item of information did not come to light and it is important to understand why this was.
15.17 It is clear that from the earliest stages MPCU's preferred option was to hold the casualty in the 'pool' for a lightening operation. All the immediate preparations were with this end in mind. This option had one overwhelming attraction that if it was successful there would have been no further oil lost from the casualty. Up to this point the casualty had lost less than 2,500 tonnes and significant oil losses had ceased. The option to bring the casualty directly into Herbrandston Jetty was dismissed without detailed analysis because it was not thought to be possible but, most influentially, it would have involved reducing the list of the casualty with the likelihood of a renewed loss of oil. It was unthinkable that any action could be sanctioned which would have directly resulted in additional pollution.
15.18 The Harbour Master relied upon MPCU to advise him of the best course of action. Their recommendation to lighten the casualty was received favourably because this strategy had proved entirely successful in dealing with BORGA only three and a half months previously.
15.19 Initially however, both the pilots and the MPCU salvage advisers made strong representations to the Harbour Master that the casualty could not be held in the 'pool' through the impending gale without additional tugs. With the arrival on Saturday morning of the tugs ANGLIAN EARL (84 tbp) and ESKGARTH (50 tbp), and the decision to turn the casualty, their concerns appeared to have been removed, and thus the single important objection to the proposed salvage strategy had been resolved.
15.20 The salvors had examined the possibility of reducing the casualty's draught, and had calculated that a minimum draught of about 19.17 metres could have been achieved by pressurising the damaged ballast tanks. This fact was never made known to the Marine Team, and there appear to be two reasons for this. One is that the salvors did not consider that a proposal which would involve the likelihood of a further limited oil loss would have been approved. The other is that the Harbour Master indicated that he would permit a maximum draught of only 18.3 metres.
15.21 When the draught limit of 18.3 metres was stated, the Harbour Master had no idea that it was possible for the casualty's draught to be reduced without a lightening operation to the point where, on the Saturday afternoon high tide, she could negotiate the channel to Herbrandston Jetty with a 10% clearance under her keel. If this information had been tabled it might have influenced his thinking.
15.22 An analysis of this incident has shown that the salvage goal of minimum total pollution is not necessarily achieved by the pursuit of an option which offers the possibility of zero additional pollution. In certain circumstances it may be prudent to tolerate a limited, and hopefully containable, oil loss in order to bring a salvage operation to the earliest conclusion (thus securing the bulk of an oil cargo) rather than to attempt to avoid any further oil loss at all by engaging in a strategy which prolongs the salvage operation. It is therefore essential that in the early stages of an incident the search for a solution has to be as broad as practicable.
15.23 The additional oil loss which may have accompanied the reduction in maximum draught from 23.5 metres to 20.5 metres or 19.17 metres would have been dependent upon the extent of the casualty's side damage, which was of course not known at the time. However, there were two indicators to suggest that side damage was not extensive: firstly, the initial oil loss was relatively small (an estimate of the quantity could have been obtained from MPCU and from this a conservative estimate of the extent of side damage could have been made), and secondly, oil was forced out of the top of the pressure/vacuum valves which suggests that an overpressurisation from the sea equivalent to at least 6 metres head of oil existed, or to put it another way a sea water head of about 22.8 metres was present at the top of the side damage. Given that the maximum observed draught of the casualty was about 23.5 metres in places it is clear that the side damage was not severe and less than 2 metres high. Calculations indicate that the additional oil losses could have been of the following order, depending upon the extent of side damage which is assumed:
