CHAPTER 9 Continued...

The availability of section 1 firearms



The assessment of risk

9.54   If there is a case for placing a restriction on the availability of any particular type of firearm the starting point should be an assessment of the risk which is associated with it. It has often been said that it is not the gun that kills but the man that fires it. No doubt a gun cannot kill if someone does not pull the trigger, but it is right to regard a gun as dangerous and to treat some guns as more dangerous than others. As I observed in Chapter 7 this is one of the principal features of the policy of firearms legislation in this country.

9.55   An assessment of risk involves an examination of two elements in combination - (i) the chances of harm happening; and (ii) the nature and extent of the harm. Drawing on what I have written above I will indicate what seem to me to be the salient considerations.

9.56   As regards the first of these elements, the evidence shows that firearms which are or have been lawfully held are used to a significant but relatively small extent in the commission of crime. Handguns are being used to an ever increasing extent in crime in general. In the case of robberies the increase is greatest but it is unlikely that the handguns used in this category of crime are owned by their perpetrators. It appears that handgun-homicides comprise a very small part of the total of homicides. Handguns are attractive in the ease with which they can be carried and concealed and in the speed with which they can be aimed.

9.57   I have already indicated that there are significant limitations in the extent to which the certification system can be relied upon to exclude persons who are unsuitable. In this connection I note that Mr Michael Yardley in his submission drew attention to what he described as a fundamental problem in modern times - the problem of personal empowerment in mass society. According to him the average person today felt more isolated and alienated than ever before as society became more centralised and less personal. Thus one might expect a shift in the whole normal distribution of human behaviour with, at one side of the curve, ever more bizarre and aggressive behaviour. Unless this problem was addressed, he said, more Dunblanes and Hungerfords were not only possible but likely.

9.58   As regards the second of these elements, the evidence shows that where handguns are fired in the commission of crime there is as great a proportion of fatal results and an even greater proportion of injuries than is the case with shot guns.

9.59   While all firearms are by definition lethal an individual shot from a handgun, depending on the distance and calibre, may well be less lethal than a shot from a shot gun or a rifle. However, the multi-shot handgun, whether it is a self-loading pistol or a revolver, has the capacity by reason of its high rate of fire and speed of aim to kill or injure a greater number of people within a given short space of time than would be possible with any other type of firearm which is legally available; and likewise it provides a greater number of instant opportunities to kill a particular victim. The evidence provided by Mr Penn and Mr Greenwood about the rate of fire of other firearms still leaves a substantial difference.

9.60   I noted that the BSSC in their final submission maintained that the evidence which was given as to an unaimed rate of fire bore no relation to actual events at the school. However, in the light of the evidence it is likely that Thomas Hamilton's shots were to some extent indiscriminate. In any event the point of the evidence as to the rate of fire which a Browning 9 mm semi-automatic pistol was capable of delivering, whether in aimed or unaimed fire, was to demonstrate what was possible. I have no doubt that if Thomas Hamilton had chosen to do so he could have killed every person in the gym. If he had entered on the stage of the Assembly Hall while assembly was in progress (which may have been his original intention) he could have killed and injured far more by indiscriminate shooting. On the other hand Mr Greenwood claimed that few armed criminals fired more than one or two shots. He also stated in his submission that in the other "amok killings", including those at Hungerford, which he listed the rate of fire was not a significant factor. He defined an "amok killing" as being "one in which an unstable individual for no discernible or logical reason kills a number of people who were not known to him".

9.61   There is no way in which the risk of homicide or serious injury through the misuse of legal firearms can be calculated, let alone the risk associated with one particular type of firearm as against another. The instances in which legally held handguns are misused are relatively infrequent. On the other hand the harm which results can be very great, as the shootings at Dunblane Primary School demonstrated, perhaps in a unique manner. Both factors have to be borne in mind. Having considered the evidence I have reached the view that the dangers which are inherent in the availability of self-loading pistols and revolvers which are held for target shooting are so great that there is a case for restricting that availability. I distinguish them from other types of firearm, including rifles, by reason of their combination of ease of carrying and concealment, ease of aim and rapidity of fire. In the light of the evidence I see no good reason for making an exception in the case of any particular calibre of multi-shot handguns.

9.62   If there is a case for restricting the availability of multi-shot handguns, what form could that restriction take? I will now examine a number of possible measures which were discussed in the Inquiry, seeking answers to these questions:

    • would the measure be practicable?
    • would it be effective, and, if so, to what extent?

Thereafter I will consider the implications of implementing the different measures before coming to my recommendation.

Measures for restricting the availability of handguns in target shooting

Limiting the number of handguns, or the number of a particular calibre, which may be held

9.63   In the White Paper Firearms Act 1968 : Proposals for Reform (1987) Cm 261 the Government commented that the imposition of arbitrary limits on the number of weapons which an individual might possess or a prohibition on the possession of more than one weapon of the same calibre, whilst superficially attractive, would have little significant benefit in terms of control. I agree with that view, which has been supported by the Firearms Consultative Committee and is in line with the current Guidance to the Police in regard to "good reason".

9.64   While Thomas Hamilton took all four of his handguns to the school he used only one in order to fire all the shots at his victims. I see no reason to disagree with the point made by the BSSC that there is nothing to indicate that a shooter would be able to achieve a materially higher rate of fire by changing guns rather than by changing magazines as Thomas Hamilton did.

9.65   If individuals are to continue to be authorised to possess or acquire firearms I consider that it is acceptable that they should be able to justify the holding of more than one, or more than one of the same calibre, on the same basis as at present (cf para 6.29).

Separating handguns from their ammunition

9.66   There is an attraction in the idea that handguns should be in separate hands from their ammunition, except during such time as they are used together on a range. However, whichever way the matter is approached there are substantial problems.

9.67   I consider first the suggestion that handguns should be kept by shooting clubs. While there are some clubs which have the premises and the security which would enable them to keep their members' guns, a large number of clubs do not have any premises at all and are dependent on the Ministry of Defence or other owners for access to shooting ranges. Stirling Rifle and Pistol Club is one example. For such clubs the responsibility for safe storage would fall upon club officials who would have to use their homes. This would involve them accommodating a considerable number of guns, with attendant risks to safety and security. Where clubs have their own premises the concentration of a large number of guns in a single place, often in a remote location, would present an obvious target for organised theft. Upgrading the security of such premises would not necessarily discourage, and might even encourage, attack. In his evidence Mr Penn cited the case in about 1995 in which thieves carried out a highly organised raid on a pistol club in South West London in which they removed the clubhouse roof and used a crane to lift through it a safe weighing some 2.5 tonnes containing a large number of guns. Further, if handguns were kept at club premises or by club officials shooters would no longer be able to practice dry-firing at home.

9.68   It is clear from the evidence that it is common for shooters to travel to clubs or ranges other than their own in order to compete either in teams or as individuals. Where teams are shooting at other clubs or ranges it might be possible to provide some form of arrangements by which a gun was transported to and back from the other location without being in the possession of the individual shooter. But if an individual shooter was to compete elsewhere it appears that it would be necessary to release the handgun to him at some point. I noted that while the Dunblane Snowdrop Petition suggested that, on the basis that the private ownership of handguns should be made illegal and that all firearms held for recreational purposes for use at approved shooting clubs should be held there with the firing mechanisms removed, there should be a pass system to deal with cases where shooters wanted to attend organised shoots at other locations. According to that system, confirmation from the shoot organisers would need to be sent to the individual's club that he was booked on the shoot and payment had been received. A pass for the main body of the firearm would be issued to allow it to be transported to a fixed location. Pass details would include the travel-out date, period at other location and travel-back date as well as the serial number and description of the firearm. Any firearm not returned to the original club by the pass expiry date would be notified immediately to the police, and non-compliance with the authority given by the pass would lead to various possible sanctions. However, the position adopted by the BSSC was that "no matter what system of checks and paperwork is maintained in such circumstances, it would be a simple matter indeed for a shooter intent in recovering his guns to enter a competition, provide evidence to his club secretary that he had done so, recover possession of the complete gun together with ammunition for it, and perpetrate an outrage" and for this reason they regarded such a system as containing a fundamental flaw.

9.69   I noted that ACPO took the view that, despite the inherent risks, storage at the certificate holder's premises was still preferable, while the Police Superintendents' Association of England and Wales and ACPO-S took a different view. It is pointed out in the Green Book (Part II, para 103) that an arrangement for the storage of firearms operates in Hong Kong where all handguns must be kept at shooting ranges or at gun dealers. This may, of course, be easier to arrange within a relatively small territory.

9.70   Many of the same points apply to the suggestion that handguns should require to be stored in a central location, such as the premises of dealers or at police stations.

9.71   While the police at present require dealers to comply with conditions as to security in connection with their registration under section 36 of the 1968 Act, it might well be that additional measures would be required if they were expected to look after the handguns of club members. In the case of many shooters access to a dealer's premises would be difficult. In any event it may be questioned whether any such responsibility should be imposed on dealers whether they like it or not.

9.72   The storage of handguns at police stations would raise similar problems in regard to the provision of secure accommodation and reasonable accessibility. It would also involve the police in what might well be thought to be an inappropriate role in being responsible for looking after shooters' handguns. This suggestion was not supported by ACPO or ACPO-S.

9.73   The converse of the above is that the desired separation should be achieved by the ammunition being stored away from shooters' homes. I note that the White Paper of 1987 concluded (at para 29) that there were serious obstacles to such storage and recommended against it. It was pointed out that many clubs did not have secure facilities and that many serious competitive shooters loaded their own ammunition (ie centrefire ammunition) at home for reasons of economy. It was quite common for shooters to belong to several different clubs and to shoot at a number of ranges and it would be inconvenient and uneconomic for them to store ammunition at each of those premises or to buy a new supply each time they shot. Above all the Government felt that such an approach would be irresponsible in providing large and readily identifiable stores of ammunition which might attract the criminal or the terrorist.

9.74   In their final submissions the BSSC added to such objections. As regards rimfire cartridges, which were not reloaded at home, it might be possible for clubs to provide a reasonable range for purchase. However, a very significant number of shooters, including all serious competitive shooters, would be at a disadvantage as visitors to clubs where they could not count on being able to use the same batch as that for which their gun had been "zeroed". (A gun is "zeroed" when its sight is adjusted for the individual shooter and the ammunition which he is using so that if a known point of aim is taken the bullet should hit the centre of the target.) To have to "re-zero" the gun before starting the competition would be distracting and give an edge to the home team. As regards centrefire cartridges, there could be a similar problem due to variation in factory-made ammunition. Since there was a wider range of brands in the case of centrefire the club might not even be able to stock the same brand as that which the shooter was accustomed to using, let alone the same type and weight of bullet. In any event about 70% of shooters who shot competitively loaded their own ammunition at home according to their own specifications. Reloading in the club was not practicable where the club did not have any premises. In any event it raised questions of safety. Such an operation was best and safest done under conditions of privacy and without distraction. It might well not be practicable to provide a check to prevent shooters removing rounds from the club premises if they were of a mind to do so. Where clubs had no secure storage ammunition would require to be kept at the homes of club officials or elsewhere. This would raise further problems of security, accessibility and accounting.

9.75   I consider that the objections expressed by the Government in the White Paper in 1987 remain valid. As regards the additional points made by the BSSC, which were supported by Mr Penn, unsuitability or lack of club premises provide additional and important grounds for ruling out the suggestion that ammunition should be kept elsewhere than in the homes of shooters.

9.76   It is sufficient for me to say, without having to go further into the question of effectiveness, that I am not satisfied that the proposal for the separation of handguns from their ammunition, whichever method is adopted, is a practical proposition.


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Prepared 16 October 1996